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Abstract 
In this thesis, the channel assignment and routing problems have been investigated for both 
cooperative and competitive Wireless Mesh networks (WMNs). A dynamic and distributed channel 
assignment scheme has been proposed which generates the network topologies ensuring less 
interference and better connectivity. The proposed channel assignment scheme is capable of 
detecting the node failures and mobility in an efficient manner. The channel monitoring module 
precisely records the quality of bi-directional links in terms of link delays. In addition, a Quality of 
Service based Multi-Radio Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (QMR-AODV) routing protocol has 
been devised. QMR-AODV is multi-radio compatible and provides delay guarantees on end-to-end 
paths. The inherited problem of AODV’s network wide flooding has been addressed by selectively 
forwarding the routing queries on specified interfaces. The QoS based delay routing metric, 
combined with the selective route request forwarding, reduces the routing overhead from 24% up to 
36% and produces 40.4% to 55.89% less network delays for traffic profiles of 10 to 60 flows, 
respectively.  
A distributed channel assignment scheme has been proposed for competitive WMNs, where 
the problem has been investigated by applying the concepts from non-cooperative bargaining Game 
Theory in two stages. In the first stage of the game, individual nodes of the non-cooperative setup 
are considered as the unit of analysis, where sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Negotiation-Proof Nash Equilibrium (N-PNE) have been derived.  A 
distributed algorithm, based on non-cooperative bargaining, has been presented with perfect 
information available to the nodes of the network. In the presence of perfect information, each 
node has the knowledge of interference experience by the channels in its collision domain. The 
game converges to N-PNE in finite time and the average fairness achieved by all the nodes is greater 
than 0.79 (79%) as measured through Jain Fairness Index. Since N-PNE and NE are not always a 
system optimal solutions when considered from the end-nodes prospective, the model is further 
extended to incorporate non-cooperative end-users bargaining between two end user’s Mesh 
Access Points (MAPs), where an increase of 10% to 27% in end-to-end throughput is achieved.  
Furthermore, a non-cooperative game theoretical model is proposed for end-users flow 
routing in a multi-radio multi-channel WMNs. The end user nodes are selfish and compete for the 
channel resources across the WMNs backbone, aiming to maximize their own benefit without taking 
care for the overall system optimization. The end-to-end throughputs achieved by the flows of an 
end node and interference experienced across the WMNs backbone are considered as the 
performance parameters in the utility function.  Theoretical foundation has been drawn based on 
the concepts from the Game Theory and necessary conditions for the existence of NE have been 
extensively derived.  A distributed algorithm running on each end node with imperfect information 
has been implemented to assess the usefulness of the proposed mechanism. The analytical results 
have proven that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists with the proposed necessary conditions in 
a game of imperfect information.  Based on a distributed algorithm, the game converges to a stable 
state in finite time. The proposed game theoretical model provides a more reasonable solution with 
a standard deviation of 2.19Mbps as compared to 3.74Mbps of the random flow routing. Finally, the 
Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the system is close to one which shows the efficiency of the proposed 
scheme. 
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1. Chapter 1:  Introduction and Motivation 
 
Introduction and Motivation 
This chapter presents brief background of the problems investigated, motivation of 
work, aim and objectives for undertaking this research. Further, the major contributions and 
the research methodology to achieve them have been described. Finally, this chapter briefly 
outlines the next chapters in this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
 
Channel assignment and routing in multi radio multi-hop environment is a 
challenging issue in recent years because of the possibility to deploy multiple radios on the 
relaying nodes in the recent emerging wireless access networks [1]. The multiple non-
overlapping channels in the free ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) band provides an 
opportunity to the research community to exploit the spectrum for multi radio access 
networks [2], resulting in increased overall network throughput and connectivity through 
communication parallelism.  The channel assignment and routing problems have been 
addressed in several studies ranging from the last mile of traditional cellular mobile 
networks [3] to the specialized Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) [4-5] and Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs) [6]. In all these cases, a single radio per node has been considered 
in the problem formulation. Equipping the wireless relay nodes with multiple radios along 
with assigning multiple non-overlapping channels poses a fundamental question of efficient 
spectrum utilization. Another challenge, which all the emerging access technologies are 
facing, is the gap between the end users demands and the capability of network to ensure 
such Quality of Service (QoS) by filling this gap. Routing, in multi-hop networks, plays an 
important role in providing the efficient end-to-end paths in the end user’s prospective.  
Channel assignment and routing are fundamentally interdependent on each other. 
The aim of channel assignment in a multi radio network is to control the interference as 
much as possible. However, the interference phenomenon cannot be eliminated from the 
networks due to the limited range of frequencies available in the ISM band. Combined with 
Chapter 1 
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routing, the channel assignment can be re-arranged based on the routing loads on links. 
Routing, on the other hand, determines the end-to-end paths across the network between 
any source-destination pair. The path provided by the routing protocol transverses multiple 
links and hence the channel assignment algorithms applied play an important role. To 
address this combined problem of routing and channel assignment, several research studies 
have been carried out [7-9] in the past decade with an implicit focus on the QoS 
provisioning in these networks. However, no such real effort has been made explicitly to 
provide these QoS guarantees to the end users as for as the joint problem of routing and 
channel assignment is concerned in Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs). 
WMNs protocols are extremely distributed due to the self-configuring and self-
healing nature of these networks [10], therefore, each entity in the network can behave 
selfishly by deviating from the standard defined protocol to increase its own benefit from 
the network resources. Since channel assignment plays and important role in the 
performance of WMNs, the selfishness of network entities can exploit it exclusively for their 
own benefit. Therefore, some mechanisms are needed to address the behaviour of these 
selfish nodes inside the network for smooth functioning. In such a competitive network, the 
traditional standard protocols need to be revisited in order to meet these challenges [11].   
1.2 Motivation 
In recent years, the field of wireless networks has witnessed a tremendous growth in 
terms of their deployment and have attracted more users. Such networks have improved 
the people’s life style by keeping them more connected, entertained and have impacted 
their productivity [12]. However, ranging from the traditional cellular access for voice traffic 
to the wireless data access networks for broadband connectivity, each wireless access 
technology faces the same fundamental problems of interference, capacity limitations and 
scalability [13]. The available finite spectrum is the main issue, which limits the capacity and 
growth of wireless networks. On the other hand, the user’s expectations are increasing with 
the passage of time, i.e., the emerging applications like video conferencing, voice 
communication and online games nowadays require real time data transfer.  In a multi user 
network, the main objective is to satisfy the demands put by the end users applications. To 
cope up with the varying demands of end users from the underlying network, each wireless 
technology providers aim at to improve the QoS provisioning mechanisms for smooth 
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functioning of the network and to meet with the customer’s expectations. The emergence 
of IEEE 802.11 based WMNs as the last mile wireless Internet broadband connectivity 
anywhere, anytime and to anyone has provided new avenues in terms of research and the 
user’s satisfaction [14 -15]. Being capable to be equipped with multiple interfaces, the 
WMNs backbone effective capacity can scale up to provide the broadband connectivity to 
the end users by exploiting the free ISM spectrum in the 2.4GHz and 5 GHZ range. However, 
the existence of limited non-overlapping channels in the free ISM band, the multiple 
number of radios per node in the network and the link quality of the end-to-end paths pose 
a limitations as for as the end user’s demands are concerned. This needs that the existing 
protocols should be revisited to accommodate the users’ QoS demands in the current 
WMNs architecture. 
The competitive and selfish nature of nodes poses threat to the network 
performance because of the extremely distributed and self-organizing nature of WMNs. The 
selfishness of network entities can degrade the overall performance during the channel 
assignment and routing leaving it at standstill. To tackle such problems in a competitive 
environment, Game Theory [16] and its employment for balancing the use of network 
resources among the competing users is of tremendous importance.   
The work presented in this thesis is motivated by the following issues in cooperative 
and competitive WMNs: 
1. WMNs are gaining popularity to be deployed as the future broadband access 
networks in the user’s premises due to their static, self-configuring and self- 
organizing nature. The existence of multiple non-overlapping channels, 
assigned to the multi-radios of devices in these networks, results in 
communication parallelism and improves the overall connectivity and 
capacity of the network. Multi-radio Multi-channels (MRMC) Medium Access 
Control (MAC) has gained popularity recently because of their capability to 
increase the wireless networks capacity, connectivity and scale. These 
wireless networks, however, suffer from interference, congestions, packet 
losses and capacity problems due to the wireless nature of the medium. 
Keeping the above limitations in mind, it is necessary to design a channel 
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assignment scheme, which is dynamic, distributive and works with simple 
operations.  
2. The QoS requirements of the end users increase with time and the network 
should be able to meet them. The most important requirement for the 
emerging voice and video applications is the delay guarantees on the end-to- 
end paths. For this reason, the routing protocols, which are designed over 
MRMC capable wireless networks, should be re-investigated to provide paths 
matching for these QoS demands of the delay sensitive video and audio 
applications. 
3. The channel assignment and routing are two separate problems but are 
highly interdependent. Being located at the two different layers of the 
protocol stack, an efficient solution should be provided to interlink the two. 
4. Channel assignment in competitive WMNs is a challenging issue because the 
network routers are located in multiple collision domains and a mechanism is 
needed to cope with the selfish behaviour of these nodes during channel 
assignment. Game Theory provides an efficient solution for tackling the 
selfish behaviour because of its ability to model individual decision makers 
whose decisions can potentially affect other’s decisions. 
5. The WMNs provide the wireless backbone for the Internet access where the 
routers are spread over multiple collision domains. Being equipped with 
multiple radios assigned to multiple non-overlapping channels, there can be 
multiple paths across the backbone from the end users to the Gateways 
destinations. The selfishness of end users during the path selection on end-
to-end basis in the interference-constrained topology of WMNs can 
potentially degrade their individual fairness and the network performance as 
a result. This selfish behaviour should be tackled in order to provide the 
smooth functioning of the network. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives  
 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to design and implement channel 
assignment and routing for 802.11 based Multi-Radios Multi-Channels cooperative and 
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competitive (i.e. non-cooperative) WMNs. The main objectives are to provide QoS to the 
end users and ensure the fairness among the competing nodes. The research aims and 
objectives are summarized as follows: 
1. To utilize the non-overlapping multiple channels effectively and efficiently by 
providing a distributive and dynamic channel assignment scheme. 
2. The research aims to design a distributed and dynamic joint channel 
assignment and routing protocol capable of providing the required QoS as 
demanded by the end users. 
3. To ensure the link quality, design an efficient mechanism at MAC layer to 
provide input to the routing protocol during the decision making process. 
4. The research also aims at to design Game Theoretical models for channel 
assignment in non-cooperative MRMC WMNs. The objective is to look at the 
channel assignment, taking the nodes of the network as the unit of analysis, 
by providing solutions from the non-cooperative alternating offer braining 
game theory. Further, it also aimed at to look at the channel assignment from 
the end user’s prospective and to provide QoS and throughput enhancements 
using concepts from non-cooperative bargaining games. 
5. To solve the selfish routing problem in a non-cooperative MRMC WMNs by 
using the concept of Game Theory. The research aims at to use the non-
cooperative game theory to provide maximum fairness during the flow 
routing of the end user nodes across the network backbone. 
 
1.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in the research area of channel assignment and 
routing considering the IEEE 802.11 based WMNs. These two research issues have been 
addressed jointly considering the QoS requirements of the end nodes in cooperative WMNs. 
Further, a channel assignment and routing scheme has been developed for non-cooperative 
WMNs. The issues of QoS for the end users and fairness among them have been thoroughly 
investigated. The key contributions are summarized as follows:   
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1. A minimum interference channel assignment scheme has been developed for 
assigning multiple non-overlapping channels, as present in the IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 
802.11b/g standards, to the multiple radios of the mesh backbone routers. The 
channel assignment scheme has the following capabilities.  
a. The channel assignment scheme ensures the minimum interference 
among the nodes of the network and provides maximum connectivity. 
b. It can be initiated from any point in the WMNs backbone and 
therefore gives the freedom to the network planners to initiate the 
process based on the network load in a specific region of the WMNs 
backbone. 
c. It is capable to record accurately and maintain the bi-directional link 
quality by measuring the delays on specific associated links between 
any two nodes. This delay metric is further utilized by the routing 
protocol for determining the end- to-end paths across the WMNs 
backbone on source-destination basis. 
d. The channel assignment scheme quickly responds to the routing load, 
mobility and nodes failures by re-assigning the channels when and 
where necessary. 
 
2. A QoS based routing scheme has been proposed to provide end-to-end 
guarantees to the applications in terms of path delays. The proposed scheme has the 
following properties. 
a. It is based on the Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing 
protocol and paths are established whenever it is necessary.  
b. The network wide flooding phenomenon associated with the on-
demand routing protocols has been controlled based on selective 
forwarding on specific interfaces. The routing module only forwards 
the routing requests on those interfaces which qualify the end user’s 
QoS bounds.  
c. The routing protocol, combined with the channel assignment module, 
ensures end-to-end paths according to the end users delay 
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requirements. This scheme enhances the packet delivery ratio by 
eliminating the flood of unnecessary route request packets and the 
overall latency of the network is minimized.  This further provides a 
mechanism of load balancing across the WMNs backbone by avoiding 
the already congested links to establish routes between end users and 
the gateway destinations. 
 
3. A game theoretic model has been developed for assigning channels to the 
multiple radios of the WMNs backbone routers by considering the non-cooperative 
environment. The WMNs routers are assumed to be in multiple collision domains 
and the interference phenomena is captured by using the concept from the graph 
theory. The channel assignment scheme has been formulated by considering a two 
stage static non-cooperative game.  
a. The WMNs backbone is partitioned into multiple collision domains by 
using the concepts from Conflict Graphs (CG). Channels are assigned 
to the interfaces in a distributed manner, where each node is 
considered a self maximizer entity. Solution is provided using the 
concepts of non-cooperative bargaining game theory. 
b. An end user non-cooperative bargaining scheme has been proposed. 
In the second stage of the game, the end users Mesh Access Points 
(MAPs) come into contact with each others and bargain on the 
channels in their end-to- end paths. Two Mesh Access Points bargain 
with each other when the channels exchange, in their end-to-end 
paths, has an advantage for one in terms of throughput and for other 
in terms of money. This channel exchange has been modelled with a 
non-cooperative bargaining game, where information is considered as 
imperfect.  
 
4. A selfish flow routing scheme in non-cooperative multiple radio multiple 
channels WMNs has been developed. End users of the network are selfish and non-
cooperative aiming to route their flows across the end-to-end paths of the WMNs 
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backbone with high utility. The Game Theoretic model provides a solution to 
balance the traffic on the individual links. 
a. The selfish flow routing over MRMC WMNs was modelled using the 
non-cooperative games. The necessary conditions for the existence of 
NE were derived.  
b. A distributed algorithm running on each end node was developed 
which aims to establish links across the end-to-end paths from source 
to destination. The fairness issues were addressed in the model. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology used for conducting the research presented in this thesis 
is summarized as follows: 
1. In the beginning phase, an extensive literature review was conducted of the 
present and past research work done in the area of channel assignment and 
routing in both cooperative and non-cooperative WMNs. During this stage, 
the IEEE standards, routing protocols RFCs, sate of the art related to the 
issues addressed and Game Theory concepts were studied and investigated.  
2.  Literature review was followed by the implementation phase which included 
the development of channel assignment scheme for multi radio WMNs and a 
multi radio extension for the AODV routing protocol. Conventional AODV 
works only with a single radio by disseminating the routing packets over a 
single interface. This was followed by implementing the delay metric for the 
proposed routing protocol. The performance of the proposed scheme was 
measured by carrying out extensive simulations with adequate confidence 
interval (averaging 20 independent runs) and the results in terms of delay, 
packet loss, packet delivery ratio and response time were compared taking 
Multi-Radio AODV (AODV-MR) [17,18] as a comparison benchmark. For 
channel assignment to the multiple radios, the protocol has been 
implemented on the guidelines as in [26]. The link monitoring and cross layer 
functionalities have been added by modifying the various files at MAC and 
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routing layers. Network Simulator2 (NS-2) version 2.34 [19] was used as 
implementation and testing platform. The code was compiled and tested 
under the Linux Kernel version 2.6.34 in the openSUSE [20] version 11.3 
platform. NS2 is an open source discrete event simulator which provides 
interfaces to develop new protocols at various layers of the Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) [21] protocol stack. Necessary 
modifications were made to various libraries, header functions and C++ files 
at MAC as well as Network Layers for the implementation of the proposed 
schemes. Scripts were written in the Tool Command Language (TCL) for 
network topology generation and traffic profile definitions in the testing 
phase. 
3. In the Chapter 3, for the designing of QoS based routing and channel 
assignment, the protocol model was followed as compared to the physical 
model [13]. The protocol model enables the nodes to know about the degree 
of interference on the various channels/links, available in their vicinity, 
through the exchange of messages. The physical model, on the other hand, 
provides more accurate information about the interference on the channels 
by deploying some specialized hardware on each node. Although, the physical 
model for measuring the interference is more accurate and precise due to its 
capability to take measurements through the signal strength; however, 
protocol model was considered in this work due to its cost effectiveness. 
4. For physical propagation, the TwoRayGround reflection model was used in 
the NS-2 simulations. The two-ray ground reflection model considers both the 
direct path and a ground reflection path. It has been proved in studies that 
this model gives more accurate prediction at a long distance than the free 
space model [22].    
5. For channel assignment and flow routing schemes in competitive WMNs, a 
thorough understanding of the Game Theory concepts was obtained and the 
utility functions were designed for each issue. The proposed algorithms for 
the schemes were implemented in MATLAB [23] version R2007a under the 
Linux Kernel version 2.6.34 in the openSUSE version 11.3 platform. MATLAB 
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provides an easy and interactive programming environment for mathematical 
and numerical algorithm implementation. It allows matrix manipulation 
which best suits the Game Theoretic models proposed.  
6. The Stanford GraphBase version 3.4e [24] program was used for generating 
the graphs for the topologies of the networks under the Linux Kernel version 
2.6.34  in the openSUSE version 11.3 platform. For channel assignment and 
flow routing in the competitive WMNs, the results were validated by taking 
the average of 40 independent runs to get the appropriate confidence.  For 
channel assignment in the competitive WMNs, the work of [25] was taken as 
a base and benchmark model and the results obtained for the proposed 
algorithms were compared in terms of achieved throughput and fairness. The 
results were analyzed with an in depth discussion of their fairness 
capabilities. Further, the results of the proposed end-users bargaining were 
compared with the N-PNE outcome of the first stage of the game. For flow 
routing in the competitive WMNs, the obtained results from the proposed 
game theoretic models were compared with the random selection scheme, 
where flows of the end users select the end-to-end paths across multiple 
collision domain WMNs through the standard protocol’s deviation in the 
absence of game theoretical model.  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters, beginning with this introductory chapter which 
provides a brief synopsis of the whole thesis. Chapter-2 presents the history and 
fundamental concepts of Game Theory and its applications in various telecommunication 
systems. This chapter provides a base later for chapter 4 and 5, where the non-cooperative 
game theory has been applied to solve the channel assignment and routing problems in 
competitive WMNs.  
Chapter-3 provides a brief introduction to WMNs, channel assignment and routing in 
these networks. A comprehensive literature review has been outlined and discussed with 
the merits and demerits of each.  Further, the proposed channel assignment and routing 
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schemes in cooperative WMNs are presented in the same chapter. The chapter ends with 
the comprehensive performance evaluation of the proposed schemes. 
In chapter-4, a channel assignment scheme has been presented in competitive 
WMNs. The problem is addressed by using the concepts from non-cooperative game theory 
by proposing a two non-cooperative game theoretical models, with perfect information in 
the first one and imperfect information in the second stage of the game. The network is 
represented by a standard as well as Conflict Graph to capture the interference among links 
and the nodes. Various conditions for the existence of the N-PNE have been proved. This 
chapter also outlines two algorithms for channel assignment and re-assignment in the 
competitive WMNs. The chapter ends with the performance evaluation of the presented 
scheme and conclusion. 
Chapter-5 addresses the issue of flow routing in non-cooperative WMNs. Similar to 
chapter-4, a graph theoretic model has been presented for the representation of network 
topology. Selfish end users routing over WMNs has been modeled as a non-cooperative 
game, where the proposed scheme has been proved with extensive analytical analysis and 
the conditions for the distributed algorithm have been outlined. The chapter ends with the 
performance evaluation of the proposed scheme and the summary of the chapter. 
Finally, chapter-6 concludes the research findings of the thesis and suggests future 
work that may be carried out in connection with the research presented in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
12 
 
 
     
1.7 References 
[1]  Y. Zhang and H. Hu, Wireless Mesh Networking: Architectures, Protocols and 
Standards. Auerbach Pub, 2006. 
[2]  Akyildiz, I. F., Wang, X., & Wang, W, Wireless mesh networks: A survey. Computer 
Networks, 47(4), 445-487, 2005. 
[3]  I. Katzela and M. Naghshineh, "Channel assignment schemes for cellular mobile 
telecommunication systems: A comprehensive survey," Personal Communications, 
IEEE, vol. 3, pp. 10-31, 1996. 
[4]  S. L. Wu, C. Y. Lin, Y. C. Tseng and J. L. Sheu, "A new multi-channel MAC protocol 
with on-demand channel assignment for multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks," in 
Parallel Architectures, Algorithms and Networks, 2000. I-SPAN 2000. Proceedings. 
International Symposium on, pp. 232-237, 2000. 
[5]  S. L. Wu, Y. C. Tseng, C. Y. Lin and J. P. Sheu, "A multi-channel MAC protocol with 
power control for multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks," The Computer Journal, vol. 
45, pp. 101-110, 2002. 
[6]  Y. Wu, J. A. Stankovic, T. He and S. Lin, "Realistic and efficient multi-channel 
communications in wireless sensor networks," in INFOCOM 2008. the 27th 
Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, pp. 1193-1201, 2008. 
[7]  P. Kyasanur and N. H. Vaidya, "Routing and interface assignment in multi-channel 
multi-interface wireless networks," in Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference, 2005 IEEE, pp. 2051-2056 Vol. 4. , 2005. 
[8]  C. Cicconetti, V. Gardellin, L. Lenzini and E. Mingozzi, "PaMeLA: A joint channel 
assignment and routing algorithm for multi-radio multi-channel wireless mesh 
networks with grid topology," in Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems, 2009. 
MASS'09. IEEE 6th International Conference on, pp. 199-207. , 2009. 
[9]  L. Bononi, M. Di Felice, A. Molinaro and S. Pizzi, "A cross-layer architecture for 
effective channel assignment with load-balancing in multi-radio multi-path wireless 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
13 
 
 
     
mesh networks," International Journal of Communication Systems, vol. 22, pp. 
1267-1296, 2009. 
[10]  J. H. Huang, L. C. Wang and C. J. Chang, "Architectures and Deployment Strategies 
for Wireless Mesh Networks," Wireless Mesh Networks, pp. 29-56, 2007. 
[11]  K. Akkarajitsakul, E. Hossain, D. Niyato and D. I. Kim, "Game theoretic approaches 
for multiple access in wireless networks: A survey," Communications Surveys & 
Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 13, pp. 372-395, 2011. 
[12]  P. Nicopolitidis, M. S. Obaidat, G. I. Papadimitriou and A. S. Pomportsis, Wireless 
Networks. Wiley Online Library, 2003. 
[13]  P. Gupta and P. R. Kumar, "The capacity of wireless networks," Information Theory, 
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 46, pp. 388-404, 2000. 
[14]  Bruno, R., Conti, M., & Gregori, E., Mesh networks: Commodity multihop ad hoc 
networks. Communications Magazine, IEEE, 43(3), 123-131., 2005. 
[15]  T. Fowler, "Mesh networks for broadband access," IEE Rev, vol. 47, pp. 17-22, 2001. 
[16]  M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. The MIT press, 1994. 
[17]  A. A. Pirzada, M. Portmann and J. Indulska, "Evaluation of multi-radio extensions to 
AODV for wireless mesh networks," in Proceedings of the 4th ACM International 
Workshop on Mobility Management and Wireless Access, pp. 45-51, 2006. 
[18]  A. A. Pirzada, M. Portmann and J. Indulska, "Performance analysis of multi-radio 
AODV in hybrid wireless mesh networks," Comput. Commun., vol. 31, pp. 885-895, 
2008. 
[19]  The Network Simulator, NS-2: www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/     [Accessed May 2011]. 
[20]  http://software.opensuse.org/121/en                            [Accessed May 2011].    
[21]  W. R. Stevens, TCP/IP Illustrated: The Protocols. Addison-Wesley Professional, 
1994. 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
14 
 
 
     
[22]  http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/doc/node216.html        [Accessed June 2012].    
[23]  http://www.mathworks.co.uk/products/matlab/                 [Accessed August 2010]. 
[24]  http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~uno/sgb.html       [Accessed June 2012].   
[25]  R. D. Vallam, A. A. Kanagasabapathy and C. S. R. Murthy, "A non-cooperative game-
theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless 
networks," Wireless Networks, vol. 17, pp. 411-435, 2011. 
[26]  K. Xing, X. Cheng, L. Ma and Q. Liang, "Superimposed code based channel 
assignment in multi-radio multi-channel wireless mesh networks," in Proceedings 
of the 13th Annual ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and 
Networking, pp. 15-26, 2007. 
   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
15 
 
 
2 Chapter 2:   Game Theory - An Overview 
Game Theory – An Overview 
 
2.1 Fundamental Concepts of Game Theory 
 
Game Theory [1-3] is the study of mathematical models, which are used in a 
situation when multiple entities interact with each other in a strategic setup. The theory in 
its true sense deals with the ability of an entity or individual (called player in Game Theory) 
to take a certain decision keeping in view  the effect of other entities decisions on him, in a 
situation of confrontation. A wage negotiation between a firm and its employees can be 
considered as a game between two parties, where each party makes a decision or move in 
the negotiation process based on other party’s move.  Similarly, a business run by a group of 
people can be considered as a game played against its competitors or customers. 
The concept of modern Game Theory was introduced by John Von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern [4] in 1944, who described the word ‘game’ for the first time by 
systematically specifying the rules of the game, the move of players, the information they 
possess during their moves and the outcome for each player at the end of the game [5]. 
They are considered the pioneers of modern Game Theory who modelled the economic 
situations as decision mathematics models for the first time and presented it as a static 
game, where individuals come into contact only once. Their models were successfully used 
in economics in later years. In 1950, John McDonalds [6] published his famous book 
“Strategy in Poker, Business and War”, where he demonstrated the use of strategic 
interaction in the real world environments. Game Theory took a revolutionary leap when 
John Nash presented the models for non-cooperative games in 1951 [7]. His proposed 
solution for non-cooperative games, later on called Nash Equilibrium, is still considered as a 
standard for any conflicting situation’s outcome. R. Luce and H. Raiffa [8, 9] introduced the 
concept of incomplete information in games in 1957, where they argued that it is not 
necessary that the participants of a game are fully aware about the rules under which they 
Chapter 2 
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play and about the utility functions of other players. The co-operative games were 
introduced by Harsanyi [10] in 1960, where he argued that the commitments (i.e. threats, 
punishments, agreements) in a game are enforceable. The progress of Game Theory 
continued since its inception and later on and was used in many other fields other than 
economics.  Game Theory has now become an important mathematical tool, which is used 
in situations that involves several entities whose decisions are influenced by the decisions of 
other entities playing with them. 
Any game, when played, consists of the participants called players or agents of the 
game, each having his own preference or goal. Each player of the game has an associated 
amount of benefit or gain, which he receives at the end of the game, called payoff or utility, 
which measure the degree of satisfaction an individual player derives from the conflicting 
situation. For each player of the game, the choices available to them are called strategies. 
The solution of a game is referred to as Nash Equilibrium or Strategic Equilibrium, where 
each player cannot get a better payoff than the existing one by individually changing to 
another new strategy.  The utility function is a mapping of a player’s choices into a real 
number [1]. To understand the concepts presented so for, refer to the Table 2-1, where two 
players P1 and P2 come in a strategic interaction to play this game. For ease, the game is 
represented by a matrix, called payoff matrix, which shows the choices available to players 
and the outcome for each choice he makes against the others. As shown in the payoff 
matrix of the game between P1 and P2, each one has to decide either to choose X or Y. The 
setup is strategic, so the choice of individual player’s payoff depends on the choice made by 
other player as a response to his strategy. If player P1 chooses X, then his payoff depends 
upon which choice the player P2 makes. If P1 choose X and P2 also chooses X, P1 payoff will 
be 2, otherwise 10. Similarly, if P1 chooses the Y, then depending upon the choice of P2 he 
will either receive 10 or 3. The same choices are available to the player P2 and the 
corresponding outcome/payoff received by him. Here in this game, the players are P1 and 
P2, the strategies for each are X and Y and the benefits or outcome of the game are 
represented in the form of matrix where each entry shows the payoffs in the form (payoff of 
P1, payoff of P2) duple. The numerical outcome for each player depends on the utility 
function used by each in the situation in which this game is played. 
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Table 2-1:   An Example Game in Strategic form 
             P2 
X Y 
 
X (2, 8) (10, 5) 
Y (5, 10) (3, 3) 
 
Formally, a game can be defined [1] as consisting of a non-empty finite set of N= {N1, 
N2, … .., N|N|} players, a complete set of actions/strategies Ai={a1,a2,…a|Ai|} for each Ni ∈ N. A 
set of all strategies space of all players, represented by the matrix A=A1xA2x…xA|N|.  A(ai,a-i) 
is a strategy profile when a player Ni ∈N selects an action ai from its action set Ai against the 
actions of all other players N-i. The subscripted notation –i is a convenient way to represent 
a set of entities or set of events excluding a specific entity or event in a strategic setup. For 
example N-i means set of all players excluding Ni and a-i means set of actions of all players 
excluding the action of the player Ni during a strategic interaction. At the end of the game, 
each player Ni ∈N gets benefit in the form of a real number (R) called payoff of the player 
which is determined by the utility function Ui as: Ui=Ai  → R. 
2.2 Examples of Games  
In this section, some famous games are presented along with the associated 
important definitions, concepts and their classifications according to some parameters.  
2.2.1 Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The well known game of Prisoner’s Dilemma was presented by Professor Tucker of 
Princeton University in 1950 [11-12]. This game depicts an imaginary situation where two 
persons are arrested under the suspicion of their involvement in a crime. The police place 
both the suspects in separate rooms so they are not able to communicate with each other 
during the interrogation process. Each suspect is informed of the following payoffs based on 
their strategies, separately: 
1. If    both suspects confess the crime, each will serve in jail for ten years. 
P1    
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2. If both deny the crime, both will serve in jail for 3 years. 
3. If one confess and the other deny, the confessor will be set free and the 
denier will be sent to jail for 15 years.   
The choices available to the suspects and their corresponding outcomes when they 
play this game are given in the Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2:   Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
             Suspect 2 
Confess Deny 
 Confess (10, 10) (0,15) 
Deny (15, 0) (3, 3) 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of simultaneous move game and the solution lies 
in one of the concept of Game Theory called dominant strategy.  The game is solvable and 
both players will be better off, if they opt for the (Deny, Deny) strategy giving both a 
maximum payoff of 3 years jail sentence. Since both players of the game are unaware of the 
decision of each other due to the lack of communication and therefore no cooperation is 
possible in this case. To solve this game, each player has to weight the possible outcome of 
his strategies as well as the opponent’s decisions in this game. Considering the above game 
in the Suspect 1 prospective, the possible payoffs for his different strategies are: (Confess, 
Confess) = 10 years, (Confess, Deny) = 0 years, (Deny, Confess) = 15 years, (Deny, Deny) =3 
years. By a method call Cell-by-Cell Inspection, Confess seems the best strategy to be played 
by Suspect 1, irrespective of the Suspect 2’s strategies. In Game Theory’s terminology, such 
a strategy is called the dominant strategy or best response and is defined as the strategy of 
a player which earns him the larger payoff than any other strategies, irrespective of the 
strategies played by other players in a game. All other strategies are called dominated 
strategies. In the game above, Suspect 1 will always go for Confess, irrespective of suspect 2 
decisions. Similarly, in the prospective of Suspect 2, Confess is the dominant strategy; 
irrespective of Suspect 1’s adopted strategies. Assuming that both players are rational, the 
solution of this game is (Confess, Confess) i.e., both players play their dominant strategies.  
Suspect 1 
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2.2.2 Battle of the Sexes 
Another famous game in the field of Game Theory is called the Battle of the Sexes 
and was introduced by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa [9] in 1957. The game is played 
between a wife and husband and both have to decide between two independent and 
simultaneous accruing events to attend. The game assumes that there are two events, a 
football match and a musical concert, and both the husband and wife have different payoffs 
from each. The payoff matrix and the strategy set for each player is shown in the Table 2-3.  
Table 2-3:   Battle of the Sexes game 
             Wife 
Football Music 
 
Football (3,1) (0,0) 
Music  (0,0) (1,3) 
By looking at the strategy matrix of the Table 2-3, none of the players would like to end up 
attending an event alone so (Football, Music) and (Music, Football) are two unacceptable 
outcomes in both player’s prospective. However, husband prefers Football more than Music 
based on his utility function while the wife has high preference for Music based on her utility 
function. In this particular game, there is no dominant strategy for both players and hence 
the solution space is either (Football, Football) or (Music, Music). This particular example 
shows that a game might have more than one solutions i.e., multiple Nash Equilibriums. 
2.3 Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency 
2.3.1 Nash Equilibrium 
Definition:  Nash Equilibrium [7] for any game is the set of strategies of all players, 
called the strategy profile, where no player can increase its payoff by changing his current 
strategy, assuming that all other players keep their current strategies intact.  
Mathematically, a Nash Equilibrium of a game is the strategy profile A of all players such 
that: 
           
Husband 
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( , ) ( ' , )i i i i i iU A A U A A− −≥  ∀  i ∈N, ∀ 'iA ∈ A   (2.1) 
Where Ai is the current strategy of player i against all other strategies of other 
players (A-i).  A’i are all other strategies of player i. This simply means that a strategy profile 
A (combined strategies of all the players) will be a Nash Equilibrium if and only if the 
condition in the Equation (2.1) holds for all the players. In the examples given in the Sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2, (Confess, Confess) is the Nash Equilibrium for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
while (Football, Football) and (Music, Music) are the Nash Equilibriums for the Battle of the 
Sexes game. In the case of all other outcomes in the given games, players can deviate from 
their current strategies to increase their payoffs and hence they are not accepted as the 
Nash Equilibriums. 
2.3.2 Pareto Efficiency 
 
Definition: Pareto Efficiency or Pareto Optimality, named after Vilfredo Pareto,  is 
defined as “A situation is said to be Pareto efficient if there is no way to rearrange things to 
make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off” [13]. Pareto 
Efficiency is the measures the performance a game outcome.  If such a strategy exists in a 
game, where any single player can increase his payoff by changing his current strategy 
without hurting the payoffs of other players, then the outcome is not Pareto Efficient. In 
other words, in a Pareto Efficient outcome of a game, every player stick to the current 
strategy and if a single deviation of a player can increase his payoff, it will definitely harm 
the payoff of other players in the game.  
It is not always necessary that a Nash Equilibrium outcome of a game be the Pareto 
Efficient one.  
 Mathematically, a strategy profile A will be Pareto Efficient if and only if there is no 
such other profiles Ai’ and A’j, such that for any players i, j: 
 ′	 ≥ 	   ∀  i ∈N, ∀ ′∈ A    (2.2) 
and: 
            ′ ≤ 	    for any  j ∈N, for any ′∈ A                           (2.3) 
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2.3.3 Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium  
 
When players are playing a game, the strategies can be pure or mixed. In a pure 
strategy game, all the players are taking moves in discrete values. This means that all the 
players are playing with a probability of one on all of their set of strategies. Refer to the 
example game in the Section 2.1 again with different payoff values as given in the Table 2-4, 
with two players P1 and P2. The set of strategies for both are {X ,Y}. If both players pick X or Y 
discretely during the play of a game, then their strategies are called pure and the 
equilibrium in such a case is called pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. However, in some 
situations players don’t always play with pure strategies. For example if the game shown in 
the Table 2-4 is repeated for multiple times, it is possible that in some stages of the game, 
the players might decide to randomize their strategies by picking multiple strategies from 
their strategies set with some probabilities. By definition, a game is called of mixed strategy 
when the players randomize their moves over the set of pure strategies and the outcome of 
the game is called mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium [15]. Let us assume that player P1 picks X 
with a probability of 0.7 times and Y with a probability of 0.3 times. It is assumed that player 
P2 play with pure strategies, either X or Y. For this game, the player P1 will have an expected 
payoff for playing X or Y in terms of player P1 ‘s randomization. i.e: 
Expected payoff of P2 for playing X= 2x0.7	 + 2x0.3	 = 2and for playing         
Y= 3x0.7	 + 1x0.3	 = 2. 
 
Table 2-4:   Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Example 
             P2 
X Y 
 
X(probability=0.7) (2, 2) (1, 3) 
Y(probability=0.3) (4, 2) (0, 1) 
   
The mixed strategies are normally used in the repeated games where players know 
the history of each other’s preference over the strategy set. There might be situation that a 
   P1        
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player play with mixed strategy when he is indifferent towards his all pure strategies or 
when the game is of a pure guess or when the players can guess the next move of each 
other [1]. There might be a situation for a player to play with mixed strategies, when the 
strategies available to it are not dominated by each other in his own set of choices. There 
might be the situations where a pure strategy game does not converge to the Nash 
Equilibrium. The mixed strategy games always have a Nash Equilibrium solution.  
 In order to calculate the expected utilities in mixed strategies applied by the players 
of the Battle of the Sexes game, lets assume that the women want to go to music and 
football events equally likely as shown in the Table 2-5. For this assumption, let the husband 
want to randomize his move over his pure strategies by 1/3 and 2/3 i.e., he will want 1/3 of 
the time to go to music event and 2/3 of the time to go to the football event. The expected 
utilities of wife in terms of the mixed strategies of her husband can be calculated as follows: 
 
         	 =  !"##, %	 = % ∗ '"())	 + 1 − %	 ∗ '"())    (2.4) 	+ = ,-./0, %	 = % ∗'"())+	 + 1 − %	 ∗ '"())+         (2.5) 
  
Where 	+   is the expected value of wife’s payoff when the husband is going to 
the music event 1/3(%) times in the game. Similarly 	 is the expected payoff of wife 
when the husband is going (1-%	 times to the football match. '"())+  is the wife payoff in 
pure strategies when her husband is opting for music event.  Similarly, the wife can also 
randomize her moves over her pure strategies and husband can derive his expected value of 
utility from the game of mixed strategies.  
 
Table 2-5:   Battle of the Sexes game 
             Wife 
Football(1/3) Music(2/3) 
 Football(2/3) (3,1) (0,0) 
Music (1/3) (0,0) (1,3) 
 
 
Husband 
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2.4 Classification of Games 
Depending on the player’s knowledge about each other’s strategies, payoffs, and past 
histories; games can be subdivided into different categories. Depending upon the number of 
players, a game can be classified as 2-player game or n-players where n>2. Depending upon 
the cooperation level, information available and the occurring of moves of the individual 
players the games can be broadly categorized as follows. 
2.4.1 Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Games 
In non-cooperative games, each participant player acts in his own interest and the 
unit of analysis is always the individual player instead of group of players. In these types of 
games, the players are always selfish – i.e., they always try to increase their own individual 
payoffs without taking care of other player’s payoffs in the game. So, non-cooperative game 
theory studies the competitive nature of individual players where players come into contact 
with the sole aim to increase their own benefits from the strategic situation [16].  
In cooperative games, the groups of players are the unit of analysis and the players 
tend to increase their group payoffs as well as their own. A cooperative game can be 
considered as a competition among the groups in a game rather than individual players.  
The applications of cooperative game theoretical models are in the situations where players 
form groups, called coalitions, and the individual or group of player’s contribution towards 
the game depends on the actions of other agents in the game [17]. 
Most of the problems in Telecommunication Systems have been modelled as non-
cooperative games, where each node is considered to be a selfish self maximizer without 
taking care of the benefit of other nodes in a conflicting situation. However, there are some 
studies where the coalitions games have been modelled to study the individual nodes 
behaviour in a network each contributing to a coalition [17]. 
2.4.2 Sequential and Simultaneous Move Games 
Those games where the players take their decisions sequentially are called 
sequential move or extensive games. The basic characteristic of these games is that the 
players are aware about the strategies of other players and the moves are observable.  The 
sequential move games involve strategic interaction where there is a very strict order of 
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play and the players take turns during making their decisions. Each player has the 
knowledge about the decision of a player who moves ahead of him. Such games require 
strategic interaction in terms of a player’s current move effects on the future move and this 
adds to help every player to calculate his current strategy. The game of chess is an example 
of sequential move games. These games are solved with decision tree or game tree. The 
sequential games can be one shot or repeated [18]. 
In the simultaneous or strategic move games, players are unaware of the other 
player’s strategies ahead of time and the moves are simultaneous in that sense. The 
information about other players selection of a strategy over his strategy profile is not known 
to other players but it is assumed that the list of the strategies might be known. In these 
type of games each player thinks strategically not only about their own best response but 
also the best responses of other players in the game. Normally, the simultaneous move 
games are represented by the game matrix or payoff matrix. Prisoner’s Dilemma and the 
Battle of the Sexes are the example of simultaneous move games. 
2.4.3 Zero-Sum and Non-Zero Sum Games 
A game is called Zero-Sum where the total payoffs of all the players are equal to zero 
at the end of the game. These are the games which present the total win-total loss of 
players in a game. These are strictly competitive games where the player’s interaction is in 
complete conflict. Many games are Zero-Sum e.g., in all sport games; one team or 
individual’s win (+1) is the loss (-1) of the other team or individual.  In the Non-Zero sum 
game, every player gets some share of the total benefit or some loss at the end of the game. 
There is no total loss and the competition is not that much strict as that of the Zero-Sum 
games. The basic difference between these two games is that in Zero-Sum games, the 
players have no common interests and in Non-Zero-Sum games, players have conflicting and 
sometimes common interests. These types of games are very common in most economic 
activities and trading. 
2.4.4 Games with Perfect and Imperfect Information 
When each player knows exactly about all the decision of other players during his 
turn, the type of game is called a game with complete information. For example, all the 
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sequential games are games of complete information. In other cases, when there is no 
information about other players past strategies then the game is called of imperfect 
information. All simultaneous move games are games of imperfect information. For 
example the games presented in the Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 (The Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
the Battle of the Sexes) are the games of imperfect information. 
2.4.5 Games with Complete and Incomplete Information 
When all the factors of the game are the common knowledge to all the participant 
players, such games are called games with complete information. The information in the 
game is symmetric and each player equally knows about other player’s strategies and 
payoffs associated with those strategies in these players prospective. The complete 
information games are perfectly competitive and the moves of the players are extremely 
strategic and calculated. The games where the knowledge of players regarding each other 
strategies and payoffs is limited are called games of incomplete information. These games 
can further be categorized as games of symmetric incomplete information or games of 
asymmetric incomplete information [19]. In the symmetric incomplete information, the 
absence of knowledge is equal for all the players. For example, in a sealed bid auction all 
players are equally unaware about the strategies of other players and the outcome 
associated with each. In the case of asymmetric incomplete information, some players know 
more than the other players. This knowledge or asymmetric information can be used by the 
possessive player as a threat or ultimatum to the other players of the game for his own 
advantage. For example, in the game of poker each player has only partial knowledge about 
the cards held by the other players.  
2.4.6 Rationality in Games 
One of the important factors in the games is the assumption of rationality of the 
players. A player is called rational if he tries to maximize his payoff from the game as high as 
possible.  The idea of expected value maximization was first justified by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [4] in their work in 1944. In terms of human behaviour, rationality does not 
mean that a player is selfish and always self maximizer. For example humans can rate highly 
the well being of others and incorporating this high rating in his own payoffs [17]. For 
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reasoning purposes, human seldom use the propositional calculus, which concerns truth 
functions of propositions i.e., the logical truths [18]. The assumption of rational behaviour in 
the prospective of selfishness is perfectly justified in the computing and communication 
systems where the devices can be programmed to act in a certain way. 
2.5 Evolutionary Games 
The pioneering work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in classical game theory is 
based on the rationality of all individual players. This assumption, however, when made in 
presence of novice players who have no prior necessary experience to choose their best 
strategies, can lead to unpredictable equilibrium. The concept of evolutionary game theory 
was first introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in 1973 [20-21], whose 
argument was based on the pure biological evolution. Their work accommodates the novice 
players, where they can improve their strategies in non-cooperative evolutionary games 
with learning and observing others in multiple stages. In evolutionary games, the non-
cooperative games concepts are re-defined in the light of biological evolution. The players 
are not assumed to be rational maximizers but each come with a strategy which is pre-
programmed [18]. Just like genetic evolution, those strategies with whom players get better 
payoffs multiply faster and those who earn less payoffs decline. This mechanism of growth 
and decay in biology is controlled by genes through reproduction process, while in other 
systems; the players get the same mechanism in social or cultural context. These types of 
games have attracted scientists from different backgrounds including economists, biologists, 
and sociologists. The reason behind the popularity of this very idea is that the rationality 
assumptions as made in evolutionary game models are more appropriate in the social and 
cultural context [20].   
2.6 Applications of Game Theory in Communication Systems 
Almost all the communication systems follow some standards, e.g., the Internet 
architecture follows the popular TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol)    
[22] protocol suits where all the involved network entities are assumed to follow the rules of 
the protocol in exact order. However, the cooperation to follow a certain protocol cannot be 
taken as for granted. Since devices are built by different vendors and it is quite possible that 
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some manufacturers design their network devices such that they behave selfishly by 
deviating from the standard protocol, while other devices adhere to the same set of rules in 
the same network. This selfish behaviour enables the individual devices to maximize their 
own performance in the shared network resource pool at the cost of others [23]. There is 
also the possibility that the end users of these devices program them in a selfish way. This 
maximization of one’s own benefit in a communication system at the cost of other users is 
called selfishness in the game theory. There are two approaches to cope with this selfish 
behaviour in otherwise cooperative communication system. First, there are studies which 
provide some incentives and punishment mechanisms to force these selfish entities for 
cooperation. The misbehaviour can also be modelled as a trust mechanism where only 
those entities in the network are served who cooperate [24, 25]. The other approach to 
tackle this behaviour is found in the non-cooperative game theory. This theory gives a 
perfect match and aims to solve the selfish behaviour of the individual entities in a network 
by outlining rules of the game, which are same for all the participant agents. By not 
following these rules of the game, saying generally, no network entity can do better while 
others are following the same set of rules. This gives a huge advantage to address the non-
cooperative behaviour as for as telecommunication systems are concerned. The use of non-
cooperative game theoretic models is not new and a huge amount of literature can be 
found at different protocol layers and for different telecommunication systems. There is a 
huge amount of work on the access mechanisms, which tries to solve the non-cooperative 
behaviour of nodes during accessing the shared medium with the game theoretic 
approaches [26]. The routing layer problems have been solved in many contexts, initially 
taking the concept of the application of non-cooperative game theory in transportation 
system and then extending the same findings to the network routing [27]. Thus, the aim of 
applying the game theoretic models for routing solves the path finding problem, where 
routing and resource allocation problems have been solved as a joint game formulation. The 
non-cooperative routing games aim to solve the ‘path’ problem where a path is the route 
established inside a network from a source to destination, both aim to maximize the route 
benefit for themselves and compete with other source, destination pairs in the network. 
The flow routing games across Multi-Radio Multi-Channel WMNs have been modelled by 
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[42, 43]. The problems at transport layer have been addressed in many research findings 
[28], where the behaviour of TCP protocol has been fully analyzed and solutions from the 
non-cooperative game theory have been provided to solve the congestion problem in the 
selfish environment.  There is a huge interest in studying the cognitive radio networks with 
the help of non-cooperative game theory [29-32]. Since cognitive networks consist of 
primary and secondary users, the spectrum access mechanism is designed with a game 
outlining the rules to maximize the spectrum utilization as well as the user’s personal 
payoffs.  
Several telecommunication problems have been addressed in studies where the 
mechanisms are being developed based on the models from cooperative game theory. The 
studies of [24-25], address the issues concerning the physical layer of the protocol stack 
using cooperative game theory. The network layer issues have been addressed in the work 
of [25], while congestion control cooperative games have been studied by [33-34]. 
Comparatively, designing cooperative games in a large system like Internet and other 
scalable networks faces many challenges ranging from efficiency, complexity and fairness 
among the individual users. The fundamental role of the cooperation among the entities of 
a network and their effect on the overall system performance has been reported in most 
recent studies. This basis of cooperative communication can be traced back to the work of  
[35], who have introduced the relay channel cooperation games. Recently the work of [36, 
37] have used the idea of cooperative communications and proposed models based on the 
cooperative strategies by the network entities. Similarly, in [38, 39] the authors have proven 
that the use of cooperation can increase the energy efficiency in wireless ad-hoc networks. 
However, these studies assume that the network users cooperate and forward the packets 
for others in the network at the expense of their own energy consumption. In the emerging 
networks, which are distributed in nature and not being in the authority of single 
organization; this assumption cannot hold. For example, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) 
[40] and Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [41] are extremely decentralized, auto-
configured and the nature of resource is very distributed. In such environment, the 
assumption of cooperation may not be valid. The increased capability of re-programmability 
of wireless devices offers another threat to this assumption. It is, therefore, important that 
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the issues in networks like WMNs and MANETs should be addressed by using the concepts 
from non-cooperative game theory. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis are the application of 
non-cooperative game theory in a strategic wireless network setup. These chapters present 
the game theoretic models to assess the selfishness posed by the individual nodes during 
their flow routing and channel assignment to their nodes. 
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter presents a detailed study of game theory and the associated concepts. 
The classification of games based on the information, rules, moves and rationality has been 
discussed. The two famous games in the literature of game theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
the Battle of the Sexes have been investigated in detail with the associated concepts of pure 
and mixed strategies. Nash Equilibrium along with Pareto Efficiency has been covered in 
detail along with their properties. Finally, the chapter gives an insight to the use of game 
theory in the problems of telecommunication both from cooperative and non-cooperative 
perspectives.  
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3 Chapter 3:   Channel Assignment and QoS Routing in Co-operative Wireless Mesh Networks  
 
Channel Assignment and QoS Routing in Co-operative 
Wireless Mesh Networks  
 
3.1 Introduction  
The Multiple-Radio capability, and their assignment to the multiple non-overlapping 
channels, makes Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) as one of the prime candidate to be 
deployed as the future wireless broadband access technology. The WMNs are characterized 
by the self-organizing, self-healing, dynamic and distributed architecture, where the 
backbone routers are relatively static.  On the other hand, WMNs are facing the same 
inherited problems of capacity limitations and interference being in the category of multi-
hop wireless networks. First, the multi-hop nature of its routers put an upper bound on the 
end-to-end data rate achievements. Secondly, the interference phenomenon needs to be 
seriously considered while developing any protocol for such types of networks. Support for 
providing the Quality of Service (QoS) to the recent broadband applications like Voice over 
IP (VoIP), Video Conferencing and Online Games is one of the essential requirements from 
the access technologies. These QoS in the form of delays and bandwidth must not be 
compromised and should be guaranteed for the smooth functioning of the network. If 
channel assignment is one of the deterministic parameter in improving the capacity of the 
network by minimizing the interference and providing communication parallelism among 
the multiple radios of the neighbouring nodes, routing plays an equally important role by 
providing the guaranteed end-to-end path selection based on some required metric. Both 
these issues are interdependent and hence affect each other.  
In this chapter, a joint routing and channel assignment scheme for the WMNs has 
been developed, where the channel assignment scheme tries to minimize the interference 
of the network while ensuring the connectivity. Routing, on the other hand, provides an 
end-to -end guaranteed path based on the end users’ delay requirements. A MANET routing 
Chapter 3 
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protocol, called Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [25], has been extended to 
make it Multi-Radio Multi-Channel (MRMC) compatible and to provide an end-to-end path 
to the end users ensuring the maximum tolerable delays guarantees. The decision of end-to-
end route selection between a pair of source-destination nodes is taken based on the end 
users requirements and the capabilities match of each individual link with those 
requirements. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme achieves low network 
latency, high throughput and low routing overheads in the network.  
3.2 Wireless Mesh Networks-An overview 
Wireless networks have been evolved with time to cope with the ever increasing end 
users demands in terms of data rate, scalability, reach-ability, mobility and ease of use. The 
recent advancements in wireless network access technologies have provided a platform of 
ubiquitous communication for multiple types of data including voice, multimedia and other 
web-based applications.  However, the scale-ability and data rate of wireless networks are 
constrained due to the wireless nature of medium and the availability of finite spectrum [1]. 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [2-5], a key technology in the wireless access, have 
emerged recently to provide on the go connectivity to the end users. WMNs are dynamic 
multi-hope networks having the capabilities of self organization and self configuration. 
Conceptually, WMNs have been evolved from Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) [3] and 
thus inherit the forwarding and self configuration capabilities from them. WMNs consist of 
two main components i.e., Mesh Points (MPs) and Mesh Clients (MCs). While MPs are the 
wireless routers interconnected to one another in a multi-hop fashion to form what is called 
the mesh backbone, end users MCs typically consist of the client machines accessing 
Internet through the mesh backbone with wired or wireless medium. Depending upon the 
location and functionalities of MPs in WMNs, they are further divided into three categories 
[3]. Those mesh routers which give connectivity to the end users are called Mesh Access 
Points (MAPs) and are usually located at the user premises. Those mesh routers inside the 
WMNs backbone which are responsible for forwarding the MCs data to/from the Internet 
are called Mesh Points (MPs).  There are some backbone routers, called Gateways, which 
provide connectivity between WMNs backhaul and the Internet through wired medium. In 
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the Figure 3-1, a WMN is shown, where some MCs are connected to the MAPs and the 
traffic is forwarded by the MPs to the Gateways. Gateways in turn play the role of an 
exit/entrance door for the data traffic from and to the Internet to/from the WMNs. 
WMNs are a promising technology to provide broadband wireless connectivity in the 
user premises [6] due to their rich resources and fixed wireless routers, having stable power 
supplies. The multi-hop capability results in a scalable solution for otherwise limited ranged 
networks. These networks are highly resilient as failure of some nodes has no effect on the 
connectivity of end users and overall network at large. The always connected and robust 
Internet
Mesh Points
Mesh Access 
Points  
Gateways
Mesh Clients
 
Figure 3-1:   A Wireless Mesh Network 
 
nature of WMNs qualifies it to be deployed as future broadband wireless solution  in the 
user premises. Due to the advantages of WMNs, IEEE has established subgroups to include 
mesh capability in their existing standards like IEEE 802.11s for Wireless Local Area 
Networks (WLANs), IEEE 802.15.5 for Wireless Personnel Area Networks (WPANs) and IEEE 
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802.16e for Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs) [7, 52]. Many commercial 
products are also available in market for the deployment [8, 9] and vendors like Motorola, 
Nokia and Mesh Dynamics have implemented practical WMNs topologies [10, 11, 12]. The 
work presented in this thesis is related to the IEEE 802.11 based WMNs. WMNs can be 
divided into three broad categories based on their architecture [13].  
1. Flat Mesh: In Flat WMNs, all the nodes connect to each other in a peer-to-
peer fashion. Just like MANETs, all nodes function as forwarding relays as well as clients as 
shown in the Figure 3-2. This type of meshing can be achieved inside homes and offices and 
is constrained by the scalability issue.  
2. Hierarchical Mesh:  In these types of WMNs, components of the network are 
divided into different tiers. The Mesh Clients, forming tier1 of the networks, are connected 
to the Mesh Access Points to get Internet access. In tier2, Mesh Points form the backbone of 
the network to facilitate the forwarding of data from/to the Mesh Clients as shown in the 
Figure 3-1. Besides forwarding facility, they can also provide the bridging facility to give 
connectivity to clients having different access technologies.  In tier3, the Gateway routers 
are located and their only functionality is to give a wired connectivity between wireless 
mesh backbone and the Internet. 
3. Hybrid Mesh: These types of WMNs are the combination of both Flat and 
Hierarchical Mesh. The MCs can also connect with each other in an Ad-hoc manner. 
 
Figure 3-2:   A Flat Wireless Mesh Network 
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Since the 802.11 based WMNs historically evolved from the traditional Wireless 
Local Area Networks (WLANs) [7] and inherited the advantages of MANETs, therefore it is 
necessary to clarify the difference between WMNs, MANETs and WLANs. WLANs are the 
type of wireless networks where clients, called Stations (STAs), are connected through a 
single router called Access Point (AP). AP is further connected to the Internet through a 
wired connection. The surrounding area served by an AP including STAs is called a Basic 
Service Set (BSS). These types of networks are used inside homes and offices for wireless 
connectivity and give roaming facility to the users within the limited coverage area. MANETs 
are special type of networks where nodes, having moderate to high mobility, serve as data 
generation point as well as relays to forward other node’s data. These types of networks are 
deployed on ad-hoc basis in emergency situations like earthquake and military operations. 
In the Table 3-1, these three types of networks are compared in terms of their capabilities 
[13].  
Table 3-1:   WLAN, MANETs and WMNs comparison 
 WLAN MANETs WMNs 
Topology Static Dynamic Relatively static 
Mobility of routers Static Medium to high 
mobility 
Relatively static 
Scale Office or Home  medium area Large area/Towns 
Infrastructure 
requirements 
Yes No Yes 
Stable power Supply Yes No Yes 
Multi-Radio Multi-
Channel capability 
Normally no No Yes 
Relaying capability No Yes Yes 
                                                               
3.2.1 Channel Assignment in Wireless Mesh Networks 
In typical WLANs [14] and MANETs [15], based on the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n standards 
[16, 17, 18], all nodes are equipped with a single radio where nodes compete for a single 
channel across the whole network or collision domain. Keeping in view the higher user 
demand in a wireless broadband setup and the multi-hop nature of WMNs, a single radio 
solution is not feasible for implementation. A channel is a band of frequency which can be 
used by a transmitter and receiver when both simultaneously tune their radios to it. The 
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IEEE 802.11a and [16] IEEE 802.11 b/g [17] standards define 12 and 3 non-overlapping 
channels in the Industrial Scientific and Medical (ISM) band, respectively. These non-
overlapping channels can be used inside a single collision domain without causing any 
interference. As shown in the Figure 3-3, a total of 23 channels are available in the 4GHz 
spectrum for IEEE 802.11b/g out of which only 3 are non-overlapping.  
 
 
Figure 3-3:    Non-overlapping channels in IEEE 802.11b/g 
 
Wireless mesh routers can be equipped with multiple radios due to their static 
nature and the existence of permanent power supplies. Since multiple channels are 
available in the free ISM 2.4 and 5 GHz bands, multiple radios can be tuned simultaneously 
to exploit the free non-overlapping channels and hence increase the overall capacity, 
connectivity and resilience of the wireless mesh backhaul. Due to these characteristics, 
WMNs is a prime candidate to be implemented as a broadband wireless access network in 
the user premises. 
Multi-Radio Multi-Channel (MRMC) capabilities in Wireless Mesh Networks can enormously 
increase backhaul connectivity, network throughput and fault tolerance as simultaneous 
transmissions can be achieved through multiple radios tuned to non-overlapping channels 
with minimum degree of interference. To illustrate the effectiveness of MRMC phenomenon 
in WMNS, consider the example given in the Figure 3-4.  Figure 3-4(a) shows six nodes 
residing in the same collision (interference) domain and communicating with each other in a 
set of three sessions. Each node is equipped with a single radio and it is assumed that a 
single channel is available to all pair of nodes for communication. Two nodes can 
communicate only if they are in each other’s transmission ranges and their radios have been 
assigned the same channel.  As can be seen, communication between nodes (A – B, C – D, E 
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– F) is established by tuning their respective radios to channel C1 in times t1, t2, t3 
respectively. This is an example of Single-Radio, Single-Channel (SRSC) and is widely applied 
to 802.11 based MANETs and WLANs. In the Figure 3-4(b), each node is equipped with a 
single radio, parallel communication session is achieved by tuning each set of radios to 
multiple orthogonal channels (C1, C2, C3) at time t1. In this example of Single-Radio, Multiple-
Channel (SRMC) [19], theoretical throughput increases by 3 times effectively as compared to 
SRSC. If each node is equipped with multiple radios, the system throughput and connectivity 
can be further increased by intelligently tuning their radios to the multiple available 
channels as shown in the Figure 3-4(c), where nodes D and F are equipped with two 
interfaces. Given the set of non-overlapping channels C= {C1, C2,….., C|C|}, tuning the 
multiple radios of mesh routers to these non-overlapping channels across multiple collision 
domain is called Multi-Radio, Multi-Channel(MRMC) [20] assignment.  
There are two approaches for channel assignment, static and dynamic. In static 
channel assignment schemes, channels are assigned once and forever to the 
interfaces/radios of the nodes. This type of assignment is simple but it has the cost of non-
conforming with the dynamics of the network.  In a dynamic channel assignment, the 
channel assignment changes with the change in network dynamics or the user’s 
requirements. This channel assignment has the cost in the form of overhead it generates for 
managing the channel assignment/re-assignment based on the traffic demands or network 
conditions.  
The third type of channel assignment problem studied in the literature is hybrid 
channel assignment, where some of the interfaces are assigned permanent channels based 
on their traffic characteristics while other nodes channel assignment is done in a dynamic 
fashion [21]. This approach reaps the advantages of both static channel assignment and 
dynamic channel assignment schemes.  
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                                                     (a)                                                             (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3-4:   (a) SRSC    (b) SRMC   (c) MRMC 
 
Channel assignment can also be categorized as centralized and distributed. In centralized 
approaches [20], a central node runs the channel assignment algorithm and other nodes are 
only informed of the resultant channel assignment matrix as to which channel should be 
used between which pair of nodes in the entire network. While in distributed channel 
assignment schemes, the channel assignment is performed by all the nodes independently 
with coordination with other nodes. Centralized channel assignment schemes have the 
advantages of being simple at the cost of single point of failure. Further, full knowledge of 
the entire network topology is needed. Distributed channel assignment has the advantages 
of being efficient but costs more control traffic to the network. 
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3.2.2 Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks 
While channel assignment is one of the fundamental issues of MRMC-WMNs [3], 
routing, too, has its impact on the network performance. On one hand, channel assignment 
scheme in WMNs assigns channels to the node’s radios/links, while on the other hand; 
routing determines the end-to-end path from source to destination and transverses these 
individual channels assigned to the end-to-end path links.  Although routing is 
fundamentally the Network layer functionality while channel assignment is performed at 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, both these issues are interdependent. A channel 
assignment can be affected by the routing due to the ups and downs in the load on specific 
channels assigned to links, similarly two different channel assignments in the same network 
can result in different end-to-end paths for the same routing protocol [22]. This 
interdependency between the two has motivated the research community to solve this 
problem jointly. Combining routing and channel assignment needs more cross layer 
information exchange between the two mentioned layers in the case of MRMC WMNs. 
Broadly, routing protocols can be categorized into two classes, i.e., proactive or table 
driven and reactive or on-demand. The main difference between these two classes of 
protocols is how the routing information is maintained by the individual nodes. Routing 
determines the end-to-end path from a source node to a destination node. In the case of 
proactive routing protocols, each node maintains routing tables and periodically updates 
them. These routing tables on each node contain fresh routes to all other nodes in the 
network. Thus each node knows the path to all other nodes in the network. The advantage 
is fast response time at the expense of high routing overhead. In MANETs, Optimized Link 
State Routing (OLSR) [23] and Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [24] belong to 
this class of routing protocols. In the case of reactive routing protocols, each node need not  
to maintain the routing information. These protocols are called on-demand as the routing 
path is determined from source to the destination prior to data session, whenever they are 
needed. AODV [25] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [26] belong to this class of routing 
protocols.  
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3.3 Related Work 
Channel assignment has been studied widely for cellular communication systems 
[21], where various schemes have been proposed. With the emergence of WMNs and its 
capability of supporting multiple radios at its routers, MRMC has been a hot research topic 
since 2004. Since a MRMC scheme affects the network interference level, connectivity, 
scalability, throughput, routing, latency and fairness, therefore considerable research has 
been conducted in this area for the last few years. Similarly, routing and MRMC assignment 
are studied as a combined problem in various studies.  
The centralized channel assignment problem based on graph theory has been 
studied by [27, 28, 29, 30], where network topology has been considered as a graph G (V, E) 
[31] where V and E, the set of vertices and edges in graph, show the set of nodes and links 
of the wireless network interconnecting these nodes respectively. Marina et al. [27] 
proposed an algorithm which assigns channels to nodes according to priority by applying the 
depth-first searching technique over the network graph. The proposed algorithm has the 
disadvantage of being greedy in some aspects and fairness in channel assignment is 
compromised. Tang et al. [28] further extended this work by including weights in the link 
matrix of the network topology, thus capturing the interference in some way. The main 
requirement of this scheme is an equal number of radios on each node and it provides 
strong connectivity than [28].  In [29], the authors have formulated channel assignment as 
coloring the conflict graph with the aim of minimizing the total interference in the whole 
network.  In [30], the authors modeled MRMC problem as Multi-Radio Conflict Graph (MR-
CG) for the first time, to truly capture the multi-radio concept in graph theoretical analysis. 
Their formulation has two main objectives, i.e., calculation of interference inside the 
backbone (internal interference) and external interference from the sources outside the 
network.  
A set of other centralized schemes formulate the channel assignment problem based 
on the network flows [32, 33, 34]. In all these approaches, the network flow, in the form of 
end-to-end or on each link, is assumed to be known to the channel assignment algorithm in 
advance. This global link load information is further fed to the centralized scheme for 
channel assignment. Raniwala et al. [32] considered a centralized load aware channel 
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assignment with routing in MRMC WMNs. They have solved the channel assignment 
problem first followed by routing with a greedy heuristic.  Their centralized algorithm first 
measures the flow on each link by using heuristics and then assign channels accordingly, 
taking gateways of the WMNs as the starting reference point. Kodialam et al. [33] have 
solved channel assignment in WMNs by considering it as a joint problem with routing and 
scheduling. The authors in [34] solved flow based channel assignment along with routing as 
a joint problem by using the concept from linear programming. All the flow based 
centralized channel assignment schemes assume a constant traffic flow which is not always 
the case in bursty or un-predictable networks. Further, the basic flaw associated with the 
centralized schemes is the failure of the central operation point responsible for channel 
assignment, which could lead to the whole system’s standstill. 
In distributed algorithms, the pioneering work of Raniwala et al. [22] solves channel 
assignment and routing as a combined problem. They have proposed a WMNs architecture 
called “Hyacinth”, which assumes the presence of gateway/gateways in the WMNs 
backbone. The solution provided is gateway centric and the merit of this scheme is it’s 
adaptation to the varying load inside the network. This scheme performs routing in the first 
stage followed by the channel assignment. The channel assignment is guided by the routing, 
where load on each link is measured and channels are assigned appropriately. The 
architecture presents a parent-child relationship among the nodes of WMNs. Gateways are 
considered as the initial root/parent of all the other nodes in the network and this 
relationship goes down till the MAPs. Only the parents can assign channels to the downward 
children nodes. The disadvantage of this scheme is the long time it takes to assign channels 
to the new nodes which join the network. The second drawback in this work is the parent-
child relationship in the nodes of the network. If a parent node in the network fails, all the 
children are isolated from the mesh topology.  Das et al. [35] proposed DMesh, where the 
authors have proposed the use of directional antennas. Their solution is identical to that of 
[22], inheriting the same parent-child relationship during the channel assignment. The 
limitation of this scheme is the manual setup of directional antennas in a specific focus 
during deployment and this setup is unchangeable. The work of Xing et al. [36] is based on 
the superimposed codes theory, where the channels are assigned to nodes in distributed 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
45 
 
 
     
manner. Each node computes the superimposed code and assigns channels to the interfaces 
according to its own interference constraint. The limitation of this scheme is its scalability, 
which is constrained by the number of nodes in the network. To further improve their 
mechanism, the authors have proposed partition of the whole network into different cells. 
In [37], the authors have proposed a joint channel allocation and congestion control 
mechanisms. In [38], the authors have addressed topology control and channel assignment. 
At the network start up, the network nodes are grouped together in clusters and the 
channel assignment is run in the next phase. The intra-cluster connectivity is provided by a 
default common channel.   
Kyasanur et al. [39] have proposed channel assignment based on the probabilistic 
usage of each channel by each radio. They divide the whole set of radios into two groups 
i.e., static/non-switchable and dynamic/switchable. Their channel assignment algorithm 
switches the static radios only at periodic manner while the dynamic radios are switched 
from one channel to another with the variation of traffic demand. 
Joint routing and channel assignment algorithms have been studied in [22, 32, 33, 
34, 40, 41, 42], where both problems have been solved together. Although, QoS has not 
been considered explicitly as a source- destination performance measure in their design, all 
these studies try to provide a solution having minimum interference in the network or high 
throughput and high connectivity. In [22, 32], the authors have addressed the problem by 
considering routing first and in second phase assign channels iteratively to the links based 
on the network load information. The authors in [41] have solved the routing and channel 
assignment problem by splitting the large optimization problem into small manageable sub-
problems. The feasible solution is obtained after independently solving the sub-problems. 
The work of Bononi et al. [26] presents a multipath routing solution by splitting the flow at 
different paths while minimizing the interference. Their solution obtains the load balancing 
across the mesh backhaul routes.  Rad et al. [42] have solved the joint routing and channel 
assignment problem by considering it as a linear mixed integer problem and cross layer 
information is used to compute the routes and assign channels to the paths accordingly.  All 
the above cited research has tackled the QoS indirectly by considering the flow information. 
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However, no bounds for the QoS parameter have been considered in their work as for as 
the end-to-end applications demands are concerned.  
The problem of QoS based routing for MANETs has been considered by [43, 44, 45], 
where routing is performed without channel assignment. Each approach has devised specific 
route metric for the selection of best end-to-end path. For designing the routing metrics for 
WMNs, Campista et al. [46] have discussed the key performance parameters. 
A QoS based routing and channel assignment scheme is proposed by Bakhshi et al. 
[47], where the authors perform routing in the network according to their pre-defined 
routing metric and then assign channels according to the end users demands. Their 
provided solution is dynamic but centralized. 
In this chapter, we propose a dynamic and distributed QoS based routing and 
channel assignment scheme in MRMC WMNs keeping in view the end users demands. To 
the best of our knowledge, all the studies till now have ignored the mobility of the backbone 
WMNs routers by considering them as always static. Further, the channel assignment 
scheme presented in this chapter captures the mobility of the WMNs backbone routers and 
efficiently re-assigns channels to them at their new locations. 
3.4 System Model 
An infrastructure based hierarchical WMN is considered where the Mesh Clients, 
consisting of end users, access the Internet via Mesh Backbone as shown in the Figure 3-1, 
Section 3.2.  There is always some data at the Mesh Clients or at the server connected to the 
gateways, which have some QoS demands in terms of end-to-end network delays. The 
application scenarios of WMNs are always in the form of data travelling to or from the Mesh 
Clients towards the gateways. This means that the QoS provided on an end-to-end path 
must be bi-directional. For instance, consider the example given in the Figure 3-5, where 
node A wants to send some data to node B on path Pa-b. Let αa-b be the maximum delay 
node A’s data can tolerate, on-end-to end path Pa-b, where the total path delay is the 
cumulative delays of individual links. If αa-b>=9 units, the path is feasible for the said 
application. However, delays on bi-directional links are not the same from both sides. For 
example, it is possible that node A data experience one type of delay while sending it to 
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node c; on the opposite c might experience different delay when sending some data to node 
A on the same link. 
 
Figure 3-5:     End-to-end delay example 
 
Generally, for a path Pa-b in the multi-hop network, the end-to-end delay is given by: 
                      
| |
1
_ delay
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Path Delay l
=
= ∑                                                   (3.1) 
Where delay
il is the delay associated with the ith link across the path. 
Let S={S1,S2,S3,….., S|S|} be the set of source nodes requesting for some delay 
sensitive data like a request from the network to find a route to a video conferencing 
application or a VoIP server. Let D= {D1, D2, D3, …., D|D|} be the set of destination nodes in 
the network. In the case of WMNs the (Si, Di) is always the (end user nodes, gateways) or 
(gateways, end user nodes). Lets each (Si, Di) have some data to send across the WMNs 
backbone through a path PS-D with the some delay constraint. Since WMNs consist of multi-
hop routers spreading across multiple collision domains and each router is equipped with 
multiple radios deployed to multiple channels; therefore, there are multiple routes possible 
for this data to transport from the source to the destination. The routing function is to 
select such a route across these multiple collision domains so that the delay constraint 
imposed by the (source, destination) is satisfied. 
A channel assignment scheme based on minimum interference is proposed to 
achieve the above objective. Secondly, a reactive routing protocol is extended for MRMC 
WMNs which achieves the minimum requirements set by the end users applications. Both 
routing and channel assignment  are inter-dependent as channel assignment scheme affects 
the routing decisions on each node; and the load due to the already established connections  
by the routing decisions triggers the channel re-assignment. 
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3.5 QoS based Channel Assignment and Routing  
We consider an 802.11 based WMNs, where each mesh router is equipped with K 
multiple radios/IEEE 802.11 compatible network interfaces. The topology of the network is 
considered relatively static and only a few routers are able to move in the whole network. 
Multiple orthogonal channels, C, (12 or 3) are available to each node as according to the 
IEEE 8021.11 a/b/g standards. All the routers, afterwards called nodes, have equal 
transmission capabilities. This means that all the radios of the nodes belong to the same 
technology i.e., either IEEE 802.11a or IEEE 802.11 b/g. Similarly all the radios have the same 
transmission and interference ranges as defined in these standards. A node can assign only 
one radio to a specific channel. This is necessary because assigning the same channel to two 
different radios of a specific node causes co-channel interference [48]. The aim of the 
channel assignment scheme is to assign channels from the channel set C to each link 
connecting two radios of a pair of nodes in the mesh backbone such that the interference is 
minimized. 
3.5.1 Channel Assignment 
We follow the protocol model [1] for developing the proposed channel assignment 
and routing scheme. The channel assignment model consists of the following sub-modules, 
where the interference is minimized using a similar concept as in [36]. 
1. Initialization and channel assignment  
2. Channel/link Assessment and Neighbors Monitoring   
3. Channel Re-Assignment   
3.5.2 Initialization and Channel Assignment 
This module assigns multiple non-overlapping channels from the set C to the 
multiple radios set K of the nodes. The aim of channel assignment is to produce a network 
topology inside the WMNs backbone so that each link gets a channel causing minimum 
interference and the backbone is highly connected. In this work, it is assumed for simulation 
purposes that the channel assignment process is initiated at the gateways. Our assumption 
is based on one of the basic characteristic of WMNs data traffic which travels from MAPs all 
the way towards the gateways. This assumption is made in all gateways oriented channel 
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assignment protocols [22, 32, 35]. However, the algorithm is flexible enough that the 
starting point can be any mesh router in the mesh backbone. It is assumed that there is no 
prior channel assignment inside the backbone and all the radios of all nodes listen to 
arbitrary channels for broadcast messages. Broadcast messages are special type of 
messages as defined in IEEE 802.11 standard, where the destination address is set to all 1’s. 
Any node N in the WMNs backbone can initiate the channel assignment process by sending 
a special channel assignment request in the form of CHReq frame. The first field of this frame 
is set to broadcast address so that all the neighboring nodes listen to it. The second field is 
the MAC address of source node which initiated the CHReq frame. The third field is the 
Request Type which shows the type of the frame used in the proposed channel assignment 
protocol.  Six types of frames are used in the proposed model. CHReq, CHReply, CHUsage, 
CHUsageReply, CHAck and Hello, each having its own code in the Channel Type field, as shown in 
the Figure 3-6. The fourth field of CHReq is 4 bits long showing the number of channels 
available to the system. Four bits are sufficient to cover all the non-overlapping channels in 
the IEEE 802.11 standards. However, the fourth field of the CHUsageReply packet consists of 26 
bits, where each two bits are used to show the usage of a channel by the replying node. 
Upon listening the CHReq broadcast, all the neighboring nodes reply with a CHReply frame in a 
unicast manner, setting those channel fields where this node has assigned its radios before, 
with the value of 1, if no prior channel is assigned by the replying node, this field is set to 
zero accordingly. CHReply frame has exactly the same fields as that of CHReq but with the last 
field having 26 bits as shown in the Figure 3-6. Each 2 consecutive bits in the last filed of 
CHReq represents the number of channels the replying node maintains in it’s Neighboring 
Channel Usage (NCU) table. Upon receiving the CHReply frame, the initiating node N assigns 
channels to its radios according to the following rules. 
 
1. Assign among those channels which are not already been assigned to one of 
the initiating node own radios. This is necessary to avoid the co-channel 
interference on the initiating node. 
2. Assign a channel to each interface while applying rule 1 in neighbors 
prospective. This will ensure to avoid the co-channel interference on the 
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neighboring nodes. For this, initiating node looks at the channels already 
been assigned by the sending nodes to their interfaces. 
3. Initiating node N assigns those channels to the interfaces which cause least 
interference to it by looking at the Neighbor’s Channel Usage (NCU) list.  
4. If all channels under consideration cause same level of interference to 
initiating node N, send a unicast message to each neighboring node 
requesting for their NCU lists. Assign channels to each specific interface, 
causing least interference to the specific neighboring node. 
5. If neighboring nodes NCUs have a tie, assign channels to each interface 
arbitrarily keeping rules 1 and 2 in view. 
 
 
Figure 3-6:   (a)  Generic  MRMC frame type    (b)  CHReq    (c)  CHReply     (d)  CHUsage   
  (e)  CHUsageReply      (f)  CHAck    (g) Hello 
 
An example channel assignment is shown in the Figure 3-7. Five non-overlapping 
channels are available to the system and node ‘a’ initiates the channel assignment process 
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by broadcasting the CHReq frame to all of it neighbors nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4, as shown in the 
Figure 3-7(a). When these nodes receive the CHReq frame, each unicasts the CHReply frame to 
the initiating node, on the channel on which it has received the CHReq broadcast. In the 
Figure 3-7(c), node ‘a’ assigns channels to its neighbors according to rules 1-5. Those nodes 
upon channel assignment to at least one of their interfaces, repeat the process for their 
neighbors, as shown in the Figure 3-7(d).   
C 2 C 2
 
Figure 3-7:   An example channel assignment 
 
Each node keeps the record of channel usage in two separate tables. The first one is 
of its own interfaces and the channels assigned to each. This table, called the Channel Usage 
Table, contains the information of each interface of the current node N, channels assigned 
to each interface and the MAC addresses of other neighboring nodes to which this current 
node N is connected through these specific interfaces. Table 3-2 shows the Channel Usage 
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Table for a node N where the first column in the table shows the interfaces/radios {inf1, inf2,  
…, infn} of the node N. The second column of the Table 3-2 shows the MAC addresses of the 
neighboring nodes to which it is connected through its interface (infi) in the corresponding 
previous column. The next columns shows which channel is used by the node N for its 
connection to the corresponding neighboring node.  The second table is called Neighboring 
Channel Usage (NCU) table. As shown in the Table 3-3, the table shows node N’s NCU for all 
its neighbors and their channels they have assigned to their interfaces. First column shows 
the node number/MAC address and the corresponding columns show the channel usage of 
each neighboring node on each channel. The rank of a channel is calculated by the node N 
as the number of interfaces assigned to C by all its neighbors, accordingly.  Information 
required for rule 1 is available to node N from its own Channel Usage Table. For rule 2, the 
initiating node gets the information from the NCU to avoid the co-channel interference on 
the neighboring nodes. The information in NCU is also used to calculate the rank of each 
channel usage by node N in its neighborhood and it selects a channel according to rule 3 
causing least interference to node N. 
Table 3-2:  An example Channel Usage Table 
Node MAC Neighbors 
/MAC 
Ch1 Ch2 Ch3 …
… 
Chn 
Inf1 1 1 0 0 ….
. 
0 
Inf2 2 0 1 0 ….
. 
0 
… … … …. …. … … 
infn x 0 0 0 …. 1 
 
Table 3-3:   An example Neighbouring Channel Usage (NCU) table at node N for all its 
neighbours {1, 2, 3…, x} 
Node/MAC Ch1 Ch2 Ch3 …… Chn 
1 1 1 0 ….. 0 
2 0 1 1 ….. 0 
… … …. …. … … 
x 1 0 0 …. 1 
Channel Rank 2 2 1 … 1 
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If all the channels are of the same rank, it means that all cause the same level of 
interference to the initiating node N and therefore it sends a CHUsage frame to each neighbor 
and requests their NCUs. All neighboring nodes reply with a CHUsageReply frame containing 
theirs NCUs ranks for each channel. The channels are assigned to each interface according 
to the ranks of each channel in the neighboring node’s NCUs. This last step reduces the 
chances of interference for the neighbor nodes. 
Once the initiating node N assigns channels to all of its interfaces, it sends the last 
frame called CHAck to all its neighbors which contains the channel usage of the current node 
N. All the neighboring nodes update their NCUs for the initiating node N, accordingly. All the 
neighbors of the initiating node N further repeat the above procedure to assign channels to 
their remaining interfaces in stages. This process continues till all the nodes in the network 
have assigned channels to all of their interfaces. The proposed algorithm can be initiated by 
any node of the WMNs network and multiple nodes can start the same process 
simultaneously. Once a node N has assigned channels to all its interfaces, it does not listen 
to further broadcast CHReq frames. The channel re-assignment is triggered in two cases. First, 
if a neighboring node fails and second, if the set routing threshold is not met by all the 
interfaces of a specific node. This will be explained further in the Section 3.5.4. 
3.5.2.1 Channel Assessment and Neighbours Monitoring 
 
When each node assigns channels to all of its radios/interfaces, they switch to the 
monitoring state. Monitoring state is the state in which each node frequently monitors the 
channel usage status of all its interfaces. Each node also monitors the status of all its 
neighbors, whether they are alive or not, through the exchange of Hello messages. The Hello 
messages, as shown in the Figure 3-6(g), are also used to update the link delay by the nodes 
they are connected through. This is necessary because the link delay on a bi-directional link 
is different from both nodes prospective. A greater delay in the Hello message replaces the 
smaller one on both nodes.  Monitoring the link status is needed to calculate the metric for 
the QoS based routing later on, as discussed in the Section 3.5.3, where the decision of 
selecting an end-to-end path is made based on the individual links quality in the path. 
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Each node, in the monitoring state, maintains and frequently updates a table called 
the Channel State Table. This table, as shown in the Table 3-4, contains information about 
the quality of the individual bi-directional links between each pair of nodes sharing a 
common channel, and has four parameters i.e., Average Queue Length, Average MAC layer 
backoffs, Transmission rate and Average Lost packets retransmission time. Average Queue 
Length is the average taken over specific period of time of the MAC layer’s queue associated 
with the interface of a node. This parameter indicates how much a single application layer 
packet has to wait in the queue of the interface.  Average MAC layer backoff is the average 
value taken over specific times for the number of successful transmitted packet. 
Transmission time/rate is the number of bits a node’s interface can transmit over a medium 
in per unit time. This value depends on the physical layer modulation techniques and the 
width of frequency called bandwidth. The Lost packet retransmission is the time it takes for 
retransmission of lost packets in a given number of packets transmitted over a link.  
 
Table 3-4:   Links Quality State Table on each node 
MAC address 123456789:;8<	 =23<5>?6@<	 ABC285:;8<< 	 D23E5>?6@<	 
Inf0 X  Y Z a 
Inf1 X Y Z b 
-- -- -- -- c 
Infn X Y Z e 
 
The QoS parameter for the proposed routing protocol is defined in terms of links 
delays expected to be experienced by a single application packet, when it is routed over the 
end-to-end path consisting of individual bi-directional links. The delay sensitive applications 
like video or audio should have an end-to-end delay guarantees from the network. The 
information provided by the channel monitoring module is available to the network layer as 
shown in the Figure 3-8. Delay of an end-to-end path in an 802.11 based WMNs depends on 
many parameters. Since IEEE 802.11 is a shared wireless medium and even in MRMC there 
is always a chance that a given channel C, assigned to a link connecting two radios, is also 
assigned to another link in the same transmission or interference ranges. This makes each 
radio to follow the access mechanism for the wireless medium called Distributed 
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Figure 3-8:   Cross layer information for link monitoring and routing decisions 
 
Coordination Function (DCF) in IEEE 802.11 literature [16, 17, 18]. The backoff time in DCF 
system, in which a transmitting system goes into the idle state, increases exponentially with 
each lost frames. Even with DCF arbitration for the shared medium, there is always a chance 
of losing packets on the wireless medium. This parameter is captured in terms of packet loss 
ratio and is accurately calculated. The lost packet ratio is the number of lost packets x in a 
given number of transmitted packets y. In IEEE 802.11, those packets are considered lost for 
which the transmitting MAC does not receive an acknowledgement. Lets a node sends y 
number of packets on one of its interface, say inf0, in which x packets are lost, the expected 
retransmission time for one lost packet is calculated as: 
                       
FGH = I J KLMNOPQRS
              
(3.2) 
This delay information is captured in the parameter FGH and is averaged over time. 
Similarly, there is a limit on the medium and radio capability to transmit at some bounded 
rates. Each node calculates this average transmission rate (TUVGWX) for each of its link 
associated with each of its radio and shows the number of bits transmitted over a link per 
unit time. Transmission rate value is calculated from the link queue. This whole information 
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is fed to the total delay which is supposed to be experienced by a single packet to be 
considered for forwarding through a specific interface’s link. 
                      TYXZG[ = \GH + ]G^^ ∗ T^ XV_`W + FGH                          (3.3) 
Where T^ XV_`W is calculated as follows: 
                          
T^ XV_`W = aPb_cRdeQfMNOPQR                                                    (3.4) 
 ]G^^ is the MAC layer frame size in bits and the variable \GH in the Equation (3.3) 
represents the average backoff on the specified interface, where the expected \GH for a 
single packet is calculated as follows. Let the backoff incurred over a link during m successful 
transmitted frames be n, then the expected backoff for one packet (\GH) is calculated as: \GH = gh .i0jk.                                             (3.5) 
  The total delay calculation for a single packet is maintained in a separate table 
associated with each interface of a node. As shown in the Figure 3.9, node B is connected to 
node A through interface0 (inf0) where channel C2 is assigned to their shared link. Similarly, 
it is connected to node C through interface1 (inf1) with C1 assigned to their common link. 
The figure shows the delays calculations for each individual links. This delay information is 
updated in a bi-directional manner through the periodic Hello message exchange. If delay x 
Milliseconds maintained by node B for B-C link is less than the delay it received from node C 
for the same link in the periodic Hello message, x will be replaced with the new delay for the 
same link. All nodes update this delay information for the bi-directional links in a similar 
way.  
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Figure 3-9:   “Hello” Message exchange for delay updates and neighbour’s monitoring 
 
3.5.3 QoS Based Routing  
Quality of Service (QoS) is the provisioning of some guarantees by the network to the 
end users in terms of a set of performance parameters like delay, jitter, bandwidth and 
packet loss [46]. Since routing determines the end-to-end path for each source-destination 
pair in a network, therefore, it is one of the important design factors to be considered in 
providing these QoS guarantees to the end users.  In MANETs, all the standard routing 
protocols have explicitly ignored this important issue. Since MANETs are emergency 
networks and extremely mobile, QoS provision is very difficult task to be achieved on an 
end-to- end basis. The main factor in deciding the QoS is the routing metric, i.e., the 
parameter or set of parameters based on which the routing decisions take place. Almost all 
MANETs routing protocols use minimum hop count as the only metric and the shortest path 
is considered as the best path. While minimum hop count is a best metric in networks 
where reach-ability is the only concern, the end users of WMNs put some constraints other 
than mere reaching to the destination.  
QoS of the end users is considered as a prime parameter in the proposed joint 
routing and channel assignment scheme. The MANETs AODV protocol has been used as a 
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base for developing the routing protocol in the proposed solution. However, AODV has the 
some shortcomings when used in its original form in the WMNs. First, it is based on network 
level flooding to forward a route request, thus creating a lot of extra overhead packets. For 
example, for a network of N nodes and for finding a single path between any source and 
destination, a total of (N-1) route request packets are flooded in the entire network. 
Second, there is no defined metric for routes selection in the AODV and thus QoS can’t be 
supported explicitly. Although, AODV prefers the shortest paths, but shortest paths can be 
worst in providing the QoS  as compared to the longest ones in the wireless networks. Third, 
AODV only supports Single-Radio Single-Channel MAC architecture, while WMNs routers are 
equipped with Multiple-Radios operating on multiple non-overlapping channels.  
AODV works as follows. For a pair of Source-Destination (S, D), S broadcasts the 
requests to its neighbours for a route to D with RREQ packet. It is on demand in the sense 
that requests are only sent by the source node, whenever it needs to have connection with 
the destination for sending some data. All the neighbours of S rebroadcast this route 
request to their neighbours and the process continues until it reaches either the intended 
destination or an intermediate node, which have updated route to the destination D, 
Destination Sequence Number field along with Destination IP address in the RREQ packet is 
used in the later case. Intermediate nodes avoid duplicate RREQ reception by dropping 
them if the Originator IP and RREQ ID of the current message is matched with the one 
maintained by it for the previous RREQ packet. Upon reaching the destination, a unicast 
RREP packet is sent back to the neighbouring node through which it received the first RREQ 
packet. All next RREQs for the same requests are dropped by the destination.  Routes in 
AODV are maintained through route error (RERR) messages. If a source node moves, it 
reinitiates the route to the destination. If an intermediate node along the path moves, the 
neighbour nodes notice this and inform sender node of this failure by sending back the RERR 
message.  
A WMNs backbone can be exposed to two types of data as for as its end users are 
concerned, one which has a bound on some QoS parameters; for example video and audio 
applications are extremely delay sensitive and if these requirements are not met, it can 
severely affect users perception and the quality. The other category of applications which 
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do not need any specific requirements can be considered as best effort as for as the 
network bandwidth and delay requirements are concerned. Providing of QoS in WMNs is 
essential as its deployment forecast in the future wireless broadband access technology.  
Similarly, we divide the applications for the proposed MRMC routing scheme into 
two categories. One, which has some bounds on the QoS  of  end-to-end path and others 
which is best effort and do not need any services from the underlying network in terms of 
delays and bandwidth e.g., FTP, HTTP and other delay insensitive applications.  
The AODV extension in the proposed solution is called Quality of Service based 
Multi-Radio multi channel capable AODV (QMR-AODV). In the simple AODV and Multi-Radio 
AODV (AODV-MR) [49, 50], the selected end-to-end path does not ensures the QoS 
requirements and simply establish routes for the requesting users. In the case of AODV-MR 
[49, 50], multiple radios are deployed on each node and these radios are tuned to the 
multiple non-overlapping channels as present in the IEEE 802.11a/b/g standards. When a 
source, S, needs a route to a destination, D, a RREQ is broadcasted by the source node on all 
of it’s interfaces simultaneously. If the RREQ is not a duplicate, each neighbouring node of 
the source ‘S’, upon hearing this broadcast, re-broadcasts the RREQ all of its interfaces. This 
process of broadcasting continues and disseminates in the whole network until the 
destination is found. It is important to mention that in the case of AODV-MR, those 
neighbouring nodes which share a common channel hears the broadcast on that channel. 
Before broadcasting the RREQ, each node maintains the reverse route, which points 
towards the source node from which this current node has received the RREQ packet. The 
flooding mechanism, as discussed before, even worsen in AODV-MR as each mesh router 
now rebroadcasts the RREQ packet on multiple interfaces creating a total of (N-1)x i 
overhead packets, with an N routers WMNs backbone each having i interfaces. Further, 
there is no QoS provisioning in both these protocols. Generally, the proposed QMR-AODV 
works as follows.  As shown in the Figure 3-10, when an end user wants to establish a 
connection with the destination (Gateway), it sends the modified RREQ packet. The 
modified route request packet has four important fields to be considered by the end users 
as well as the rely routers. As shown in the Figure 3-11, first the D flag, it is set by the route 
requesting node which needs this RREQ to be replied by the destination only. Thus, a RREQ  
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Figure 3-10:   The modified RREQ flow of function 
 
with D flag set will never return a path to destination from an intermediate node. This 
ensures that a path returned by QAODV-MR will always satisfy the end-to-end requirements 
of user’s applications.    
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    -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|                     |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                            RREQ ID                            | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Originator Sequence Number                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   | User’s QoS Bounds             | Total Path  Delay           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 3-11:    Modified RREQ packet format 
 
The first bit in the reserved field is either set or zero. If this bit is set by the requesting end 
user, it is an indication for the intermediate nodes that some specific QoS is required by the 
source node. The last field of modified RREQ packet is divided into two halves, the first half 
shows the maximum delay an application can tolerate (User’s QoS Bounds) for each of its 
individual packet on end-to-end basis. The RREQ packet initiator node, based on the 
application requirements, sets this field by putting the appropriate value of maximum delay, 
which can be tolerated by the end users application on the end-to-end path requested. The 
second half of this field, Total Path Delay, shows the cumulated delay of the path from the 
initiating node to this current node so far. Upon receiving the RREQ packet, the 
intermediate node (and the destination node if that is the case) first checks the Destination 
IP address in the REEQ packet. If a match is found between the Destination IP and the IP 
address of the current node, the RREQ is for a path request to this node and a RREP is 
unicasted to the initiating node. If the current receiving node is not the destination, then the 
intermediate node first checks the D flag and the first reserved bit. If both are zero, the 
request is considered as a normal AODV RREQ and is forwarded over multiple 
radios/interfaces of the node, as shown in the flowchart of Figure 3-10. If current node is  
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Algorithm for routing decision on each node 
 for each node(n) on receiving RREQ packet 
  If RREQ_DEST_IP== NODE_IP       //then this node is the destination  
                            Send RREP 
                     else if (D=0 and Reserved=0) 
                              Forward packet through normal AODV-MR/AODV operations 
    else // QMR-AODV operations 
    for i=inf0 to infn 
     Total_Path_Delay=Total_Path_Delay+ infi_delay 
    If {Total_Path_Delay≤ User’s required delay 
                                     Hop_Count=Hop_Count+1 
                                                       Send RREQ to next hop 
                                                 else  
                                                       Drop RREQ for infi 
                                                 end if 
                                             next i 
   end if  
Figure 3-12:   Algorithm for QoS (delay) based on demand routing 
 
not the destination, then all the interfaces of this current node are evaluated for providing 
the required QoS (delay) as requested by the source node as follows. The intermediate node 
adds up the delay of bi-directional link associated with the current  interface as maintained 
by the channel monitoring module, discussed in the Section 3.5.2.1. This updated delay 
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associated with the link/channel assigned to the interface of the node under consideration 
is added up with last 16 bits field, Total Path Delay, and is compared with the User’s QoS 
demanded delay. As shown in the Figure 3-12, if the User’s QoS demanded delay bound is 
less than the one calculated by the current node for it’s aspecific interface, the RREQ is 
dropped for that interface. This means that the current interface’s delay added up with the 
path delay so far cannot guarantee the QoS requirements of the end user application. In this 
case the RREQ packet is dropped by the node from forwarding at the current interface as 
shown in the algorithm of the Figure 3-12. Otherwise, Total Path Delay is updated and the 
RREQ packet is sent to the next hop by this interface. Upon reaching the destination, a RREP 
packet is unicasted for the first RREQ packet it receive from the one hop neighbour. All 
other successive RREQs for the same connection are dropped. As shown in the Figure 3-13, 
the mesh routers B, C, D and H do not forward the RREQ on some of their interfaces simply 
because the QoS limit set by the end user can’t be satisfied. This technique has two fold 
gain.  
 
Figure 3-13:   RREQ selective forwarding by the WMNs backbone routers 
 
First, the flooding associated with the AODV-MR [49, 50] is reduced from (N-1)xi to 
(N-1) in the case if only one interface of all the routers in the path is satisfying the QoS 
requirements. Another advantage is that by setting the D flag in RREQ packet, only the 
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destination is bound to reply the RREP packet. This, combined with the QoS value 
comparison on each node’s interface ensures the requested quality of the end-to-end path. 
3.5.4 Channel Re-Assignment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Nodes can fail inside the network backbone and this failure can affect the 
performance of network in terms of connectivity and throughput. If a channel assignment 
scheme is not capable to detect the node’s failures, the network nodes can go into isolation. 
For self-configurable networks like WMNs, node failure should be tackled effectively. In the 
proposed channel assignment and routing scheme, the channel re-assignment is triggered 
with three events. First, if a node fails with some or all of its interfaces then this node failure 
is detected by the Channel Assignment module and channel re-assignment is performed in 
that locality. Although, WMNs have relatively very static topology and the routers are 
almost fixed, however, in some cases the routers can be mobile e.g., if the routers are 
integrated from the Vehicular Network infrastructure inside the WMNs backbone, then 
mobility can be expected. In this case, a node can move from one location to another one 
due to mobility. This can impact the topology of the network in terms of connectivity. This 
information should be captured in an efficient way. Third, there might be some cases that all 
the interfaces of a certain node are not complying with any of the QoS based RREQ from the 
end users. This latter case can happen, for example, when the channel assigned to a specific 
node’s link is interfering too much with other links in its range. 
If a node fails or moves from one location in the backbone to another location, this 
failure or movement is detected by the neighbouring nodes through the periodic Hello 
messages. Let suppose a node ‘a’ fails in the example network shown in the Figure 3-15, it 
means that all of its neighbours will not receive the periodic unicast Hello messages from 
node ‘a’.  This will mean two possible events. Either the node in the vicinity has failed or it 
has moved to a location which is no longer in the transmission range of its previous 
neighbouring nodes. This event triggers the channel re-assignment module. 
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Figure 3-14:   Nodes failure and channel reassignment 
 
Each neighbouring node, which had a connection with node ‘a’, will remove the channel 
assignment information as mentioned in the Tables 3-2 and 3-3 of Section 3.5.2. In the next 
phase, the interface on which the neighbouring nodes were connected to node ‘a’ are 
available for channel re-assignment. Each neighbouring node of failed node ‘a’ broadcasts 
the CHReq frame on all the channels. Any neighbouring node with an interface unassigned to 
any channel can reply with the CHReply unicast message. The channel re-assignment is 
performed in a similar way as mentioned in the Section 3.5.2. 
Similarly, if a node ‘a’ moves from its current location to some other location inside 
the network backbone, this event is considered the same as node failure by all its 
neighbours and channel re-assignment is performed as mentioned for node failure. 
However, the re-located node, when no longer receiving the periodic Hello messages from 
its neighbouring nodes, realizes of its movement and starts broadcasting CHReq messages on 
all of its interfaces. If there is any node in its neighbourhood (inside the transmission range) 
having no channel yet assigned to one of its interface, will reply with the CHReply unicast 
message. However, it is possible that at the new location there is no node whose interface is 
available for this new channel re-assignment. 
The channel re-assignment can also be triggered by the routing request service 
threshold configured on each node. If a node rejects all the QoS based RREQ’s on all of its 
interfaces for a certain threshold number of times, the channel re-assignment module 
triggers. This, however, is performed by the affected node by sending the CHReq unicast 
messages to all of its neighbours. The requesting node, upon receiving the CHReply messages 
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from its neighbours re-assigns channels as according to the channel assignment rules 
mentioned earlier in the Section 3.5.2. 
3.6  Simulation Setup and Performance Evaluation 
This section presents the performance evaluation of the proposed channel 
assignment and QMR-AODV routing protocols. Network Simulator-NS2 version 2.34 [51] was 
used for development and simulation of the proposed model. Four performance metrics, 
Routing Overhead, Packet Delivery Ratio, Average Network Latency and Response Time, 
were observed for a set of two different scenarios. Simulation in each scenario was run 20 
times each and the average was plotted in each case to build confidence in the observed 
results. 
Routing Overhead: Routing Overhead refers to the number of routing control 
packets generated inside the network.  
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): PDR refers to the ratio of the number of packets which 
succeeded to reach at the destination to those packets which were generated by the end 
user’s applications. i.e.,: 
PDR= Total Received packets/Total generated packets                                             (3.6) 
Average Network Delay: This parameter refers to the total delay occurred inside the 
network for the data packets. The latency or delay is measured by calculating the time 
elapsed between the packet generation at the end user’s nodes and when they reach at the 
destinations. 
Average Response Time: Average Response Time is the average of time elapsed 
between each RREQ and when the source node gets the RREP packet. 
3.6.1 Simulation Setup for Delay Sensitive Data 
In this scenario, a network of 30 mesh routers was deployed in an area of 1000m 
x1000m in a grid topology with the following parameters as shown in the Figure 3-15. End 
users Mesh Clients generate Constant Bit Rate (CBR) UDP traffic with some specific delay 
constraint for each packet.  The performance of the proposed scheme is compared with a 
Multi-Radio AODV (AODV-MR) [49, 50] scheme and comparative analysis is done. All the 
simulation parameters are given in the Table 3-5. 
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Figure 3-15:   Network Deployment 
 
 
Table 3-5:    Simulation Setup 
Simulation Parameters Assigned Values 
Topology Grid 
Number of Mesh Routers 30 
            Number of Interfaces(inf) on each   
Mesh Router 
3 
Number of Mesh Clients 45 
Medium Access Control (MAC) IEEE 802.11a 
Number of Channels 8 
Propagation  TwoRay Ground reflection 
Transmission Range 250  meters 
Max Interface Queue length 50 
Routing Protocols AODV-MR, QMR-AODV 
Mobility Model None(Static) 
Number of flows Varies (10 to 60) 
Packet Size 1000 bytes 
Packet generation rate 128 kbps per flow 
Simulation time 600 Seconds 
Topology covered area 1000x1000 meters 
Data Rate 2MB 
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Routing Overhead: 
As shown in the Figure 3-16, both the AODV-MR and QMR-AODV produce almost the 
same number of routing overhead packets at the beginning. The reason is that for less 
number of flows, QMR-AODV functions the same as the AODV-MR due to less load and 
hence less congestion in the networks. Effectively, all the interfaces of intermediate nodes 
are conforming to the QoS delays bounds of RREQs of the end users applications. 
Furthermore, when the number of flows increases from the end users, the network gets 
congested and QMR-AODV outperforms AODV-MR by producing less amount of routing 
overhead. This is because; QMR-AODV now forwards the RREQ only on those interfaces of 
the intermediate nodes which are capable to handle the requested delay. On contrary, with 
increase in the network load, AODV-MR functions the same by broadcasting each RREQ on all 
of its interfaces except the one on which it was received. This linear increase in the routing 
overhead is evident from the Figure 3-16 for number of flows 30 and onwards. The AODV-
MR produces 24% more routing overhead for 30 flows going up to 36.1% for 60 flows, as 
compared to QMR-AODV. 
 
Figure 3-16:   Routing Overhead for multiple number of flows 
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Average Network Delay: 
The Average Network Delay of QMR-AODV is compared with AODV-MR for different 
number of end users generated flows. As shown in the Figure 3-17, QMR-AODV performs 
better by producing less latency in the network for all its data packets. The prime reason is 
the QMR-AODV’s route selection mechanism based on the delay condition. While AODV-MR 
selects any route without QoS guarantees and thus the data is stacked on the congested 
links inside the network. Secondly, AODV-MR broadcasts RREQ messages on all of its 
interfaces which creates more congestion inside the network and hence more latency. As 
depicted by the Figure 3-17, the Average Network Delay increases for AODV-MR abruptly 
with the increase in the end user generated flows while QMR-AODV’s latency increases very 
steadily. Overall, the average network delay for AODV-MR increases from 40.4% to 55.89% 
for traffic profiles 10 flows to 60 flows, comparatively.   
 
 
Figure 3-17:   Average Network Delay for multiple number of flows 
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Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): 
PDR is an important performance measure of any routing protocol and indicates its 
significance in terms of achieved throughput on end-to-end paths. As shown in the Figure 3-
18, both protocols perform equally at lower generated flows, where their PDR is almost 
equal to 100 percent. However, when the number of users flows increases, the PDR starts 
dropping for AODV-MR. AODV-MR produces more routing overhead causing more network 
congestions and collisions. Secondly, it selects whatever path is available and thus the end 
node’s data is either lost due to queue overflows or due to collisions on the links. On the 
other hand, QMR-AODV selects paths with the delay guarantees and unicasts the RREQ 
packets on specific interfaces. This reduces the overhead inside the network leading to less 
collisions and congestions. Each end node data gets a confirmed service in terms of delays 
on end-to-end path and thus less data is lost during the communication. Overall, QMR-
AODV performs better to carry upto 70% more data on extremely congested network as 
compared to AODV-MR. 
 
 
Figure 3-18:   Packet Delivery Ratio (%) for multiple number of flows 
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Average Response Time: The Average Response Times of both protocols is measured 
by taking the average of the time elapsed between all RREQs and their returned RREPs at 
the source nodes, for different number of flows. The Average Response Time is given by: 
                                                    lW = mW + nY                                                                     (3.6)                          
 
Where lW  is the total average response time, mW  is the average processing time each 
RREQ and RREP packets takes for it’s operation for determining the end-to-end route from 
source to destination and nY  is the delay associated with the network.  
As shown in the Figure 3-19, AODV-MR’s has a better response time for low as well 
as high traffic profiles. The reason is that each QMR-AODV’s RREQ packet is assessed for 
delay requirements and the interface compatibility. This takes extra processing time for 
RREQ to reach at the destination. On the contrary, AODV-MR’s RREQ packets are only 
processed at the intermediate nodes for the routing information and then broadcasted on 
all the interfaces. This reduces the end to end latency for the RREQ-RREP cycle between the 
source and destination nodes. Second, AODV-MR’s RREQ might return a path for the source 
node’s RREQ from the intermediate nodes and thus extremely decreasing the response 
time.  
 
 
Figure 3-19:   Average Response Time of the routing protocols 
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3.6.2 Simulation Setup for varying number of radios 
In this scenario, the number of radios/interfaces per node was incremented from 2 
to 8 in step 1. Each time, the average delay and routing overhead was measured based on 
an average of 20 simulation runs. Number of flows generated by the end nodes was kept 30. 
All the remaining parameters were kept as according to the Table 3-5.  IEEE 802.11a was 
used as the underlying MAC as in the Section 5.6.1.  
Figure 3-20 shows the effect of varying the number of nodes interfaces on the 
routing overhead. When the number of radios/interfaces on each node is 2, the Routing 
overhead is almost equal for both AODV-MR and QMR-AODV. This is because both are using 
one interface for reception and the other one for transmitting the data. In this case, QMR-
AODV only unicasts the RREQ packet to its next hop neighbour when the interface is capable 
of meeting the delay requirements. AODV-MR broadcasts the RREQ packet as it arrives only 
on the second interface. Since in a two interfaced nodes, the possibly of collision is minor 
keeping in view the number of channels available in IEEE 802.11a, and hence both performs 
equal. However, when the number of radios on each node is increased to 4, an abrupt 
change in the routing overhead is observed for AODV-MR. This is because the RREQ is now 
broadcasted on all the interfaces causing more routing overhead. On the opposite, a very 
small increase in the QMR-AODV’s  routing overhead is observed with varying the number 
of radios per node. The reason is that QMR-AODV’s selective forwarding of the RREQ 
messages to its next hop neighbours which effectively  reduces the number of RREQ 
diffusion in the network. The Figure 3-20 also shows a linear increase in the routing 
overhead for AODV-MR from 6 to 8 radios case. This means that AODV-MR fails to work 
efficiently with large number of interfaces per node. 
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Figure 3-20:   Routing Overhead with varying number of network interfaces/radios 
 
Figure 3-21, shows the Average Delay experienced by all the packets inside the 
network comparatively with varying the number of radios per node. The average delay is 
high for both protocols when the number of interfaces is 2, where AODV-MR does better 
with less average delay as compared to QMR-AODV. The reason for high delay with less 
number of radios for both the protocols is that the network is less connected with fewer 
radios per node. More interfaces per node means more connectivity and more routes to the 
destination. It also means that with more radios per node, more parallel communication 
links and load distribution is achieved. With fewer interfaces per node, each link is 
congested with the high amount of data from the end users, which leads to congestion and 
network latency. For 2 interfaces per node, AODV-MR performs better than QMR-AODV 
because of the possibility of the latter to drop a RREQ from transmitting to the next node 
based on the non-compliance with the QoS requirements. Thus, those RREQs packets, which 
never get RREPs, are re-sent by the end source nodes and thus increase the total delay. 
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Figure 3-21:   Average Delay with varying number of network interfaces/radios 
 
However, QMR-AODV outperforms AODV-MR when the number of radios per node 
increases as can be seen in the Figure 3.21. This is because, increasing the interfaces per 
node for the same number of users’ flows, connectivity increases and hence there are more 
chances for the RREQ to be sent on those interfaces which can meet the end users required 
QoS delay requirements. This ensures the data is always routed through best possible paths 
leading to fewer delays. Second, QMR-AODV comparatively produces less RREQ as 
mentioned earlier and thus decreasing the chances of congestion in the network.   
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3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presents joint channel assignment and routing scheme for Multi-Radio 
Multi-Channel WMNs. The proposed channel assignment scheme ensures low interference 
by assigning the non-overlapping channels to the multiple radios with a dynamic and 
distributed scheme based on channel usage exchange messages. The channel assignment 
scheme is capable of detecting nodes failures and mobility within the WMNs backbone. The 
delays associated with the bi-directional links are accurately captured by the channel 
monitoring module in terms of average queuing delays, backoffs, transmission rate and 
retransmission for the lost packets. This delay information is further used by the QoS based 
routing scheme as a metric for determining the end-to-end path. The proposed QMR-AODV 
routing protocol controls the network wide flooding of conventional AODV by selective 
forwarding the RREQ packets. This helps to decrease the network routing overhead. QMR-
AODV returns a guaranteed end-to-end path according to the applications requirements as 
each node assesses each of its interface during the RREQ packet forwarding, for complying 
with the applications required minimum delay bounds. Further, the proposed scheme 
improves the packet delivery ratio, network latency and effectively reduces the routing 
overhead.  
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4 Chapter 4:   Channel Assignment in Competitive Wireless Mesh Networks with Bargaining Games 
Channel Assignment in Competitive Wireless Mesh 
Networks with Non-Cooperative Bargaining Games 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [1] have multi-hop topology spanning multiple 
collision domains. The inherited advantages of self-configuration, self-healing and self- 
organization along with static nature of its backhaul routers make WMNs a prime candidate 
for wireless broadband provisioning in users premises WMNs routers can be equipped with 
multiple radios due to their static nature and the existence of permanent power supplies. 
Since multiple channels are available in the free Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) 
band, multiple radios can be tuned simultaneously to exploit the free non-overlapping 
channels and hence to increase the overall capacity, connectivity and resilience of the 
wireless mesh backhaul [2].  
Channel assignment is a critical design factor in competitive (non-cooperative) 
WMNs because it affects the network interference, delays, throughput and connectivity. In 
a distributed environment, each node of the network runs a copy of the channel assignment 
algorithm independently. In such a de-centralized and independent environment, 
cooperation from nodes to follow the standard protocol during channel assignment cannot 
be taken for granted. Nodes selfishness can lead to system wide performance degradation 
during channel assignment, as it is highly likely that each individual node deviates from the 
standard protocol with the sole objective to maximize its own benefit from the channel 
resource.   
In this chapter, a distributed channel assignment scheme has been proposed for 
competitive multi-hope WMNs deployed in a large area. The channel assignment problem 
has been investigated by applying the concepts from non-cooperative bargaining game 
theory. A two stage game has been modeled for WMNs by considering a multiple-collision 
domain topology spanning multiple hops. In the first stage of the game, sufficient and 
Chapter 4 
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necessary conditions for the existence of Negotiation Proof Nash Equilibrium (NP-NE) [3] 
have been derived and a pricing mechanism is designed for the system based on the 
alternating offer bargaining [4,5].  A distributed algorithm has been presented based on the 
nature of information available and the position of the node with perfect information. It is 
proved analytically, that Nash Equilibrium (NE) and NP-NE are both not the system optimal 
solutions considering the source-gateway communication over end-to-end paths in the 
WMNs. Since WMNs can be deployed over a large area, it is possible for multiple 
organizations to get access to the Internet through these networks. In the second stage of 
the game, the model is further extended to incorporate the end users non-cooperative 
bargaining [4, 5]. The simulation results show that a moderate to good amount of fairness 
has been achieved while the end-users non-cooperative bargaining further increases the 
end-to-end throughput of the system. 
4.2 Non-Cooperative Behaviour in Wireless Networks 
In Non-Cooperative Networks, nodes behave selfishly to maximize their own benefit 
by deviating from the defined standard protocol [4], which leads to system-wide 
performance degradation, instability and individual unfairness. In Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANETs) [5], for example, each node acts as data generating user of the network as well as 
relays data for others. A non-cooperative node can misbehave by dropping others packets 
to save its battery life while sending its own packets to be forwarded by other nodes. This 
selfish behavior of free riders leads to limited connectivity of the network and affects 
individual as well as network-wide performance. If all the nodes behave selfishly in the same 
manner, the network will end up with each entity in isolation, as shown in the Figure 4-1, 
nodes ‘c’ and ‘g’ drop the incoming packets from other nodes while send their own packets 
to be forwarded by others in the network. To cope up with these similar behaviors, multiple 
techniques have been used to enforce cooperation among the nodes for the stability of 
overall system [2, 6]. Viewing this behavior from game theoretic prospective, a conflicting 
situation where each entity is self interested in the network resources or service leads to a 
non-cooperative game. Similarly, competition among the nodes during channel assignment, 
while assuming them as selfish self-maximizing individual entities, can degrade the system. 
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Figure 4-1:   Non-Cooperative Behaviour in MANETs 
 
In the Chapter 3, for example, a channel assignment protocol has been proposed. 
Refer to the Section 3.5.4 of Chapter 3, a selfish node can exploit the situation by sending 
CHRequest without any necessity and with the aim to increase its own benefit from the 
channel resource. If all the nodes deviate from the defined protocol as suggested, sending 
CHRequest can affect the performance and stability of the system when each node will make 
request for a channel re-allocation in its collision domain, unnecessarily and selfishly.  
4.3 Related Work 
The problem of Channel Assignment has extensively been studied by the research 
community during the last decade mainly focusing on cellular networks to provide different 
solutions. In a Fixed Channel Allocation (FCA) scheme, channels are permanently assigned to 
different cells across a cellular network while in Dynamic Channel Allocation (DCA), channels 
are assigned based on the traffic demand. FCA is a simple technique and performs better 
than DCA during high and constant traffic, the flexibility to traffic adaptation of the later 
makes it more practical solution. To overcome the inefficiencies of both approaches, Hybrid 
Channel Allocation (HCA) schemes have been developed, where some of the channels are 
assigned using FCA while others are dynamically assigned to all users in the network [8]. 
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The emergence of WMNs has opened new avenues for researchers by re-considering 
the channel assignment problem to multiple radios of the routers in a multi-hop network. 
Due to WMN’s routers multi-hop and multi-radio nature, co-channel interference across the 
backbone as well among the multiple radios of the same router must be considered during 
the mechanism design.  The assignment of multiple non-orthogonal channels to multiple 
radios of routers, across WMNs backbone, is called Multi-Radio Multi-Channel (MRMC) 
assignment problem. MRMC problem has been addressed by many researchers keeping in 
view different system parameters.  A graph theoretic approach has been proposed in [9], 
where channel assignment is guided by the topology control prospective with minimum 
interference. A. Raniwala et al. [10] have presented MRMC models based on user’s traffic 
demands. The work of M. Alicherry et al. [11] has addressed routing and channel 
assignment in WMNs as a joint optimization problem. Although the research work so for 
cited has addressed MRMC from different aspects as discussed in the Chapter 3 in detail, 
selfish behavior of nodes during channel assignment  has been explicitly ignored by 
assuming that all nodes co-operate with each other for the system wide throughput 
optimization and follow the standard defined protocols. 
The assumption of cooperation in networks cannot be assured always due to the 
self-programmable nature of the now a day’s network devices. Each self interested node 
can deviate from the standard defined protocol to achieve its own objectives during channel 
assignment/accessing at the cost of sacrificing the system-wide goal. The spectrum 
allocation problem in cognitive networks has been studied in [12, 13, 14, 15], where the 
authors have provided solutions from non-cooperative game theory. Their main focus is the 
conflict resolution in a strategic setup between Primary and Secondary Users, each using a 
single radio. In one of the pioneering work [16], the authors have solved MRMC assignment 
as a non-cooperative game and have proven the existence of NE. Their results show that the 
system converges to a stable NE, where each player gets fair share of the channel resources. 
The limitation of their work is that they consider all nodes reside in a single collision domain, 
while multi-hop networks like WMNs span multiple collision domains. The authors in [17, 
18] have studied channel assignment to radios in a single collision non-cooperative network 
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with the aim of achieving the globally optimal throughput. The work of Chen et al. [19] is an 
extension of [16] where perfect fairness has been proven to be achieved by all players with 
an incentive mechanism. All of the above studies have focused on solving the non-
cooperative MRMC restricted to a single collision domain only, where all nodes reside one 
hop from each other.  The work of Gao et al. [20] has addressed MRMC problem in multi-
hop networks from a game theoretic prospective. They have proved the existence of 
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE), where coalitions among nodes within the same 
sessions lead to improvements in the achieved data rate across end-to-end paths.  Although 
their study is related to ours as the single hop assumption has been removed, however, they 
assume that all nodes reside in a single collision domain. Their proposed solution is also 
based on the assumption that some nodes cooperate by making coalition to improve the 
end-to-end throughput.  In practical deployment, WMNs routers are placed in multiple 
collision domains where a specific link interferes with a sub-set of links in the entire 
network. Thus, this work is not applicable to a fully non-cooperative setup in multi-collision 
domain. Selfish routing and channel assignment in WMNs have been formulated by Jun Xiao 
et al.  [21] as a Strong Transmission Game, where it is assumed that end users assign 
channels to their end-to-end paths in a strategic interaction. The limitation of their Game 
Theoretic solution is the strong assumption of non-interference among the non-overlapping 
channels across the core of the network. In practice, there are limited channels in the free 
ISM band and channel assignment is always constrained by the interference phenomena 
due to the existence of multiple radios in a large scale WMNs. In the research work of 
Rohith et al. [22] and Chen et al. [23], the authors have studied the channel assignment in 
non-cooperative MRMC networks spanning multiple collision domains. In [22], the authors 
have solved the channel assignment problems to the multiple radios of the multi-hop nodes 
residing in multiple collision domains. They have provided the conditions for the existence 
of NE and fairness properties of the system have been thoroughly analyzed. However, their 
model is based on the assumption of the consideration of links, being shared by a set of 
nodes, as the players of the game; whereas, in a competitive networks the wireless link and 
hence the channel assigned to it is always shared by two or more nodes and the agreement 
cannot be forced upon them, i.e., binding players to self enforcing agreements in non-
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cooperative games is not possible outside the rules of the game.  The authors in [23] have 
extensively proved the existence of NE by designing an incentive compatible game theoretic 
model to achieve high throughput. Their incentive mechanism ensures that the system 
always converges to a Pareto-optimal outcome.  Our model differs from both them in two 
ways. First, their solution is of significance in a MRMC network where peer-to-peer 
communication (e.g., as in MANETs) is considered more imperative than source-destination 
one. On the contrary, we follow the source-destination paradigm as the very essence of 
WMNs, where nodes are assumed totally selfish and non-cooperative. Second, the 
bargaining mechanism presented in this chapter is fully non-cooperative as compared to the 
incentive mechanism based on some imposition from outside the game. In [13], authors 
have used players bargaining for efficient spectrum utilization among WiFi Access Points. 
Their analytical results show that system level improvement in the data rate is achieved. 
One of the closest studies is that of Lili Cao et al. [24], where the authors have proposed an 
adoptive and distributed bargaining solution for spectrum allocation in MANETs. Their 
proposed solution is of too much importance where the channel re-allocation is performed 
with the change in the network topology due to the nodes movements. They have further 
optimized this re-allocation of channels by localizing the process. Joint channel and power 
allocation problem has been addressed by Q Ni et al. [25], where a cooperative bargaining 
game theoretical model has been presented for cognitive radio networks. The above 
proposed bargaining solutions [13, 24, 25] are cooperative and the nodes interaction is in 
the form of collusion.  Besides, these research studies have assumed a single radio per 
primary and secondary user’s device of the cognitive networks. 
4.4 System Model  
Since Wireless Mesh Networks consist of backbone routers connecting end users via 
Mesh Access Points (MAPs) to the Gateways, therefore the flow of data is always between 
the end users and gateways. However, the backbone routers do not generate data by 
themselves and act only as forwarding relays. Secondly, the multiple collision domain nature 
of the routers demands to re-consider the game theoretic models as studied before in [16-
21].  WMNs provide wireless broadband across towns and there is a chance that multiple 
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organizations will connect to the same backbone to relay their data for Internet access. In 
this chapter, we consider the scenario of a town-wide WMNs deployment, where users 
from different organizations are connected as shown in the Figure 4-2.  
 
 
Figure 4-2 :   A Wireless Mesh Network 
 
4.5   Graph Theoretical Network Model 
To visualize the WMNs topology and connectivity, concepts from graph theory [26] 
are used throughout this chapter. A graph G (V, E) generally represents the connectivity 
between multiple entities, called vertices, in terms of lines called edges. Any two vertices      
(v1, v2 ) ∈ V form an edge e ∈ E in a graph G (V,E), if and only if they are connected to each 
other through a line. Figure 4-3 shows the graphical representation of a WMN network. The 
network consists of 15 nodes, out of which the connected nodes in the network are 
represented by the edges in the graph representation. The set of vertices in the graph G (V, 
E) is V= {v1, v2…, v15} where each edge in the set of edges E= { e1, e2, ….., e20}, represents the 
connectivity between two vertices from the set V. 
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Figure 4-3:   Graphical Representation of a WMN 
 
Two wireless nodes can communicate if and only if they lie within each others transmission 
ranges. Transmission range of a radio is the range where it can receive a packet without any 
error from another radio. An associated concept is the interference range of a node which is 
the area around a receiver within which an unrelated transmission causes a packet drop. 
We assume that all nodes use the same transmission power as in IEEE 802.11/a/b/g/n [24, 
25, 26] standards. Two nodes vi an vj ∈ V can successfully communicate with each others if 
and only if the Euclidian Distance between them is equal to or less than the total sum of 
their radii [21], i.e: 
               
( ) ( )d , ,  Vi j vi vj ,  i jv v r r for any v v≤ + ∈                                                     (4.1) 
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Where rvi and rvj are the radii of vertices vi and vj in the graph G, respectively. In other 
words, they are in the transmission range of each other and can successfully communicate 
as shown in the Figure 4-4.  
An edge between two nodes (vi,ui) ∈ V exists if and only if a there is a communication 
session going on between them. We represent the set of communication links in the 
network graph G by L, where L={ ei =(vi,ui)│ ∀ vi,ui ∈ V and satisfies the Equation (4.1)}. Let 
the interference range of a node is represented by the outer circle as shown in the Figure 4-
4, whose radii is twice that of smaller circle, then two set of nodes (v1,u1), (v2,u2) ∈ V cannot 
communicate  with each other if any of the following is true[21]:  
 
d(u1,v2)<2(ru1+rv2) OR d(v1,v2)<2(rv1+rv2) OR d(u1,u2)<2(ru1+ru2)  OR d(v1,u2)<2(rv1+ru2)        (4.2) 
 
In other words, two set of nodes (v1,u1), (v2,u2) ∈ V cannot communicate with each 
other independently, if any node from the set is inside the interference range of  any of the 
other node from another set and both links are using the same channel for communication 
[27]. 
 
Figure 4-4:   Transmission range and Interference ranges of two nodes 
 
Due to the multi-hop nature of WMNs, multiple collision domains exist and a given 
link can potentially interfere with a sub set of links in total. In order to capture the 
interference phenomenon between the collision domain specific links, the network is 
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further represented by a conflict graph G’ (VCG, ECG) [28, 22]. The set VCG represents nodes in 
G’, where the edge i  ∈ G’ exists if and only if two links (ei, ej) ∈ L interfere with each 
others in the generic network graph G.  As shown in the Figure 4-5a, links e1, e4 and e2  
interfere with each others; similarly e2, e3 and e5 interfere in the graph G. The vertices of the 
interference graph G’ are e1, e2, e3 e4 and e5 respectively. Figure 4-5b shows the conflict 
graph representation of the example in the Figure 4-5a, which shows the interference 
relationships between different links. Further, the generic and conflict graphs will always be 
referred to while formulating the game theoretic models in the next sub-section. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5:  (a) Links interference graph G (b) Links conflict graph G’ 
 
Since, in the multiple collision domains, each link interferes with a sub-set of links in 
the network, therefore, conflict graph is an effective way to capture these collision domain 
specific interferences. However, in the complete non-cooperative environment, the 
competition for the channel resource is between the nodes instead of the links. To 
understand this phenomenon of competition among the individual nodes during channel 
assignment in the selfish environment, consider the graph representation of a network in 
the Figure 4-6(a), where two nodes v1 and v2 want to assign a channel, say Ci,  to the 
potential  link, e12, between them. As can be seen from the Figure 4-6(b), link e12 interfere 
with the links set {e13, e14} and {e25, e26} independently.  Considering the links of the network 
as players of the game in a non-cooperative MRMC WMNs, spanning multiple collision 
domains, is based on a fundamental assumption of binding the two nodes to be connected 
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over a potential link by a default agreements as in [22, 20]. These are one sided agreements, 
where the other node in the pair over a shared link is considered always to be agreed on 
assigning a channel based on the link interference degree. This assumption leads to two 
problems. First, in a non-cooperative network and hence in a non-cooperative game, the 
agreements cannot be forced from outside the rules of the game [32]. Secondly, in a multi-
radio setup, each node in the node pair =(vi,vj) might evaluate and experience different 
degree of interference for a channel Ci to be assigned to a potential link eij in L={ eij =(vi,vj) 
such that ∀ vi,vj) ∈ V}. This is because the two nodes might be possibly sharing disjoint set of 
neighbouring nodes, in their respective collision domains, and there are chances that these 
neighbours have assigned Ci to their interfaces in varying degrees.  
 
 
Figure 4-6:  (a) Node interference graph G (b) Links conflict graph G’ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
93 
 
 
     
For example, in the Figure 4-6(a), it is possible that the neighbours of v1, i.e, v3 and 
v4, might have assigned Ci to their respective radios in more numbers than the neighbours of 
v2, i.e., v3 and v6. This means that v1 essentially experience more interference as compared 
to v2 for Ci being assigned to the link e12 between them. In a competitive environment, v1 
will prefer to assign another channel, say Cj, which causes it less interference over the 
potential link e12 with v2. Further in next sections, the graph G, as shown in the Figure 4-3, 
will always be referred to determine the number of nodes interfering with the current node 
Vi as according to the rule outlined in the Equation (1) and the Figure 4-4.  Similarly, the 
conflict graphs of the topology will always be referred to show the degree of interference 
experienced by a node.  
  
4.6 Game Formulation and Concepts 
In this section, the game formulation and the relevant concepts are presented. 
4.6.1 Game Formulation 
The channel assignment in the MRMC WMNs has been formulated as a non-
cooperative game as follows. Each node of the network, as represented by the vertices of 
the graph in the Figure 4-3, is referred to as rational player of the game, represented by the 
non-empty finite set N= {N1, N2…, N|N|}. The notion of player’s set as discussed in the 
relevant work [16-20] and [22, 23] and the one presented in this Chapter is fundamentally 
different. When channel assignment to the multiple radios is considered in the  single 
collision domain [16-20], it means that all nodes of the network can potentially interfere 
with each other if they try to simultaneously assign a similar channel to their respective links 
due to their existence in the same collision domain. While in multiple-collision domains [22, 
23], the set of links which can potentially interfere with a subset of other links residing in 
the same collision domain are considered as players of the game.  However, considering 
links as the unit of analysis has the shortcomings during the design of a non-cooperative 
game as discussed in the Section 4.5. We consider each individual node as the unit of 
analysis during the game formulation and hence the set of players are the nodes residing in 
the same collision domain. For example, refer to the Figure 4.6 (a), the set of players are in 
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separate groups (collision domains), i.e., the sets {v1, v2, v3, v4}  represents the set of players 
with respect to the player v1 , {v1, v2, v5, v6} with respect to player v2, {v1, v3, v4}  with respect 
to players v3,and v4 and {v1, v2, v5, v6} with respect to players v5 and v6 respectively . Non-
overlapping orthogonal channels, as present in IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n, is denoted by the set 
C= {C1, C2,…., C|C|} all having the same channel characteristics. Each node / is equipped with o < |r|number of multiple radios of the same communication capabilities. The total 
achievable data rate on a channel  
c ∈C is represented by Rc which is equally shared by all the radios deployed on channel c. As 
in [14], the total number of channels where a player / has deployed all of its radios in the 
respective particular collision domains is represented by: 
o =so,tt∈u 4.3	 
 Where o,tis the number of radios assigned by player / ∈ N to the channel c. To 
avoid the co-radio interference, we assume that each player can assign only one radio to a 
particular channel at the same time, i.e., o,t = (1 | 0)∀0 ∈ C, ∀/ ∈ N.  Any channel 0 ∈ C 
is evaluated differently by each node player for the reason mentioned earlier in the Section 
4.5. Therefore, we define j ⊆ N, representing the sub set of nodes which have an edge with / in the graph G including player/, i.e., L={ i, =(/, z )│∀/, z ∈ N} and satisfying the Equation 
(4.1). We define the potential degree of conflict of player / as % = {i + i| − 1}, 
where L={ i, =(/, z )│∀z ∈ j}  and L={ i| =(z, o )│∀o ∈ j  . It is assumed that all the 
nodes possess the same number of radios, i.e., o = o  ∀/, z ∈ N. Accordingly, the total 
number of radios using a particular channel c in the collision domain of ith player is 
represented by: 
ot~ = so,t∈h 4.4	 
Refer to the Figure 4-6a, if the same channel 0 ∈ C is assigned by all the players to all 
their respective radios, then j = {1, 2, 3, 4}, j = j = {1, 3, 4}, j = j ={2, 5, 6} and j = {1, 2, 5, 6} and accordingly % = % = 8, % = % = 6 and 
similarly % = % = 6. Similarly, ot = ot = 9, ot = ot = 5 and ot = ot = 5. The 
achievable data rate of a player i on a particular channel c is represented by: 
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l,t = s o,tot~t∈u 4.5	 
In a non-cooperative game [32], players interact with one another in a rational 
manner, keeping in view the actions of all other players. In order to study the strategic 
interaction of players in the channel assignment game, we define the strategy set which 
shows all the actions available to player i, represented by Ai as follows: 
                                 Ai ={ ki,1, ki,2, ki,3, . .., ki,|C|} 
We represent the strategy profiles of all players by a strategy matrix A=[A1, A2, ….., 
A|N|]
T, where any row in A shows the action of a particular player. As a notation 
convenience in a strategic interaction, A-i means the action of all players in the game less i 
and the pair (Ai, A-i) shows the action of player i against the actions of all other players in a 
strategic setup. At the end of the game, each player i∈N gets benefit in the form of a real 
number (R) called payoff which is determined by the utility function Ui  as: Ui=Ai  → R. We 
define the utility function of player i as the total data rate achieved by deploying all of its 
radios i-e: 
 = s l,t||t + 	4.6	 
Where l,t is the achievable data rate of player i on a particular channel c, as defined 
in the Equation (4.5) and 	 its expected utility from the non-cooperative bargaining as 
discussed in the next sub-section, represented by the Equations (4.9-4.12). The bargaining 
utility, 	, is represented by 	 and 	 for the Buyer and Seller agents, 
respectively. The utility function in the Equation (4.6) calculates the sum of the gain, in 
terms of throughput, of a player i  on each channel in its collision domain plus the expected 
utility earned if a player opt for bargaining if that is the case.   
4.6.2 Non-Cooperative Bargaining  
 
The bargaining process has received enormous attention in a variety of disciplines 
ranging from economics, industrial politics, applied mathematics to political science and 
psychology. In pure economics, bargaining is an alternative to the fixed price trading. It is 
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common in several parts of the world, where the vendor’s asking price is much higher than 
the actual value of the item or service [33]. This situation leads to an unfair trading, where 
sellers get buyers surplus money through price discrimination.  Societies across the globe 
deal this exchange of goods and money with different bargaining strategies [34]. Bargaining 
problem involves two or more agents to negotiate and reach to an agreement keeping in 
view each one’s own personal gains. 
 Bargaining can be viewed as a conflicting situation, where the cooperation of the 
parties involved is for some incentive. The rationality of both to get maximum share in the 
outcome makes it competitive and non-cooperative.  Non-Cooperative bargaining is defined 
as a “situation involving two rational individuals/agents who have the opportunity to 
collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. Being rational, each agent can 
accurately compare his/her desires for various things and all have equal bargaining skills” 
[34]. Game theory has contributed much to this conflicting situation to solve the problem of 
bargaining in a strategic set up. John Nash [35, 36] was the first who formally defined 
bargaining as a non-zero sum game between two individuals. Later developments in 
bargaining ranges from developing models considering the completeness of information, 
risk assessment, ultimatums, timing and bargaining power [33, 37, 38, 39]. 
In a two person non-cooperative bargaining game, two rational players come into 
contact with each other and negotiate on some object or service. Being rational, the aim of 
each one will be to maximize its own benefit from the trade. Many factors can influence the 
bargaining process including the information available during the game, the timing, the 
position of the bargainers and their own evaluation of the item or service in trade [4].  
As discussed earlier, two nodes can only communicate with each other if they are in 
each others hearing ranges and a common channel has been assigned to the link between 
them. Assigning a channel to a link involves two nodes and their agreement on the selection 
of a specific channel is necessary. This agreement is possible in the cooperative network, as 
the one discussed in the Chapter-3. However, in a non-cooperative WMNs, the agreements 
and hence cooperation between the nodes can not be taken as for granted. Since, each 
node of the network is considered as an individual selfish entity, therefore, a mechanism is 
needed to enforce this agreement, which is beyond the scope of non-cooperative games. 
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Consider, for example, the potential link e12 in, the Figure 4-7,  to be shared by two nodes v1, 
v2 by assigning a channel C1 to it. Since the nodes of the WMNs belong to different collision 
domains due to the multi-hop nature of the topology and hence, it is possible that node v1 
evaluates more interference for the channel C1 as compared to the node v2. In this case, 
node v1 will not agree to assign channel C1 to the link e12 if there is another channel, say C2, 
which gives it more benefit if assigned to the link e12 under the given set up. To solve the 
similar situation of disagreements during the channel assignment in a MRMC WMNs, a 
bargaining mechanism based on the strategic alternating offers [41] has been proposed.  In 
the alternating offer bargaining, the two players interact by offering and counter offering 
alternatively. As shown in the Figure 4-8, two entities, being the Seller and Buyer come into 
a contact via strategic interaction. Buyer offers an amount (or good) to the Seller. If the 
Seller agrees, the bargaining ends and both the entities update their respective utilities. 
However, if the Seller does not agree, it counter offer another amount ( or good) to the 
Buyer. If the buyer agrees, the bargaining ends. This process of offer and counter offer is 
repeated till the specified time for the bargaining, T, ends. In the non-cooperative games, as 
the one presented in this chapter, the solution is the outcome called the Nash Equilibrium 
(NE). However, NE is not an optimal solution in the MRMC WMNs game due to the fact that 
the fairness of the system is compromised because the channels are evaluated differently by 
each nodes to be connected by a potential link. However, due to the limited knowledge of 
either nodes regarding each others evaluation of a specific channel to be assigned to a 
potential link between them, the system outcome remains sub-optimal. 
 
 
Figure 4-7:  Channel assessment by nodes in different collision domains. 
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We define the two nodes to assign the channel C to the potential link between them 
as the set of bargaining agents S={S1,S2 }. During the bargaining process, one node becomes 
the buyer and the other as the seller. During the channel assignment, one node, e.g, S1 , 
offers to S2 to assign a channel, say ci, to the potential link between them based on its own 
evaluation as outlined in the Section 1.7. The node S2, based on its own evaluation of the 
offered channel ci, either accepts or rejects. 
T
 Figure 4-8:  Alternating offers Bargaining 
 
The offer will be accepted, if the current offered channel for the potential link earns high 
throughput to S2. Otherwise, S2 will offer to S1 another channel, say cj, from the set of 
available channels C, which earns it high throughput. This initializes the bargaining 
process as outlined in the Figure 4-8, because the offered channel cj essentially earns S1 
low throughput as compared to ci. In this case, S1 becomes the seller and expect to get 
some monetary benefit from S2, now being the buyer agent. It is assumed that each 
bargaining agent has some virtual currency, p, which can be used during the bargaining 
process. Being rational, each agent aims at to maximize its throughput, being the buyer or 
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the amount of currency, being the seller. The result of bargaining is either in breakdown 
or success, where breakdown means both agents fail to reach at an agreement during the 
specific time. A success in the proposed bargaining model means assignment of the 
channel to the link between the two agents/node.  
Next we present some of the important definition used as the solution for the non-
cooperative game discussed in this chapter. 
 
Definition 4.1: A strategy profile A is Nash Equilibrium (NE) if: 
( , ) ( ' , )i i i i i iU A A U A A− −≥  ∀  i ∈N, ∀ 'iA ∈ A   (4.7) 
The existence of NE guarantees the stability of the non-cooperative game in a sense 
that if any player changes its current strategy individually then this change will have no gain 
in the player’s payoff. All players being rational stick to their NE strategies at the same time.  
Definition 4.2: Negotiation-Proof Nash Equilibrium (N-PNE).  
   
 NE for a given strategy profile A is N-PNE if and only if there exists no single coalition 
in A which can make objection to the existing strategy profile in a way which can lead to 
another N-PNE giving benefits to all the members of the coalition [3]. 
This simply means that N-PNE is NE, i.e., for a strategy profile to be NPNE, it is a must 
that no individual deviation form the current strategy is possible, unilaterally. NPNE applies 
to the situations where there is a need for negotiation for a non-cooperative game before 
actually playing it. Since NE in its original form does not allow such a communication, being 
the solution concept of non-cooperative games, therefore, N-PNE is applied in such a 
situation to fill the gap. However, N-PNE only recognizes the possibility where the players 
are highly rational and the agreements are not binding[3]. The game model presented in 
this chapter is fully non-cooperative, however, taking the selfish nodes of the network as 
the players of the game needs some form of coordination, which is not possible in the pure 
non-binding solutions, such as the NE. 
In the following section, we present the conditions for the existence of N-PNE and 
hence the NE. It should be noted that each NP-NE is essentially an NE, however, it is possible 
that a NE solution for a strategy profile may not be N-PNE. In our proposed model, the latter 
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case can happen in a situation where there is no bargaining involved between any two 
player for a strategy profile A. 
 
4.7 Existence of Negotiation-Proof Nash Equilibrium  
4.7.1 N-PNE and existence conditions 
Following are the necessary conditions for the existence of N-PNE and hence NE in a 
non-cooperative MRMC WMNs spanning multiple collision domains. 
Lemma 4.1: In a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game for a strategy profile 
A to be N-PNE, ki= ,
∈∑ i cc C k =k ∀  i∈N. 
Proof: This lemma is proved by contradiction. Let a strategy profile A is NE where a 
player i has assigned ki<k radios to a set of channels Ci ⊆ C in the i
th
 collision domain. Since 
k<|C|  and ki,c=(0 |  1) as per assumption in the Section 4.6, there exists at least one channel 
c’=C\Ci  where ki,c’=0 and hence player i can assign at least one of its radio k
’
i=k-ki to one of 
the channel c’∈  C\Ci  to increase its payoff. Therefore, the strategy profile A cannot be a NE 
under this condition. This essentially means that the given strategy profile can not be N-PNE 
either and hence the statement in lemma is true. This lemma is the necessary condition for 
NE in single as well as multiple collision domain MRMC WMNs as in the relevant work [16-
23]. 
Let us take into consideration any two arbitrary channels c,d ∈C, the difference of 
radios deployed on channel c and d in the ith collision domain is represented by , ,i c dΩ
=otW − oYW ∀  i∈N. Next lemma 2 is defined as follows. 
 
Lemma 4.2: For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game, the strategy profile 
A is not a NE if: , ,i c d ≥Ω 1 for ki,c=1, ki,d=0 for any arbitrary channels c,d∈C, ∀ i∈N. 
Proof: Lemma 4.2 is proved by contradiction. Let us assume that the conditions given 
in lemma hold for strategy profile A for a player i. Since , ,i c d ≥Ω 1, ki,c=1and ki,d=0, it means 
that channel c has been assigned to at least two more players than channel d in the collision 
domain of i. Therefore player i can effectively increase its utility by deviating from the 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
101 
 
 
     
current strategy by assigning channel d to its radio and hence the current strategy profile A 
cannot be a NE and essentially not a N-PNE.   
Lemma 4.3: For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game, the strategy profile 
A is a NE ∀  i∈N if % ≥ |C|then ot~ ≤1 
Proof: For a strategy profile A, let ki,c=1 and ot~ >1, then it means that channel c is 
shared by at least two players in the collision domain of i. Let %< |C| then there is at least 
one channel d C which has not been assigned by any player in the ith collision domain and 
player i has an incentive to deviate from its current strategy. Therefore, the current strategy 
profile A is not a NE by contradiction and lemma 4.3 is a necessary condition for N-PNE. 
Lemmas (4.2) and (4.3) are also the necessary conditions for MRMC games in multi-hop 
networks when link is considered as the player of the game as in [22].  
Lemma 4.4: For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game, the strategy profile 
A is not N-PNE if for a player set /, z	      i ∈ , %,t = %,t∀/, z ∈ N.   
Proof: By contradiction, let the strategy profile A a N-PNE. This essentially means that 
there exists a channel 0 ∈ Cwhere either %,t < %,t  or %,t > %,t . This implies that for 
assigning this channel 0 ∈ C, both players /, z	 ∈ Nenters into a bargaining setup, the 
success of which can lead to N-PNE. Since, %,t = %,t ∀/, z ∈ N  as given in the condition 
and therefore the statement in the Lemma 4.4 is true. Lemma 4.4 leads to Proposition 4.1. 
Proposition 4.1:  For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game, all NE need 
not necessarily N-PNE. 
Proof: For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game let the Lemmas (4.1-4.3) 
hold for a strategy profile A. Let  %,t = %,t∀/, z ∈ N. This means that there is no such set 
of players /, z	   i ∈ ∀/, z ∈ N, where they can enter into the non-cooperative 
bargaining. Since the interference on all the channels experience by the both players is the 
same and the agreements are binding bilaterally.  
 
Lemma 4.5: For a multiple-collision domain MRMC WMNs game, the strategy profile 
A is not a N-PNE if for a player set /, z	   i ∈ , if there exists a channel 0 ∈ C such 
∈
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
102 
 
 
     
that%,t = min%,\{t} "jk%,t = min%,\{t}and c is not assigned to i ∈ ∀/, z ∈N. 
Proof: Let the strategy profile A be the N-PNE. This means that both the players /, z	 
has no way to increase their respective utilities/payoffs by deviating to a new strategy. From 
the statement, since, both the players /, z	 experience minimum interference on channel c 
as compared to the other channels r\{0} in their respective collision domains and hence 
this is a contradiction to the supposition. Therefore, the statement in the Lemma (4.5) is 
true.   
4.7.2 Convergence to Nash Equilibrium 
In the Section 4.7.1, the conditions for the N-PNE and NE existence have been proven 
for a game of channel assignment to multiple radios in competitive Wireless Mesh Networks, 
taking the individual selfish network nodes as the player of the game. The conditions, as 
outlined in the form of Lemmas (4.1-4.5), should be satisfied by all the nodes during their 
channel allocation moves. Any node, which deviates from these defined rules, will get no 
benefit from its unilateral move at the outcome of the game. All the individual players of the 
game are rational and hence their decision on their move from the current strategy depends 
on how much utility it can draw from it. Since the unilateral move of any player outside the 
rules of the game cannot benefit it individually as evident from the Lemmas (4.1-4.5) and the, 
therefore, the convergence to the NE is always ensured in the game. However, for 
convergence to N-PNE, the nodes enter into the bilateral non-cooperative bargaining, where 
they reach at an agreement based on the Algorithm 2 as shown in the Figure 4-10. In this 
section, a distributed algorithm, based on the perfect information available to all the nodes, 
is presented. 
4.7.3 Distributed Algorithm for channel assignment in the MRMC WMNs 
In this section, a distributed algorithm, which runs on each node player is presented. 
The information needed by the nodes is restricted to their own collision domains only. Each 
node needs to know about the number of channels available and the number of radios 
deployed on each specific channel in its own collision domain. This is again an example of 
perfect information in non-cooperative games. In distributed algorithm, however, nodes are 
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not supposed to be under the authority of any central system and their moves in the game 
are expected to be simultaneous. It is assumed in the proposed model that there is some 
random channel assignment already present, which is not necessarily an NE and hence N-
PNE. Each node runs the algorithm given in the Figure 4-9 and updates its current channel  
Algorithm 1 
Input: N={ N1,N2,N3, ….,N|N|}, A random channel allocation, {1,2, …. ,W} 
Output: NE or N-PNE Channel Assignment 
1.  while(Not NE or N-PNE) 
2.      get current channel assignment 
3.      for each i ∈ ′ 
4.        for each/, z	 ∈ N, where /, z	   i ∈ G 
5.            if !"0o))_0-j i==0 
6.                     for o=1 to K 
7.                       ot= o_tVVXhW 
8.                       calculate otW  and otW 
9.                        if (otW − otW)>1 ∀c’ ∈ C\{c} and (otW − otW)>1 ∀c’ ∈ C\{c} 
10.                            and %,t = %,t 
11.                             //NE move 
12.                              remove o  from c, remove o  for o_tVVXhW 
13.                              assign c’ to i−→ o , o	 where otW is of min(∀d∈ C\(c ∩                                               
c’)) and otW is of min(∀d∈ C\(c ∩ c’)) 
14.                              reset !"0o))_0-j i  to a new value from W 
15.                         elseif (otW − otW)==0 and otW − otW == 0and%,t = %,t   ∀c’ ∈ C\{c} 
16.                                  Search for: a  channel  d ∈ C\{c}  where i has minimum radios 
17.                                   if %,Y = %,Y) // NE move 
18.                                  remove o  from c 
19.                                 assign d ∈ C to i−→ o , o	 
20.                                 reset !"0o))_0-j i  to a new value from W 
21.                                esle 
22.                                 Bargain/, z, k	  
23.                                end if 
24.                          end if 
25.                      next o  
26.                            else  
27.                              !"0o))_0-j i= !"0o))_0-j i − 1  
28.              end if 
29.       next;, ¢	 (random) 
30.    do 
 
 
Figure 4-9:  Algorithm for channel assignment (Distributed and Perfect Information). 
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assignment accordingly for its own benefit. The inherent property of player’s simultaneous 
moves in distributed channel assignment algorithm can lead to channel oscillation problem. 
Since channels are assessed by each player independently, an under loaded channel 
can be assigned by multiple nodes simultaneously. In the next round, by knowing the 
previous wrong moves, every player will remove the current channel and update for  
Algorithm 2 
Input: players /, z	 
Output: N-PNE Channel Assignment 
Bargain;, ¢, @	  
T={t0 , t1 , t2, ……, tn } 
While  ≤ |T| 
1. if %/,k < %z,k) 
2.   Seller=z, Buyer=/ 
3.       Buyer / offers with an amount (p’) to Seller z 
4.           if (Seller accepts the offer) 
5.               Assign channel  d to i−→ o, o	 
6.               Return; 
7.              else (t=t+1) 
8.           end if  
9.       Seller z counter-offers with an amount (q’) to Buyer / 
10.           if (Buyer accepts the offer) 
11.              Assign channel d to i−→ o , o	 
12.               Return; 
13.         else (t=t+1) 
14.         end if 
15.       Buyer / alternate-offers with an amount ' 	 to Seller z 
16.           if (Seller accepts the offer) 
17.               Assign channel  d to i−→ o, o	 
18.               Return; 
19.              else (t=t+1) 
20.           end if  
21.        Seller z alternate counter-offers with an amount£ 	 to Buyer / 
22.           if (Buyer accepts the offer) 
23.              Assign channel d to i−→ o , o	 
24.               Return; 
25.         else (t=t+1) 
26.         end if  
27. else (Seller=/, Buyer=z) GoTo: line-3. 
28. end if 
 
 
Figure 4-10:  Alternating offer Bargaining Algorithm between two nodes. 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
105 
 
 
     
another. This process can repeat multiple times and the system will never converge to a 
stable NE state. To solve this problem and make the simultaneous moves sequential, a 
backeoff window as in [16, 20, 22], {1, 2, …., W}, similar to the one used in IEEE 802.11 [27-
29] medium access backeoff mechanism is defined.  Each player assigns a random value 
with a uniform probability distribution to its backeoff_counter variable from the set W. In 
each round, all players reduce the backoff_counter by one and only players whose backoff 
values reaches zero update their channel assignment, as shown in the Figure 4-9. Selling and 
buying agents evaluate their preference differently during the bargaining game. For seller, 
money is important in terms of virtual currency and so its whole dependency is on the 
variable p. For buyers, both currency p and channel benefit in terms of bandwidth gain worth 
during the evaluation process. A simple algorithm, similar to the one presented in [45], 
showing the interaction of a buying agent / and a selling agent z during alternating offer 
bargaining over time T is presented in the Figure 4-10. Alternating offers bargaining model 
starts with the buying agent / offering an amount p’’ lying within its acceptable region, at 
time t=0, to the selling agent z. If the offer is above selling agent’s valuation line, it is 
accepted; otherwise the offer is rejected as being outside its feasible region [41] as shown in 
the Figure 4-11. Alternatively, selling agent z asks for an amount q’ lying above its valuation 
line at time t1. If this asking amount is below the buying agent valuation line, it is accepted; 
otherwise rejected. This procedure is continued by both buying and selling agents in another 
round each time incrementing time t, till both reach to the point which is mutually 
acceptable. The region containing all these acceptable points is called feasible set [41]. We 
exactly follow the alternating offer bargaining model as presented by [41]. The feasible set 
contains all those points which are common between the valuation lines of both selling and 
buying agents as shown in the bargaining solution space of the Figure 4-11. Since both 
players are highly rational and in non-cooperative environment, each one will try to 
maximize their own profit without caring for the others.  
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 Figure 4-11:  Solution Space (Feasible Region) [41]. 
 
The solution space is within the feasible region where the buyer is bound by the lower 
end of its valuation line i.e, buyer agent have high preference for the lower end of the 
valuation line so it will always try to pay less for the channel exchange. The seller agent, 
however, will always try to look for an offer nearer to its evaluation line’s upper end.  
The Utility of each agent is the share in the surplus generated during this non-
cooperative bargaining process. Let  xi  be the maximum amount of currency the buying 
agent is willing to pay and xi’ be the minimum amount the selling agent will accept, then the 
maximum surplus can be defined as the difference between buyer’s maximum buying price 
and the seller minimum threshold price: 
                              ∆U , U′	 = U − U′          (4.8) 
Due to the strategic interaction of non-cooperative agents, the buyer will always try 
to offer a buying price (xi - α) where (xi - α) ≥ 0 by strictly preferring the points near the 
lower end of its valuation line; on the other hand,  the selling agent will always try to offer 
(xi’ + ∂) preferring the upper end of its valuation line. In such a strategic interaction, the 
bargaining converges based on the alternating offers and counter offers as shown in the 
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algorithm in the Figure 4-10 to find the solution space i.e., the point where xi’ + ∂ ∈  A or xi – 
α ∈ A, where A is the set of points in the feasible region of solution space. To find such a 
point, we follow the method as presented in [45], where each agent accepts or rejects the 
offer from other based on some probability associated with it. As shown in the Table 4-1, 
buyer highly prefers (with zero probability of rejection) an offer from the seller demanding 
no payment and this preference weakens to maximum rejection when the seller’s 
demanding offer is greater than or equal to xi  (the maximum currency the buying agent is 
willing to pay).  Similarly, the seller highly prefers an offer from buyer which is equal to or 
greater than its own valuation of the channel. It is assumed that the seller knows the market 
value (m.v) of the channel and an offer from the buyer equal to or greater than the market 
value is highly preferred by the seller (offer rejected with zero probability).  Buyer and seller 
associate a probability of rejection,  based on their own evaluation, with each offer it receive 
from the opponent agent, as shown in the Table 4-1. Since both buying and selling agents are 
unaware of each other’s reserved valuation, i.e. U  and U′ following the approach in [38], the 
Expected Utilities of both agents are calculated from the Equation (4.8) as follows:   
Buying agent’s utility function when accepts seller’s offer or seller accepts buyer’s offer: 
                            	 = U − 1 − 'U +∂		                                                        (4.9)    
                            	 = U – α	                     (4.10) 
Selling agent’s utility function when it accepts buyers offer or buying agent accepts his offer: 
                          	 = U − 'U – α − U′                                                         (4.11) 
            	 = U + ∂	               (4.12) 
Where 	 and 	 show the Expected utilities of buying and selling agents, 
respectively.  1 − 'U +∂	  and 1 − 'U – α are the respective valuations probabilities 
of buying and selling agents which show the possibility of an offer acceptance from the 
opponent based on the probabilities of rejection in their respective decision tables as shown 
in the Table 4-1. It is clear from the Equations (4.9-4.12), that the utility functions of both 
buying and selling agents are derived based on the offers acceptance possibility. Each agent 
update their respective rejection probabilities to some lower values when its current offer is 
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not accepted by the opponent. In this way, the bargaining game converges to the solution 
space during alternating offers and counter offers.  
Table 4-1:   Buyer and Seller Expected Value Evaluation 
Offer from Seller Probability of rejection Offer from Buyer Probability of rejection 
xi’ + ∂ ≥   xi 1 xi – α  ≤  xi’ 1 
xi’ + ∂1 <  xi 0.8 xi – α1  > xi’ 0.8 
xi’ + ∂2 <  xi 0.6 xi – α2  > xi’ 0.6 
xi’ + ∂3 <  xi 0.3 xi – α3  > xi’ 0.3 
xi’ + ∂4 <  xi 0.1 xi – α4  > xi’ 0.1 
xi’ + ∂n = 0 0 xi – αn  ≥  m.v 0 
 
 
4.8 Sub-optimality and End Users Bargaining 
 
Although, NE and further N-PNE are the efficient and stable outcomes for non-
cooperative channel assignment games in single collision domain as in [16], the practical 
application scenario of WMNs consists of end user source nodes accessing Internet through 
multi-hop routers and Gateways. In this case, the existence of NE or N-PNE is not always an 
efficient solution as the end-to-end achieved data rate of any source destination pair is 
limited by the bottleneck link/links among the relay nodes across the path. Let lX  be the 
end-to-end data rate achieved by a source node (Mesh Access Point), then: R©ª« = MinlZ,lZ,…lZg), where m is the number of links between any two source 
destination pair (Srci, Desti) across the multiple collision domains andlZ,lZ,… , lZg are the 
data rates achievable on the individual links in the end-to-end path. As shown in the example 
of the Figure 4-12, source nodes (Si) and relay nodes/routers are placed in two collision 
domains CD1 and CD2. Let the achievable data rate on a channel c, Rc, is normalized to 1 ∀ c
∈ C, then the effective data rate for S1 : lX = ,/j1.5, 1	 = 1, lX = ,/j1.5, 1	 = 1 . 
Figure 4-13 shows a MRMC assignment as the outcome of a game fulfilling all the conditions 
mentioned in the Lemmas (4.1-4.5) for NE and N-PNE existence, in the first stage of the 
game. Although no player will deviate from the current channel assignment strategy 
individually, it is clear that the outcome is not social optimal in the source nodes prospective 
as node S2 can do better off, if it exchanges its channel c1 in its  end-to-end path  with the 
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channel c4 in the end-to-end path of S1 at CD3. It is clear from the diagram that such an 
exchange does not affect the end- to-end data rate of S1. The game so far studied in this 
chapter is non-cooperative in nature and such an exchange is not possible keeping in view 
the selfish nature of players.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-12:   The effect of bottleneck links on end-to-end throughput 
 
 
Figure 4-13:   An example NE/N-PNE Channel Assignment 
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4.8.1 End Users Bargaining Game Design 
Similar to the bargaining mechanism as discussed in the Section 1.7.3, we introduce a 
Non-Cooperative alternating offer bargaining mechanism has been introduced in this sub-
section. 
We define the source nodes as the set of bargaining agents S={S1,S2,..,S|S|}, where 
|S| shows the cardinality of the set S being the Mesh Access Points (MAPs) of WMNs at 
different sites as shown in the Figure 4-2, Section 4.4. The MAPs are assumed to be in the 
same collision domain or are connected with each other via multi-hop fashion. It is assumed 
that each bargaining agent has some virtual currency, p, which can be used during the 
bargaining process. Being rational, each agent aims to maximize its end-to-end data rate, 
being the buyer or the amount of currency, being the seller. The result of bargaining is 
either in breakdown or success, where breakdown means both agents fail to reach an 
agreement during the specific time. A success in the bargaining process means an exchange 
of channel between the buyer and seller in the end-to-end paths across the WMNs 
backbone in a mutual beneficial way. All agents are assumed to have full knowledge of the 
network topology in the form of a Global Link Topology Matrix (GLTM) i.e., all links, 
associated interferences, and the channels assigned to them in the form of the outcome of 
the game in first stage. The bargaining process is scheduled just after the NE or N-PNE 
outcome of the non-cooperative game and is performed in a pre-determined equally spaced 
time T={t1,t2,t3,…,tn}. Each agent Si reveals its end-to-end data rate, lX , along with the 
channel across the end-to-end sessions, at the process initialization. After computing lX  
againstl®X , an agent signals either 1 or 0 in a broadcast message to show its willingness for 
the bargaining. Those agents who signal 0 are excluded from the agents set. We model the 
non-cooperative bargaining process as an alternating offers game as defined in [38], where 
two agents, Si and Si’, enter into a negotiation as buyer and/or seller and reach to an 
agreement on certain point for a bargaining game. The seller agent Si negotiates an amount 
of currency p’≤ p, with the buyer Si’, and upon agreement, an exchange of channels (ci <- -
>ci’) takes place in the Global Link Topology Matrix. The bargaining process ends when the 
pre-determined time T elapses.   
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Selling and buying agents evaluate their preference differently during the bargaining 
game. For seller, money is important in terms of virtual currency and so its whole 
dependency is on the variable p. For buyers, both currency p and channel benefit in terms of 
end-to-end bandwidth gain worth during the evaluation process. Alternating offers 
bargaining model starts with the buying agent Si offering an amount p
0 lying within its 
acceptable region, at time t=0, to the selling agent Si’. If the offer is above selling agent’s 
valuation line, it is accepted; otherwise the offer is rejected as being outside its feasible 
region. Alternatively, selling agent Si’ asks for an amount q
1 lying above its valuation line at 
time t1. If this asking amount is below the buying agent Si  valuation line, it is accepted; 
otherwise rejected.  
This procedure is continued by both buying and selling agents in another round each 
time incrementing time t, till both reach to the point which is mutually acceptable feasible 
set [38]. Considering both players are highly rational and in non-cooperative environment, 
each one will try to maximize their own profit without caring for the others.  
The solution space is within the feasible region where the buyer is bound by the lower 
end of its valuation line i.e, buyer agent have high preference for the lower end of the 
valuation line so it will always try to pay less for the channel exchange. The seller agent, 
however, will always try to look for an offer nearer to its evaluation line’s upper end.  
As in the previous section, the Utility of each agent is the share in the surplus 
generated during this non-cooperative bargaining process. Let yi be the maximum amount of 
currency the buying agent is willing to pay and yi’ be the minimum amount the selling agent 
will accept, then the maximum surplus can be defined as the difference between buyer’s 
maximum buying price and the seller minimum threshold price: 
                              ∆( , (′	 = ( − (′          (4.13) 
Due to the strategic interaction of non-cooperative agents, the buyer will always try 
to offer a buying price (yi - α) where (yi - α) ≥ 0 by strictly preferring the points near the 
lower end of its valuation line; on the other hand,  the selling agent will always try to offer 
(yi’ + ∂) preferring the upper end of its valuation line. In such a strategic interaction, the 
bargaining converges based on the alternating offers and counter offers as shown in the 
algorithm in the Figure 4-10 to find the solution space i.e., the point where yi’ + ∂ ∈  A or yi – 
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α ∈ A, where A is the set of points in the feasible region of solution space. To find such a 
point, each agent accepts or rejects the offer from other based on some probability 
associated with it. Since both buying and selling agents are unaware of each other’s reserved 
valuation, i.e. ( and (′ following the approach in [38], the Expected Utilities of both agents 
are calculated from the Equation (4.13) as follows:   
Buying agent’s utility function when accepts seller’s offer or seller accepts buyer’s offer: 
                         ′	 = ( − 1 − '( +∂		                                                      (4.14)    
                            ′	 = (– α	                     (4.15) 
Selling agent’s utility function when it accepts buyers offer or buying agent accepts his offer: 
                          ′	 = 1 − '(– α − U′                                                         (4.16) 
            ′	 = ( + ∂	                  (4.17) 
Where ′	 and ′	 show the Expected utilities of buying and selling agents, 
respectively.  1 − '( +∂	  and 1 − '(– α are the respective valuations probabilities 
of buying and selling agents which show the possibility of an offer acceptance from the 
opponent based on the probabilities of rejection in their respective decision tables. It is 
clear from the Equations (4.14-4.17), that the utility functions of both buying and selling 
agents are derived based on the offers acceptance possibility. Each agent update their 
respective rejection probabilities to some lower values when its current offer is not 
accepted by the opponent. In this way, the bargaining game converges to the solution space 
during alternating offers and counter offers.  
   
4.9 Simulation Setup and Performance Evaluation 
This section presents the performance evaluation of the proposed game theoretic 
models and show their numerical results in terms of nodes individual fairness and 
comparative throughputs. The comparison is performed between the proposed game 
theoretic model and a similar approach in the multiple collision domains [22].  In the second 
subsection, we investigate the effect of end-to-end non-cooperative bargaining on the QoS 
provisioning and its effect on end nodes (clients) in terms of their measured and expected 
throughputs. 
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4.9.1 Throughput and Fairness Analysis at Game Convergence 
For simulation purposes, the proposed Game Theoretic models were implemented in 
MATLAB [42]. Throughout simulations, IEEE 802.11a [27] standard is considered with the 
default value of C=8 orthogonal channels. A network topology consisting of 20 nodes was 
considered, each having K=2 radios.  
Figure 4-12 shows the simulation setup for the case of the proposed multiple collision 
domain topology. The nodes are placed in an area of 300 x 300 meters. A distance of 50 units 
between the nodes was considered as their transmission range. Similarly, the interference 
range was considered as twice (100 meters in each direction) of the transmission range. In 
the multiple collision domain topologies, nodes experience the interference from only those 
nodes, which are inside their interference range. Simulation parameters (Number of 
channels, radios, achievable data rate on each channel) were kept for both the approaches 
during simulation. The simulation setup was run 40 times and the average results were 
plotted.   
 
 
                                                            
Figure 4-14:   Simulation scenarios for MRMC models in competitive  WMNs. 
 
300 x 300 meters 
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Figure 4.13 compares the individual payoffs in terms of total throughputs achieved by each 
node of the network using the proposed distributed algorithm against the one proposed in 
one of the relevant work with perfect information [22]. The results were obtained when both 
the systems converge to the NE [22] and NE or N-PNE (proposed). The results show that the 
proposed distributed algorithm significantly outperforms the one presented in [22], in terms 
of achieved throughput per player. The reason is that the proposed model considers the 
nodes as the players of the game instead of the network links. This gives a possibility to the 
nodes to assess the channel conditions more accurately in their respective collision domains. 
Further, the improvement in the throughput is due to the fact that each node opt for 
bargaining where there is a chance to increase its data rate. Whereas,  in the case of NE, 
channel assignment decisions are one sided binding considering the common link as the 
player of the game. It may be the case that the node, which binds the channel assignment 
agreements with a neighbouring node, might not have the same knowledge of the channel 
interferences as experienced by its neighbour. However, in some cases, e.g. nodes 15 and 16, 
both approaches yield the same results. This might be due to the reason that in the proposed 
N-PNE there was no bargaining involved for these nodes.    
 
Figure 4-15:   Nodes Throughput Comparison 
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Figure 4-14 compares the max-min throughput/payoff difference of the proposed 
bargaining game theoretic solution with the scheme as presented in [22]. Max-min 
throughput difference is defined as the “difference between the flow which gets maximum 
throughput and the flow that gets minimum throughput” in a given setup [19]. The 
simulation setup was run for different group of players ranging from 5 to 30 in step 5.It can 
be observed from the results that the proposed game theoretical scheme, when converge to 
N-PNE, outperforms the NE solution of the distributed algorithm presented in [22], both with 
perfect information. The max-min difference is low and almost the same for both the 
systems when the number of nodes are less. However, when the number of nodes in the 
topology increases, an exponential growth in the max-min difference is observed for the NE. 
The proposed scheme also shows a similar behaviour when converge to N-PNE. This is 
because, for small group of nodes, there is high possibility that each node gets the same 
share of channel resource. However, when the number of players increases in the game, the 
max-min payoff difference increases. Since, more players mean more competition and more 
chances of players being subjected to varying degrees of interference and therefore it results 
in more max-min payoff difference.  Comparatively, the proposed scheme outperforms the 
one in [20] when the number of players in the game increases. This is because, in the 
proposed scheme, more nodes mean more chances of non-cooperative bargaining and thus 
it leads to a more fair channel resource share across the backbone of the network.  
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Figure 4-16:  Max-Min Payoff Difference 
 
The fairness of both proposed algorithm was computed and compared with the 
centralized and distributed (perfect information) algorithms of [22] by using Jain Fairness 
Index [43] using the following equation. 
Jain Fairness Index= 
¯ J	d° ±h.¯ J±d°                                                               (4.13) 
Jain Fairness Index varies from 0 being the worst to 1 being the best.  
Using Jain Fairness Index, the results were plotted for 15 independent rounds for a 
network of 20 nodes, each for both the proposed as well as the centralized and distributed 
algorithms of [20]. Each round is the average of 40 simulation runs. As depicted in the Figure 
4-15, the comparative results show that the nodes get fairer share of the channel resources 
in the case of the centralized algorithm at NE [22], as compared to the proposed as well as 
the distributed algorithm at NE presented in [22]. This is because centralized algorithm runs 
under a single authority with a perfect sequential order. On the other hand, distributed 
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algorithm runs on each node independently and the arbitration between the players moves 
is achieved through the backoff window W, which is based on probability and is not always 
perfect. For some round, e.g, round 9, the comparative Fairness Index for is almost equal for 
the centralized algorithm and our proposed scheme. This is because, the distributed 
algorithm sometimes performs as good as the centralized one in certain situations. In the 
presented result, the good performance of distributed algorithm might be due to the reason 
that the information available with the nodes are as complete as for a centralized authority. 
The same behaviour has been reported in the research work while comparing the 
centralized and distributed algorithms in [41]. The weak point of the centralized algorithm is 
that it needs to know the whole network topology and the links interferences details. Other 
disadvantage is the failure of the central authority causes the system a standstill. 
The proposed bargaining solution performed better at N-PNE than that of the 
distributed algorithm at NE in [22], both with perfect information. This is because the 
proposed scheme uses node as the unit of analysis and therefore have more perfect 
information regarding the interference in the vicinity. On the other hand, the distributed 
algorithm, as presented in [22], when converges to NE might not yield the fairer outcome 
because of the imperfection in the information. Since the distributed algorithm presented in 
[22] considers the link as the unit of analysis and hence the player of the game, while the 
proposed N-PNE scheme uses node as the unit of analysis. This gives added advantage to 
the proposed scheme to capture the interference phenomenon more accurately and hence 
resulting in more fair share of the channel resource after bargaining. Results for fairness 
index shows that on average, very good fairness averaging 0.87 is achieved in the case of 
centralized algorithm [22]. While, good to moderate fairness averaging 0.79 and 0.748 is 
achieved by both the proposed scheme and the distributed algorithm as presented in [22]. 
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Figure 4-17:   Fairness index in rounds 
 
Figure 4-16 shows the effect of varying the number of radios, per node, on the throughput 
of individual nodes. It should be noted that only 10 nodes are selected randomly to show 
this effect. As shown in the Figure 4-16, the throughput increases for all nodes with an 
increase in the number of radios.  The main reason of this increase in throughput is the very 
characteristic of the MRMC. More radios in a topology mean more connections and hence 
more chances to occupy the bandwidth keeping in view the number of orthogonal channels. 
 
Figure 4-18:    Varying number of radios per node 
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4.9.2 Throughput and QoS Analysis at Bargaining Equilibrium 
As mentioned in the Section 4.8, the end-to-end date rate of the originating source 
nodes depend on the quality of channels in their session paths. End user’s non-cooperative 
game was implemented with a alternative offer bargaining strategies. This algorithm, 
however, was only implemented on the end users i.e, the MAPs after the establishing of N-
PNE. Figure 4-17 shows the results for a simulation setup when the end users come in a 
strategic bargaining set up. The figure compares the end-to-end throughput of end nodes at 
N-PNE (stage-1) with that of the end-users bargaining at the stage-2 of the game. As shown 
in the Figure 4-17, two end nodes (node 5 and 4) increase their end-to-end throughput by 
coming in a bargaining contact with other nodes from the same set. This should be noted, 
however, that this bargaining does not affect the end-to-end throughput of the seller agent. 
 
Figure 4-19:   Bargaining gain 
To show the significance of end users bargaining, a simulation setup was run for 10 
end node bargaining agents (MAPs). The network density was kept the same as in the 
Section 4.9.1, with each node having two radios. A separate script was written in MATLAB to 
record of the quality of service requirements in terms of confirmed service of 64kbps to be 
run only on those nodes that go for bargaining. 15 client nodes (those user nodes who 
access the WMN’s backbone through Mesh Access Points, as shown in the Figure 4-2, in the 
lower tier) were setup for the experiment.  
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The result in the Figure 4-18 shows Quality of Expectation (QoE) of clients which is 
constant as 64kbps, shown by the constant blue line in the graph. Bargaining outperform N-
PNE in terms of QoS with a significant margin. The reason is that after end-users bargaining, 
the buyer gets extra end-to-end confirmed bandwidth and hence can serve it’s more clients 
with their requirements comparatively.  
  
Figure 4-20:    End-clients QoS provisioning in Bargaining 
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4.10 Summary 
 
This chapter presents a two non-cooperative game theoretical model and studies the 
interaction of WMN’s nodes during channel assignment and re-assignment, in a strategic 
setup. In stage 1, sufficient conditions have been derived for the existence of NE and N-PNE. 
Each node of the WMN has been considered as they unit of analysis during the game, i-e., 
the player of the game. Since NE is not a system optimal solution, therefore, a bargaining 
mechanism has been developed to enable the rational nodes for pre-play communication. 
Based on perfect information, a distributed algorithm was developed for channel assignment 
in competitive environment, where network nodes achieve a good fairness (based on Jain 
Fairness Index=0.79), on average. It is analytically proved that the N-PNE, and hence NE,  is 
not a social optimal solution in the end users’ prospective. In the second stage of the game, 
the end users Mesh Access Points (MAPs) come into contact with each others and bargain 
on the channels in their end-to-end paths. Two MAPs bargain with each other when the 
channel exchange in their end-to-end paths has an advantage for one MAP in terms of 
throughput and for the other in terms of money. This channel exchange has been modelled 
with a non cooperative bargaining game, where both bargaining agents have imperfect 
information during the strategic interaction. The non-cooperative bargaining mechanism 
proved to further improve the end-to-end achievable data rate of source nodes as compared 
to NE for their QoS requirements.  
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5 Chapter 5:   Flow Routing in Competitive Wireless Mesh Networks  
 
Flow Routing in Competitive Wireless Mesh Networks  
 
5.1 Introduction  
As the technology evolved, Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) routers are nowadays 
equipped with multiple interfaces/radios due to their static nature and availability of 
permanent power supplies. This added advantage enables them to achieve parallel 
communication sessions among nodes. Assigning distinct non-overlapping channels to each 
set of communicating radio-link increases network connectivity and throughput. On the 
other hand, the performance of wireless networks is always limited by the inter-flow and 
intra-flow interference [1] phenomena among the concurrent transmission sessions. The 
topology of WMNs is interference constrained due to the limited non-overlapping available 
channels [2],  selfishness of end users to transport their data further degrades individual 
fairness and affects overall network performance due to their protocol deviation in a non-
cooperative environment [3].  
 In this chapter, a non-cooperative game theoretical model is proposed in a MRMC 
WMNs [38], based on the competing end users who route their data flows in an 
interference constrained topology. The end user nodes are selfish and compete for the 
channel resources across the WMNs backbone aiming to maximize their own benefit, 
without taking care for the overall system optimization. End-to-end throughput achieved by 
the flows of an end node and interference experienced across the WMNs backbone are 
considered as the performance parameters in the utility function.  Theoretical foundation 
has been drawn based on the concept from Game Theory and necessary conditions for the 
existence of Nash Equilibrium have been extensively derived.  A distributed algorithm 
running on each end node with imperfect information has been implemented to assess the 
usefulness of the proposed mechanism. 
Chapter 5 
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The analytical results have proven that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists with 
the proposed necessary conditions in a game of imperfect information.  Based on a 
distributed algorithm, the game converges to stable state in finite time and all channels are 
perfectly load-balanced at the end of the game. Simulation results show that standard 
deviation of player’s throughputs is less than that of random channel selection scheme in 
long run. Furthermore, the Price of Anarchy of the system is close to one showing the 
efficiency of the proposed scheme. 
5.2 Related Work 
Application of game theory to networks is not new and a huge amount of literature 
can be found at different layers of the protocol stack.  In [4], for example, congestion 
control has been analyzed using game theory while the studies of [5, 6, 7] have addressed 
network routing games in general. Power control games have been extensively studied in [8, 
9], while Medium Access Control has been analyzed by using game theoretical analysis in 
[10, 11]. A detailed survey targeting the telecommunication problems using game theory 
can be found in [12]. Similarly, game theory applications in wireless networks can be found 
in [13]. 
Due to the practical importance of WMNs, considerable amount of research efforts 
have been made for designing an intelligent MRMC technique. In [14], authors have 
addressed MRMC with a graph theoretic approach while A. Raniwala et al. [15] have 
presented MRMC models based on flows. The work of M. Alicherry et al. [16] addresses 
routing and channel assignment as a combined problem.  Although all of the above research 
work have tackled MRMC from different aspects but they have considered that all the nodes 
cooperate with each other for system wide throughput optimization and selfish behavior 
has been explicitly ignored. 
In one of their pioneering work, Felegyhazi et al. [17] have proven the existence of 
Nash Equilibrium in a non-cooperative multi radio multi channel assignment. They have 
formulated channel assignment as a game where nodes, equipped with multiple radios, 
compete for shared multiple channels in a conflict situation and the result shows that the 
system converges to a stable Nash Equilibrium where each player gets equal and fair share 
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of the channel resources. The work of Chen et al. [18] is an extension of [17] where perfect 
fairness has been provided to all players by improving the max-min fairness. Despite the 
interesting results, their work is limited to single collision domain.  However multi-hop 
networks like WMNs, span multiple collision domains and hence all the above cited work 
cannot be applied to this scenario.  In one of the recent study presented by Gao et al. [19], 
have provided a more practical approach by extending the number of hops in the mesh 
backbone. They have proved that allowing coalition among players can lead to node level 
throughput improvement. They have provided a coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium and 
algorithms to reduce the computational complexity of equilibrium convergence; their 
solution considers cooperation among the nodes inside the coalition and hence cannot be 
applied to a fully non-cooperative WMNs environment. More importantly, it is more 
apposite to consider end users generating flows as players of the game [18] because of their 
competition for the common channel resource across the wireless mesh backhaul. In such a 
situation, channel assignment and flow routing may be tackled simultaneously.  It is worth 
mentioning here that all of the above cited studies have tackled the channel assignment 
problem only in the MRMC wireless networks. 
A class of game theoretical model for routing in transportation networks has been 
presented by Rosenthal. [20]. The author has considered n players in a competitive 
environment, each wants to ship one unit from source to destination while minimizing its 
transportation cost. The existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium has been proven in this 
model. In [21, 22], authors have provided game theoretic solutions based on end users 
flows to control  congestion inside the communication network. Their work is more related 
to the transport layer TCP of the TCP/IP protocol stack. Routing in general wired networks 
has been studied as a non-cooperative game in [23, 24, 25, 26, 27], where conditions for the 
existence of Nash Equilibrium has been derived. Banner et al. [28] have extensively studied 
the non-cooperative routing problem in wireless networks based on split-able and unsplit-
able flows. Although, they have proven the existence of Nash Equilibrium for both classes of 
flow problems; their solution is not applicable to MRMC WMNs. Selfish routing over the 
Internet has been studied in [29] where authors have incorporated link load and link delays 
as their cost metric in the utility function. Although, their work is more relevant, however, 
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they have ignored the interference constraint due to the wired nature of the network model 
considered. In [30], selfish routing and channel assignment in wireless mesh networks is 
formulated as a Strong Transmission Game, where it is assumed that selfish nodes at the 
user premises assign channels, in a strategic setup, to their end to end paths. While they 
have solved channel assignment and routing problem in a non-cooperative environment 
from the end users selfish prospective, the strong assumption of non-interference among 
channels needs a large set of orthogonal frequencies which is limited by the fewer channels 
available in the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n standards [31, 32, 33]. In practice, channel assignment 
is always an interference constrained phenomena due to the availability of fewer channels 
in the orthogonal frequency set of ISM band [34] and large backbone size of WMNs. This 
work looks at the routing in a MRMC WMNs from the selfish end users of the network. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in the area of flow routing in a MRMC 
WMNs with interference constrained topology. 
5.3 System Model and Concepts 
As shown in the Figure 5-1, mesh routers having multi radio capabilities reside in 
multiple collision domains. It is assumed that channels are assigned to the multiple radios of  
 
 
Figure 5-1:   WMNs Components 
 
the mesh routers as in the Chapter 4 and there is always a chance of channel usage conflict 
across the mesh backbone. Each end user uses the WMNs backbone for Internet access 
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having specific flows to transfer from users premises to the Internet via WMNs gateways, as 
shown in the Figure 5-2. 
 
 
Figure 5-2:   WMNs  end users flows 
 
5.3.1 Network Model 
Multi-hope WMNs spanning multiple collision domains is presented with a Graph G 
(V, E) [35], where the sets V and E represent mesh backhaul  routers and their associated 
links accordingly in the graph G. It is assumed that each mesh router uses same transmission 
power on all of its radios, as described in IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n standards [31, 32, 33]. Any 
two mesh routers vi and vj ∈ V can communicate with each other successfully, if the 
Euclidian Distance  between them  is less than the sum of their radii, i. e. for any two routers 
(vi, vj)∈ V: 
 
                                       d,  <  H + H                                                         (5.1) 
 
where d,  is the Euclidian distance between the vertices  and whereas H  and Hare their respective radii. In other words, they are in the transmission range of each 
others; as shown in the Figure 5-3 by smaller circles around the vertices. Let the 
interference range of a node is represented by the outer circle, whose radius is twice as that 
of smaller circle, then two set of nodes, -	, , -	 cannot communicate with each 
other if either [30]:  
 
          d(u1,v2)<2(ru1+rv2) | d(v1,v2)<2(rv1+rv2) |d(u1,u2)<2(ru1+ru2) | d(v1,u2)<2(rv1+ru2)       (5.2) 
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Two nodes can communicate with each other if and only if they are within each other 
transmission ranges and a common channel is assigned to their radios. Two communication 
links between two pairs of communicating nodes can potentially interfere with each other if 
they are using a common channel and lie within the interference ranges of each other as 
according to the Equation (5.2) [30]. 
 
 
Figure 5-3:   Transmission and Interference Range 
 
To capture this interference phenomenon among the links within the WMNs, the 
generic graph G is further represented by a conflict graph G’ as discussed in the Chapter 4. 
Flow routing across WMNs is the same phenomenon as putting weights on the edges of a 
conflict graph while considering their degree of conflict as the decision parameter. 
5.3.2 Game Theoretic Model 
The game theoretic model is formulated by considering competitive end users as the 
players of the game and each player has imperfect information in a MRMC multi-collision 
domain WMNs as follows. The core of the mesh network is divided into a set of multiple 
collision domains D={1 , 2,3,…|d|}, where |d| is the cardinality of the set D. The set of non-
overlapping orthogonal channels, as present in the IEEE 802.11a/b standards [31, 32, 33], 
are represented by C={r1, r2, r3, … . , r|C|}, where |C| represents the cardinality of the set 
C, as shown in the Figure 5-4. We refer to any channel Ci in a specific collision domain j by Cij, where Ci∈C and ∈ D , respectively. The maximum achievable data rate on a channel Ci
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∈C is represented byl. It is assumed that the maximum achievable capacity on all the 
channels is the same, i.e: 
 
                                                      ´µ; = ´µ¢, ∀µ;, µ¢ ∈ ¶                                                              
(5.3) 
 
 
Figure 5-4:  Channel Distribution in Multiple Collision Domains 
 
A limited set of channels are considered as according to the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n standards 
and there is a chance that a channel assigned to a link might potentially interfere with other 
links in its sensing range according to the conditions given in the Equation (5.2). The degree 
of interference of a link having channel Ck∈C being assigned is defined as%¸¹  which shows 
the number of links which have been assigned the same channel Ck in the same collision 
domainz ∈ D.  
Nodes originating flows from the user premises are the players of the game 
represented by a finite non-empty setN = {n, n, n, … .n|º|}, where Nn is any player 
belonging to the set N and |N| shows the cardinality of the set N. The number of flows 
generated by any player Nn∈ N is represented by a non-empty set f={f1,f2,…,f|f|}, where )h ∈ f represents any flow generated by player Nn∈ N. Assuming  packet as the basic unit of 
data transmission at the network level, the sequence of packets originated by an end-node 
Nn∈N is considered as a flow. The strategy of a player Nn∈N is defined as the channels/links 
selection vector for each of its flows across the multiple collision domains. i.e:  
 
                                                          h = ¼),, ),, … . ., )|½|,¾                                               (5.4) 
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where f1, f2,…f|f|∈ f are the flows of player Nn and Ci∈C is the arbitrary channel in the 
channel set across collision domains 1, 2, …., |d∈D.  
Accordingly, the strategy profile of all players is represented by: 
                                   A = , , … . , |º|M                                                   (5.5) 
The nth row of the vector in the Equation (5.5) shows the strategy of player Nn, i.e., An as in 
the Equation (5.4). Each player, Nn ∈ N, takes a rational decision by selecting an end-to-end 
path across the core of the network towards the Gateways of the mesh by maximizing its 
utility function. The utility function of a player  Nn is formulated as follows: 
 
h = s À 1%¹ À)hÁ. l¹Á
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
5.6	 
 
where r  denotes the channel r ∈ r assigned to a link and selected by player nh ∈ N for its 
flow )h ∈ f in jth collision domain and   is the total number of flows on the link assigned 
channel r as defined in the Equation (5.7).  l¹  is the maximum achievable data rate on 
the specific link assigned channel Ci  ∈C in collision domain j∈D, which is equal for all the 
channels as defined in the Equation (5.3). It is assumed that all users generate CBR 
(Constant Bit Rate) flows, therefore the parameter   represents the number of flows on a 
specific link assigned channel r ∈ r in any collision domain, j∈D,  and is is defined as: 
  = ÃrÄrÅl	5.7	 
 
where Ãris the queue length associated with the link to which channel r  has been 
assigned showing the length of the queue in terms of total flows selected this current 
link/channel (r) and ÄrÅl	 is the constant bit rate of any flow. Ideally,   determines the 
number of flows or the load on a specific channel. The strategy of a rational player will be to 
select the end-to-end path having links least loaded by other flows and the channels 
assigned to these links are least interfered. The parameter %¹ in the Equation (5.6), as 
defined before, shows the degree of interference on a specific link to which channel r ∈ r 
has been assigned in the jth collision domain and is determined from the conflict graph. Each 
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end node is configured as a self maximiser in terms of bandwidth and self minimiser in 
terms of interference across the end-to-end path.  In such a selfish and competitive 
environment, game theory provides a realistic solution towards the stability of the system 
by reaching at a point where no flow can move to any other channel/link across the 
complete end-to-end path, unilaterally. This stable point is called Nash Equilibrium (NE) and 
is defined below [36]. 
Definition 5.1: A strategy profile A* is called Nash Equilibrium if for each player  nh ∈ N: 
     
( ) ( )* ,   , ,  An n n n n n nU A A U A A A− −≥ ∀ ∈
                              
(5.8) 
where hh∗ , ®h) is the payoff, according to the utility function defined in the Equation 
(5.6), of player Nn by selecting the strategy h∗  against the strategy of all other players ®h 
as in the Equation (5.5). In other words, in NE, every player is playing its best response to 
everyone else in the game. It is the point where no player can get any benefit by unilaterally 
deviating from its current strategy. 
5.4 Existence of Nash Equilibrium 
 
To check the existence of NE in the proposed model, two types of links are assumed 
in any collision domain. Links with channels having maximum number of flows are 
represented by rgGN and the category of links assigned channels having minimum number 
of flows as rgh. The parameterÆ| , which is the difference of the number of flows on any 
two channelsr, r| ∈ C within a specific collision domainz ∈ D, is defined as: 
 Æ| =Ç"U	 −|Ç/j	 (5.9) 
 
where Ç"U	 and |Ç/j	 are the number of flows on rgGN and rgh respectively. 
Another term  Èr , r|	, which defines the difference in degree of  interference between 
two links assigned channels r , r| ∈ C within a specific collision domain z ∈ D , is defined 
as: 
                                                        Èr, r|	 = % − %¸(5.10) 
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where % and%¸ are the degrees of interference on channel r and r|  respectively as 
defined in the Section 5.3.2. Being rational, the objective of each player is to maximize its 
utility by selecting an end-to-end path with channels assigned to links having minimum 
number of load and minimum interference on it. Following, the necessary conditions for the 
this competitive environment are proved for the existence of the Nash Equilibrium. 
Lemma 5.1: For a MRMC multi-collision domain WMN, for Èr, r|	=0, if  Éh½d¹Ê . l¹ = 1∀)h ∈ Nh  AND ∀)g ≠ )h ∈ Ng, É½Ì¹Ê . l¹ = 0 withÆ| ≥ 1∀r ∈rgGN, r| ∈ rgh for any j ∈ D, then the strategy profile A* is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
If all the flows of any player Nn selects any link assigned channel µ; ∈ µÍ2B in any 
collision domain while flows of all other users Nm put their flows on µÍ ∈ µÍ;6, then player Nn 
will have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his strategy and this can no longer be a 
Nash Equilibrium. As shown in the Figure 5-5, player N1 selects a link assigned Channel C1 for 
all its four flows in collision domain j. It can increase its utility if one of the flows is 
transferred to other links assigned channels (C2, C3 or C4) in the same collision domain. 
C1 C3C2 C4
f1
f1
f1
f1
f2
f2
f3
f2
f3
f3
f2
f2
f3
(C1,C2)=0
 
Figure 5-5:   Example of homogenous flows on one channel 
 
Proof: Let Fh  be the gain of player Nn deviating from its current strategy which has 
defined all its flows n.fn on one of channel r ∈ rgGN. Let   be the total flows on r ∈ rgGNand |  be the total flows on r| ∈ rgh.   
Then: 
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Fh =h −h , where h  is the new payoff of player Nn after deviating from its 
current strategy which was giving it a utility h . 
We represent Î ∈Nn as one of the flow, which player Nn redirect to another channel r| ∈ rgh in any collision domain j∈D and calculate the benefit of change along the path as 
follows. 
Fh = s Ï 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹Ð
|®|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
+ 1%¹ Àj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + À 1%¸¹ À Î)h| + ÎÁ . l¸¹Á 
           
− À 1%¹ Àj)h Á . l¹Á + s 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 5.11	
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°¹Ñ
 
By considering only j∈D collision domain:  
= 1%¹ Àj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + À 1%¸¹ À Î)h| + ÎÁ . l¸¹Á − À 1%¹ Àj)h Á . l¹Á 
Since l¹ = l¸¹  ,| + Î =   and %¹ = %¸¹ as per assumption of Èr, r|	 = 0 
Therefore:  
= 1%¹ ÏÀj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + ÀÎ)h Á . l¹ − Àj)h Á . l¹Ð 
After simplification: 
      
Fh = Ò¹ ÓÉ Ô½dh®Ô	¹¹®Ô	Ê . l¹Õ (5.12)
 Fh >  0 in the Equation (5.12) as j − Î and  − Î are positive. Hence, the strategy 
profile A* cannot be a Nash Equilibrium. 
Lemma 5.2: In a MRMC multiple-collision domain WMN, forÈr , r|	 = 0, in any 
collision domain z ∈D along the end-to-end path of flows, if Æ| > 1for anyr ∈ rgGN , r| ∈rgh , then the strategy profile A* is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
Let Æ| > 1 in any collision domain z ∈D along the end-to-end path of flows then it 
essentially means that there exists a channel  r| ∈ rgh in z ∈D for which  I a¹	Ö×	−a¸¹	Ö×	S > 1 , and hence at least one of the flow fn ∈ Nn on r ∈ rgGN has incentive to 
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change for its benefit. As shown in the Figure 5-6, N2 can unilaterally switch one of its flows 
to C1, C2 or C4. 
Proof:  Let a user Nn changes its flow, fn, from r ∈ rgGN  to r| ∈ rgh in j∈D 
collision domain along the end-to-end path. The gain of change is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Figure 5-6:   Flow distribution on channels where  >1 
 
Fh = s Ï 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹Ð
|®|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
+ 1%¸¹ Ø )hÃr|	ÄrÅl	Ù . l¸¹ −
1%¹ Ø )hÃr|	ÄrÅl	Ù . l¹ 
+ s 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 5.13	
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°¹Ñ
 
 
By considering the jth collision domain only, the first and last summation terms 
become irrelevant and hence by simplification, we get: 
= 1%¹ Ø )hÉ Ãroz	ÄrÅl	 + 1ÊÙ . l¸¹ −
1%¹ Ø )hÃr/z	ÄrÅl	Ù . l¹ 
 
Since %¹ = %¸¹  as Èr, r|	 = 0, therefore: 
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= 1%¹ ÚØ )hÉ Ãr|	ÄrÅl	 + 1ÊÙ . l¸¹ − Ø
)hÃr|	ÄrÅl	 + ÆÙ . l¸¹Û 
Fh = 1%¹ Ï Æ. ÄrÅl	 − ÄrÅl	Är| + ÄrÅl	. Är| + Æ. ÄrÅl	Ð . )hl¸¹ 5.14	 
Fh>0 in the Equation (5.14), as Æ > 1. Since player Nn has an incentive to change 
from its current strategy to the new one, and hence the current strategy profile A* cannot be 
a Nash Equilibrium. 
Lemma 5.3: In a MRMC Multiple-Collision domain mesh network, for Èr, r|	 = 0, 
for any player Nn if ∀)hr − ∀)hr| > 2 and Æ| ≥1 in any collision domain  z ∈D,  ∀r ∈ rgGN, ∀r| ∈ rgh, then the strategy profile A* is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
As shown in the Figure 5-7, difference of flows of N2 on C2 and C3>2, although it does 
not deviate from the lemma 5.2, player N2 has incentive to switch one of its flow from C2 to 
C3.  
 
Figure 5-7:   Homogenous flows difference on two channels>2 
 
Proof:  Let Î, Î ∈ Nn are the number of flows of player Nn on rgGN and rgh 
channels, respectively. The parameter ∆Î, = Î1 −Î2 is defined as the flow difference of 
any player on two rgGN, rgh channels. Let Nn redirect one of its flows from rgGN to rgh in 
any collision domain z ∈D along the end-to-end path. Then the gain of change is given by: 
Fh = s Ï 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹Ð
|®|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
+ 1%¹ ÀÎ − 1	)h − 1 Á . l¹ + 1%¸¹ ÀÎ − 1	)h| + 1 Á . l¸¹ 
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− 1%¹ ÀÎ)h Á . l¹ − 1%¸¹ ÀÎ)h| Á . l¸¹ + s 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 5.15	
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°¹Ñ
 
We suppose that the change of end-to-end path for Nn accurse in the j
th collision domain only 
and hence by eliminating the first and last summation terms. Since  = | − Æ before flow 
switch from r to r| and | + 1 =   after flow switch by assumingÆ = 1, by substituting 
appropriate terms: 
Fh = 1%¹ ÀÎ − 1	)h − 1 Á . l¹ − 1%¹ À Î)h − 1Á . l¹ + 1%¹ ÀÎ + 1	)h Á . l¹ 
− 1%¹ À Î)h − ÆÁ . l¹ 
Since %¹ = %¸¹  as Èr, r|	 = 0 and by further simplification: 
 Fh = 1%¹ ÀÎ − Î + 1	)h − 1	 Á . l¹5.16	 
 
The term Î − Î + 1	 and  − 1 > 0 as ∆Î, > 2 ∴ αh > 0 and A* cannot be a Nash Equilibrium under such condition. 
Lemma 5.4:  In a MRMC Multiple-Collision domain mesh network, for Èr, r|	 ≥ 1, 
for any player Nn if ∀)hr − ∀)hr| = 1 and Æ| ≥ 1n any collision domain  z ∈D,  ∀r ∈ rgGN, ∀r| ∈ rgh, then the strategy profile A*  is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
As shown in the Figure 5-8, difference of flows of N2 on C2 and C3>2, although it does 
not deviate from lemma2, player N2 has incentive to switch one of its flow from C2 to C3. 
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Figure 5-8:   An interference difference 
 
Proof: The proof of this lemma is straightforward. Let fn∈ f be the only flow of player 
Nn ∈ N on Cmax. It essentially means that there are no flows defined by player Nn on channel 
Cmin in any collision domain z ∈D along the end-to -nd path. The gain of change is given by: 
 
Fh = s Ï 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹Ð
|®|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
+ 1%¸¹ À )h| + 1Á . l¸¹ − 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 
+ s 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 5.17	
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°¹Ñ

    
It is supposed that the change of end-to-end path for Nn accurse in the j
th
 collision domain 
only and hence by eliminating the first and last summation terms. 
= 1%¸¹ À )h| + 1Á . l¸¹ − 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ 
Since | + 1 ≤   and l¹ = l¸¹ , by substituting the appropriate terms and 
further simplification: 
 = 1%¸¹ À)hÁ . l¹ − 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹ = À%¹ − %¸¹%¹. %¸¹  Á À)hÁ . l¹ 
Fh = ÀÈr , r|	%¹. %¸¹ Á À)hÁ . l¹ 5.18	 
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Here we only consider the case
 
| + 1 =   for simplicity. This can be proved 
further for | + 1 <  , which will have the same result. 
Since the difference of interference between the two channels r, r| ∈ C is more 
than or equal to one, therefore the term Èr, r|	 ≥ 1 in the Equation (5.18) earns the 
player a gain in the utility as  Fh > 0 and A* cannot be a Nash Equilibrium under such a 
condition. 
Proof of NE existence: In a MRMC Multiple-Collision domain mesh network, if Æ| ≤ 1<=1 ∀z ∈D and lemma 5.1 and 5.3 do not hold then the strategy profile A* is a Nash 
Equilibrium. From the Equation (5.14) of lemma 5.2, let Æ| = 1 and we assume that lemma 
5.1 and 5.3 do not hold, then: 
 
Fh = 1%¹ Ï ÄrÅl	 − ÄrÅl	Är| + ÄrÅl	. Är| + Æ. ÄrÅl	Ð . )hl¸¹ = 05.19	 
Also forÆ| = 0: 
Fh = 1%¹ Ï −ÄrÅl	Är| + ÄrÅl	. Är| + Æ. ÄrÅl	Ð . )hl¸¹ < 05.20	 
Also from the Equation (5.18) of lemma 5.4, let Èr, r|	 ≥ 1: 
Fh = À−Èr, r|	%¹ . %¸¹  Á À)hÁ . l¹ < 05.21	 
Both the negative sign and zero results in the Equations (5.19, 5.20 and 5.21) show 
that no player has any incentive to deviate from its current strategy and hence the current 
strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium. 
Theorem 1: A strategy profile A* is Nash Equilibrium, if: 
1) ∀)h ∈ Nh , Éh½dÝ;¢ Ê lrgGN < 1, ∃ É½ÌÝ;¢ÊlÌPß > 0)Æ ≥ 1, 
          ∀z, ∀rgGN , rgh,ÈrgGN, rgh	 = 0 2	 ∀rgGN, rgh, 1 ≥ Æ ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ à, ÈrgGN, rgh	 = 0 3	 ∆θÌPß,Ìd ≤ 2forℓ ≥ 1, ∀)h ∈ nh , ∀nh  ∈ N, ∀z ∈ à,ÈrgGN, rgh	 = 04	 È(rgGN, rgh)<1,∀rgGN, rgh,/)Æ ≥ 1,ifÎ)h–Î)h ≥ 1forÎonrgGN,Î2onrghforanyplayerNn∈N.
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5.5 Convergence to Nash Equilibrium 
In the previous section, It was proved that a pure strategy NE exists in a selfish routing 
flow game in MRMC WMNs with interference constraint topology. In this section, we present 
a distributed algorithm running on each end node with imperfect information. As shown in 
the Figure 4-9, each player has information about each channel usage inside all collision 
domains but no player knows the strategy of it opponent players, thus a game of imperfect 
information. Using Algorithm 5.1, each player Nn∈N selects channels for all its flows fn ∈f in 
each collision domain across the end to end path in a distributed manner.  Lines 5, 9, 13 and 
17 of the algorithm are sufficient conditions for convergence to the NE. Furthermore, each 
node keeps a record of its channel usage, Cij_fnCount , in each collision domain for a necessary 
check at lines 5, 9 and 13. Players in this game move simultaneously without having 
information about the past histories. With this imperfect information, the game converges to 
stable NE in a non-cooperative environment.  
Algorithm 5.1 
        
1.             for each Nn ∈N (independently) 
2.                 for each fn ∈f (do) 
3.                    for j=1 to |d| 
4.                       for i=1 to C|c| 
5.             if Q(Cij) ≤ Q(Cmin(j)) & %¹ ≤ %Ìd¹	 
6.                              Select channel Ci for flow fn 
7.                              Cij_fnCount=Cij_fnCount+1 
8.                              exit; 
9.                           elseif(Cij_fnCount - C(rem)_fnCount) ≤  2 
                                           & ( ) 1
n
C ij
ij
n f
R
F
≠ & Cij-C(rem)j ≤ 1 
10.                               Select channel Ci for flow fn  
11.                               Cij_fnCount= Cij_fnCount +1 
12.                               exit; 
13.                           elseif(Q(Crem(j))-Q(Cij) ≥ 1 & È(Crem(j) , Cij) ≥ 1 
14.                           Select channel Ci for flow fn    
15.                           Cij_fnCount= Cij_fnCount +1 
16.                           exit; 
17.                        else 
18.                         next i 
19.                       end if 
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20.                   next j 
21.                while(fn) 
            next Nn 
 
 
 
Figure 5-9:   Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium convergence using imperfect information 
 
5.6 Performance Evaluation  
In this section, we evaluate our proposed algorithm and show its results in terms of 
individual fairness and Price of Anarchy (PoA) and its associated Cumulative Distribution 
Function (CDF). In the second subsection, we investigate and compare the throughput 
difference of the proposed scheme with a random channel selection scheme by varying the 
number of players. All the experiments were conducted in MATLAB version R2007a [37] to 
test the performance and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. 
5.6.1 Price of Anarchy, Cumulative Distribution Function and Individual Fairness  
In this subsection, the individual fairness of end users nodes and PoA and its 
associated normal CDF have been investigated. 
5.6.1.1 Price of Anarchy 
 
In this subsection, the individual fairness of end users nodes and PoA and its 
associated normal CDF have been investigated. The PoA is formulated as in [30] and is 
defined as the ratio of throughput achieved by individual players in case of worst NE to the 
throughput achieved in the best NE i.e,  
               
| |
( )
, 1, 2...,
( )
n worst
N
n best
NE
PoA n N
NE
Γ
= =
Γ         
(5.22) 
where nΓ is the end-to-end throughput of player nh ∈ N.  
In the simulation, 40 nodes are deployed randomly in a rectangular area of 600X600 
units. The transmission range is considered 50 units and interference range is taken as twice 
of the transmission range. On the left hand side of the topology, 12 nodes were configured as 
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the players of the game who want to route their flows across the MRMC WMNs backbone. At 
the right hand side of the topology, 3 nodes were configured as the Gateways, being the 
destinations for the source nodes. Each node generates 10 CBR flows of 64Kbps during each 
run of the game.  Simulation was carried out by considering IEEE 802.11a [31], where 8 non-
overlapping channels were selected for parameter set C across 5 collision domains. Each 
node is configured with two radios, each for transmission and reception. All players move 
simultaneously having no information of one another past histories. With this imperfect 
information, we investigate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of PoA.  As 
shown in the Figure 5-10, the PoA is in the range of 0.71 and 1 for all the players. This shows 
a very strong indication that the individual throughput is not degraded even if the system 
converges to a worst NE. 
 
  
Figure 5-10:   Price of Anarchy with  D=5,C=8, N=12, f=10 and CBR=64Kbps 
 
 
 
5.6.1.2 Statistical Analysis and Cumulative Distribution Function of PoA 
 
Definition 5.2: For a real number x, the Cumulative Distribution Function for a random 
variable X is given by: 
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ràU	 = é)U	kUN®ê 5.23	 
The Cumulative Distribution Function defines the probability of a random variable X from −∞ till the real value variable U. It shows the area under the curve from a lower limit 
( ℎi/ /0"##( − ∞	 till an upper limit (U	. 
The mean of PoA as presented in the Figure 5-10 is 0.8392, while the Standard Deviation is 
0.0848. This shows the PoA outcome for each individual players is not far from the average 
and hence low variance. 
The CDF over the PoA dataset was computed to show the expected occurrences of the 
individual random values in the data set limits. As shown in the Figure 5-11, the CDF 
increases from the lower values to the upper values of PoA. This shows that in the proposed 
system, the probability of high value PoA occurrence is highly likely as compared to the 
small values of PoA. In other words, the PoA always tend to 1 in the proposed system.  
 
Figure 5-11:   CDF for PoA 
 
5.6.2 Individual Fairness  
 
Fairness among players was measured at the end of the game. As shown in the Figure 
5-12, individual players achieve end-to-end data rate with a mean 121.6 Mbps and a 
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standard deviation of 2.19Mbps, with imperfect information, at the end of the game. This 
shows that using the proposed algorithm, players achieve fair end-to-end data rate across 
multiple collision domains when game converges to NE. The reason is that when the game 
ends up with NE, each player is playing its best response of its strategies to every other 
player of the game and hence has no incentive to deviate individually from its current 
strategy. A set of simulations were carried out for the scenarios with the same set of 
parameters, where nodes deviate from the proposed algorithm and select the channels/links 
of the end-to-end paths randomly.  
 
Figure 5-12:   Total End to End rate of individual players with imperfect information with 
D=5,C=8, N=12, f=10 and CBR=64Kbps 
  
As shown in the Figure 5-13, although some nodes perform better comparatively to 
our scheme by achieving high end-to-end throughputs; the mean of the system was 
measured was 127.3 Mbps and the standard deviation is 3.74Mbps among the achieved 
throughputs for the random channel selection scheme. This shows that some of the selfish 
nodes get access to less interfered channels while leaving the crowded channels for others. 
This selfish behaviour leads to individual unfairness of the system as compared to the 
proposed scheme.  
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Figure 5-13:   Total End to End rate of individual players with imperfect information with 
D=5,C=8, N=12, f=10 and CBR=64Kbps 
 
5.6.3 Standard Deviation and Max-Min throughput Difference 
In second scenario, 100 nodes are deployed in a rectangular area of 1000X1000 units. 
The transmission range is taken 25 units and the interference range as twice of the 
transmission range. Variance among players throughputs was measured by varying the set of 
players, N, from 5 to 40 in 5 steps. The  proposed scheme was compared with random 
channel/link selection where flows select channels across multiple collision domains 
arbitrarily. Figure 5-14 compares max-min throughput difference by of the proposed selfish 
routing game theoretical model with random channel selection scheme. Max-min 
throughput difference is the difference between the flow which gets maximum throughput 
and flow that gets minimum throughput, as in Chen  et al.  [18]. It can be observed that the 
game theoretical scheme outperforms random channel selection for each set of players by 
having minimum max-min throughput difference.  The max-min difference is higher for both 
systems at beginning but as the number of players increases, max-min throughput difference 
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of the proposed scheme either decreases or remains constant when the game ends up with 
NE. This shows the stability of the flow routing scheme at NE. The max-min throughput 
difference for random selection does not remain stable with varying number of players, as 
shown in the Figure 5-14. This is because of the reason that the selfish end nodes, being 
rational, select less crowded channels across multiple collision domains and thus increase 
their end-to-end throughputs while leaving more crowded channels for other nodes. 
 
Figure 5-14:   Max-Min Throughput Difference by varying number of players with imperfect 
information. D=5,C=8,N=5:5:40, f=10,CBR=64Kbps 
 
Figure 5-15 shows the standard deviation comparison of player’s throughputs in the 
proposed scheme against that of random selection. The values for collision domains (D), 
Channels (C), number of flows per node and CBR were kept same in both schemes while 
number of players/nodes was varied from 5 to 40 in step 5. Results in Fig. 5-15 suggest that 
the proposed game theoretic scheme always performed better than random selection 
irrespective of the number of players. When number of nodes is lower, some selfish players 
have always incentive to select less crowded channels across multiple collision domains and 
hence variance among players throughputs is high leading to high standard deviation. With 
the increase in the number of players, the proposed system shows a constant and 
predictable decrease in standard deviation while random selection scheme is unpredictable. 
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This means that the proposed scheme achieves good fairness in long run when the system 
converges to NE.
 
 
 
Figure 5-15:   Standard Deviation among players throughput with D=5,C=8,N=5:5:40, 
f=10,CBR=64Kbps
 
 
5.7 Summary 
In this Chapter, a flow routing game theoretical model is developed in a non-
cooperative multiple-collision domain Multi-Radio Multi-Channel Wireless Mesh Networks. 
An interference constrained topology is considered due to the limited available orthogonal 
channels. The analytical results have proven that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists with 
the proposed necessary conditions in a game of imperfect information.  Based on a 
distributed algorithm, the game converges to stable state in finite time and all channels are 
perfectly load-balanced at the end. Simulation results show that standard deviation of 
player’s throughputs is less than that of random channel selection scheme in long run. 
Furthermore, the Price of Anarchy of the system is close to one showing the efficiency of the 
proposed scheme. 
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6 Chapter 6:   Conclusion and Future work 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This chapter presents the main conclusion and summarises the major contributions 
of this thesis.  The future work section highlights those research areas where the findings of 
this research can further be investigated for new research directions.  
6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the issues of channel assignment and routing in the 
emerging IEEE 802.11 based Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [1, 2, 3] by considering both 
the cooperative and competitive behaviour of the network nodes. The main reason for 
solving the channel assignment and routing jointly in the cooperative setup was the 
interdependencies of these two problems on each others. The provision of Quality of Service 
(QoS) assurance on an end-to-end path is not only determined by the routing protocols but 
the quality of the individual links matters as well. A minimum interference channel 
assignment scheme was proposed for assigning the multiple non-overlapping channels, as 
present in the IEEE 802.11a [4] and IEEE 802.11b/g standards [5], to the multiple radios of 
the mesh backbone routers. The channel assignment scheme is distributed and dynamic. 
This means that each node of the network runs a copy of the proposed channel assignment 
algorithm and the channel re-assignment occurs based on some specific events related to 
routing load on the links, nodes mobility and failures.  Unlike some of the previous 
approaches [6, 7], the proposed channel assignment scheme is flexible and can be initiated 
by any node or set of nodes inside the WMNs backbone. This approach, therefore, gives 
freedom to the network planners for initiating the process based on the network load in a 
specific region of the WMNs backbone. It is capable to record and maintain accurately the 
bi-directional link quality by measuring the delay incurred on specific associated links 
between any two nodes. The delay associated with any bi-directional link is measured 
frequently in terms of the queue length, backoff time, packet losses and the transmission 
time of the link. This delay metric is further utilized by the routing protocol for determining 
Chapter 6 
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the end-to-end path across the WMNs backbone on the source-destination basis. The 
channel assignment scheme quickly responds to the routing load, mobility and nodes 
failures by re-assigning the channels when and where required. 
The routing problem is solved jointly with the above mentioned channel assignment 
to provide QoS support to the end users in term of end-to-end path delays. The scheme is 
based on the Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [8] routing protocol and paths are 
established whenever it is necessary. The inherited problem of network wide flooding 
associated with on demand routing protocols was controlled with selective forwarding on 
those specific interfaces, which qualify the delay guarantees demanded by the end users 
applications. The routing protocol combined with the channel assignment module ensures 
an end-to-end path according to the end users delay requirements. This scheme enhances 
the packet delivery ratio and minimizes the overall network latency by eliminating a major 
part of the flood of unnecessary route request packets and ensuring the quality end-to-end 
paths based on the delay metric proposed. This further provides a mechanism of load 
balancing across the WMNs backbone by avoiding the already congested links to establish 
routes for the delay sensitive applications between end users and the Gateway destinations. 
The performance of the of the proposed Quality of service based Multi-Radio AODV (QMR-
AODV) was evaluated against AODV-MR, where a performance gain was observed in terms 
of packet delivery, latency and routing overhead. 
The thesis has presented a two stage non-cooperative game theoretic model 
developed for assigning multiple non-overlapping channels to the multiple radios of the 
WMNs backbone routers. The WMNs routers are assumed to be in multiple collision 
domains and the interference phenomena is captured by using the concepts from graph 
theory [9]. Conflict graphs [9] were used to partition the WMNs backbone into multiple 
collision domains. In the non-cooperative environment, nodes behave selfishly to increase 
their payoffs during the channel assignment process according to their utility function by 
increasing their data rates on each individual channel. Since individual selfish nodes are 
considered as the unit of analysis during the game design, therefore, a non-cooperative 
bargaining scheme has been proposed for mutual agreements between the nodes who want 
to share a channel over a potential link. A distributed algorithm was implemented based on 
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the rules of non-cooperative game derived for the competitive channel assignment scheme. 
The game was solved by providing the necessary condition for the existence of NE and N-
PNE. The Nash Equilibrium and N-PNE were analytically proved to be sub-optimal in the 
end-users prospective. Therefore, the proposed model was further enhanced by considering 
the end users Mesh Access Points (MAPs) non-cooperative bargaining scheme. In the 
second stage of the game, end users MAPs come into contact with each other and bargain 
on the channels in their end to end paths. Two MAPs bargain with each other when the 
channel exchange in their end-to-end paths has an advantage for one in terms of 
throughput and for other in terms of money. Keeping the non-cooperative nature of the 
model, the channel exchanges at the end-to-end paths was modelled with a non 
cooperative bargaining game, where information is considered as imperfect. A distributed 
algorithm was developed to find out the solution space inside the feasible region [10] and 
hence the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in this game. Evaluation of the proposed scheme 
shows that through non-cooperative bargaining, end nodes achieve an increase in the end-
to-end throughputs. This, however, does not affect other node’s end-to- end throughputs.  
The thesis has further presented a flow based routing scheme in non-cooperative 
multiple radio multiple channels WMNs. End users nodes of the network are selfish and 
non-cooperative aiming to route their flows across the end to end path of the WMNs 
backbone with high utility. The non-cooperative game theoretic model provides a solution 
to balance the traffic on individual links. The selfish routing over multi radio multiple 
channels was modelled using the non-cooperative games. The necessary conditions for the 
existence of Nash Equilibrium were derived. A distributed algorithm running on each node 
was implemented which aims to establish links across the end to end path from source to 
destination. The fairness issues were addressed in the model.  
6.2 Future work 
There are several recommendations which can be used for future research directions 
in the area of channel assignment and routing in both cooperative as well as competitive 
WMNs.  
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6.2.1 Channel Assignment and QoS based Routing in Cooperative Wireless Mesh 
Network  
Channel assignment and routing play a vital role in the performance of WMNs as the 
connectivity, throughput, delays and other QoS provision are directly related with both 
these interdependent issues. In this thesis, the channel assignment scheme was developed 
by considering the protocol model [11], where the interference phenomenon between any 
two links is captured based on the packet exchange. However, the protocol model is not an 
accurate measure of the wireless networks interference. For further research, the protocol 
can be developed by considering the physical model [11] to accurately capture the 
interference between the nodes. This method, however, needs existence of expensive and 
sophisticated equipment in the network [12, 13] for measuring the accurate signal strength 
and interference.  In our proposed QoS routing model, if the RREQ packet does not reach 
the intended destination, the RREP is not initiated obviously. For this, the route requesting 
node initiates a fresh RREQ with an incremented ID as the default procedure of AODV. This 
procedure, however, has been modified and in the next route request the source node 
reduces the requested QoS bound i-e delay demand from the end to end path in this case. 
The proposed solution solves the problem to the point of getting the RREQ through the 
backbone with the new reduced QoS. However, for realistic scenarios, a cross layer design 
[14] for the explicit information exchange between the routing and application layers is 
highly desirable. This information exchange can inform the application layer modules to 
send the data with different delay requirements by using some upper layers delay reducing 
techniques.  
The QoS based scheme can also be further investigated for multipath routing across 
the WMNs backbone. In multipath routing [15,16], a source requests for multiple paths and 
the destination returns two or more paths which can be used by the source node either as 
backup paths or using them all simultaneously by splitting data of the same session. Looking 
at the multi-path problem at the proposed QMR-AODV can enhance the service and 
network functionality with total guarantees. In this thesis, the proposed QMR-AODV’s 
decision on end to end path is based on delay of the links. For more QoS metrics, several 
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alternatives such as end to end bandwidth and the channel diversity across the routing path 
can be investigated in the future studies. 
6.2.2 Channel Assignment in Competitive Wireless Mesh Networks 
The competitive channel assignment scheme proposed in chapter-4 assumes perfect 
information in a non-cooperative game. This assumption means that each node knows 
exactly about the number of links interfering with its own link in the same collision domain. 
The same problem, however, can be further investigated by considering imperfect 
information in a non-cooperative game. During the channel assignment, the bargaining was 
achieved through the pre-play negotiation. However, the current model does not consider 
the cheat proof mechanism and hence this can be explored in future. Further, the non-
cooperative bargaining game was played among the end-user MAPs for one time and  in a 
static environment by considering all the MAPs in the same collision domains. The realistic 
scenarios can be different where the MAPs belonging to different organizations are spread 
over multiple collision domains. In this case, modelling the bargaining game to spread the 
bargaining request across multiple collision domains of the users premises can be one of the 
possible extension to the present solution. The problem can also be looked at by assuming 
the cooperative bargaining as in [17, 18]. Further, the existing model assumes the full 
knowledge of all the channels assigned to all the links in the network topology. This 
increases the complexity in terms of memory and processing. How to design such a 
bargaining game with imperfect information can be an interesting future study. The game 
theoretic model developed achieves a good fairness among the competing nodes; however, 
it is not perfect. The reason is that network nodes are spread across multiple collision 
domains and the achieved throughput by each node depends on the quality of the channel. 
It is possible that a node in some collision domain have access to quality channels due to the 
less number of neighbouring nodes, while another node in the same network can face a 
dense neighbourhood and thus the effective throughput varies among the nodes in 
different collision domains of the same WMNs. A potential research study will be to 
approach this problem by solving the game of channel assignment with non-cooperative 
flow routing as a combined problem.  
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6.2.3 Flow Routing in Competitive Wireless Mesh Networks 
 
A flow routing game theoretical model is developed over an interference constrained 
WMNs topology in a non-cooperative setup. The solution for the game has been derived 
from the non-cooperative game theory, where each node is self maximizer by routing its flow 
through the network in a strategic setup. The model assumes that the competing nodes have 
imperfect information regarding the decision of each others. However, the information of 
individual links/channel load is known to each node and the utility is derived based on this 
information. The routing game as discussed in chapter-5 can be further extended by solving it 
jointly with the channel assignment in the same interference constrained network topology. 
This can be achieved by first establishing the shortest end to end path in a strategic setup as 
in [19] and then assigning the non-overlapping channels while considering the interference 
phenomenon among the channels in the path, using concepts from game theory.  
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Appendix-1: Proof of Lemma 5.1, Equation (5.11). 
 
Lemma 5.1: For a MRMC multi-collision domain WMN, for Èr , r|	=0, if  Éh½d¹Ê . l¹ = 1∀)h ∈ Nh  AND ∀)g ≠ )h ∈ Ng, É½Ì¹Ê . l¹ = 0 withÆ| ≥ 1∀r ∈rgGN, r| ∈ rgh for any j ∈ D, then the strategy profile A* is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Let Fh  be the gain of player Nn deviating from its current strategy which has 
defined all its flows n.fn on one of channel r ∈ rgGN. Let   be the total flows on r ∈ rgGNand |  be the total flows on r| ∈ rgh.   
Then: Fh =h −h ,  where h  is the new payoff of player Nn after deviating from its 
current strategy which was giving it a utility h . 
We represent Î ∈Nn as one of the flow, which player Nn redirect to another channel r| ∈ rgh in any collision domain j∈D and calculate the benefit of change along the path as 
follows. 
Fh = s Ï 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹Ð
|®|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°
+ 1%¹ Àj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + À 1%¸¹ À Î)h| + ÎÁ . l¸¹Á 
           
− À 1%¹ Àj)h Á . l¹Á + s 1%¹ À)hÁ . l¹'':1.1
|Y|
½d∈Â,∈,¹°¹Ñ
 
By considering only j∈D collision domain, the first and last summation terms become 
irrelevant:  
= 1%¹ Àj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + À 1%¸¹ À Î)h| + ÎÁ . l¸¹Á − À 1%¹ Àj)h Á . l¹Á 
Since l¹ = l¸¹  as in the Equation (5.3) Chapter 5,| + Î =   as per condition in 
the Lemma 5.1  and %¹ = %¸¹ as per assumption of Èr, r|	 = 0 in the Lemma 
5.1: 
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Therefore substituting the l¸¹  with l¹  , substituting | + Î with   and 
substituting %¸¹  with %¹ :  
 
= 1%¹ Àj − Î	)h − Î Á . l¹ + À 1%¹ ÀÎ)h Á . l¹Á − À 1%¹ Àj)h Á . l¹Á 
Taking out the common terms . l¹  and  Ò¹: 
= 1%¹ Ïj − Î	)h − Î + Î)h − j)h Ð . l¹ 
= 1%¹ Ïj)h.  − Î)h .  + Î)h .  − Î
)h .  − j)h .  + Îj)h .  − Î	 Ð . l¹ 
After simplification by crossing the opposite equal terms with each other: 
= 1%¹ Ï−Î
)h .  + Îj)h .  − Î	 Ð . l¹ 
After further simplification: 
      
 Fh = Ò¹ ÓÉ Ô½dh®Ô	¹¹®ÔÊ . l¹Õ '': 1.2 
 Fh > 0 in the Equation (App: 1.2) as j − Î and  − Î are positive. Hence, the 
strategy profile A* cannot be a Nash Equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
